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In the Anfal trial, the Iraqi High Tribunal (IHT or the Tribunal) in
Baghdad convicted former Iraqi high officials of genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. Unlike its predecessor-the Dujail
trial'-the Anfal trial included the presentation of a high volume of
documentary and eye-witness evidence. This evidence clearly revealed
the existence of a genocidal campaign by the former Iraqi government
and military that eliminated an estimated 182,0002 Iraqi Kurds in 1988,
as part of the eight-phased "Anfal campaign" (the Anfal). Relying on this
and other evidence, judges in the Anfal Trial Chamber explained fairly
persuasively how genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes
were committed against the Iraqi Kurds. However, the Trial Chamber
judgment has its weaknesses, in particular: (i) individual criminal re-
sponsibility is at times not fully examined; and (ii) the judgment does
not address fair trial problems, such as insufficiently detailed charges
and government interference. Furthermore, on appeal, the IHT's Cass-
ation Chamber judges did not seriously grapple with the merits of the
I. For background on the Dujail trial, see, for example, INT'L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE, DUJAIL: TRIAL AND ERROR? (2006), available at http://www.ictj.org/static/MENA/
Iraq/ICTJDujailBrief.eng.pdf [hereinafter DUJAIL: TRIAL AND ERROR]; HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, JUDGING DUJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL (2006)
[hereinafter JUDGING DUJAIL], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/iraqll06web
wcover.pdf.
2. The Tribunal found that more than 3,000 villages were destroyed, leaving "tens of
thousands of victims." Al Anfal, Case No. l/CSecond/2006, Judgment, 501 (Iraqi High Trib.,
2007), available at http:/law.case.edu/grotian-moment-blog/anfal/opinion.asp [hereinafter Al
Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment]. The Tribunal also noted that some fatality estimates were as
high as 182,000. Id.
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case. This Article will address some of these problems, in order to evalu-
ate the Tribunal's effectiveness and role on the international stage.
Part I of this Article provides background on the Iraqi High Tribunal
and an overview of the Anfal trial. Specifically, Part I.A discusses the
formation of the Tribunal and the earlier Dujail trial; Part I.B provides an
overview of the phases of the Anfal trial; and Part I.C contains a brief
discussion of the applicable fair trial standards and the fair trial problems
that arose. Next, Part II, which constitutes the main body of this Article,
evaluates the merits of the Anfal Trial Chamber judgment. It first sum-
marizes the key evidence against each of the five convicted defendants,
then evaluates whether, based on the Trial Chamber's findings, each de-
fendant was appropriately convicted of each charge. Specifically, Part
II.A provides an overview of the merits of the convictions, while the re-
mainder of Part II examines the Trial Chamber's conclusions as to each
of the defendants. Finally, Part III briefly evaluates the Cassation
Chamber judgment. A summary of this Article's conclusions as to the
merits of the convictions as to each defendant is available in the appen-
dix.
The Article concludes that due to the fair trial problems and lack of
serious appellate review, the Iraqi High Tribunal does not operate at the
level of an international or hybrid tribunal such as the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), or the Special Court for Sierra
Leone. This is particularly worrying given the extreme seriousness of the
crimes being addressed by the Tribunal and the fact that the death pen-
alty is an available punishment. However, observers should also
appreciate the extremely difficult task that the Tribunal judges faced, and
should not forget that the Tribunal afforded its defendants many fair trial
protections certainly not accorded to criminal defendants during Saddam
Hussein's regime.' The IHT's well-reasoned Trial Chamber verdict is a
notable achievement (despite its flaws), and, for it, the judges involved
deserve a fair measure of praise.
3. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Justice for Iraq: A Human Rights Watch Policy
Paper (Dec. 2002), http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/mena/iraql217bg.htm [hereinafter
HRW, Justice for Iraq] (concluding that the judiciary in Iraq was "deeply compromised" dur-
ing Ba'ath Party rule and that the Revolutionary Court, State Security Court, and Special
Provisional Court, in particular, were "instruments of repression").
Michigan Journal of International Law
I. BACKGROUND TO THE ANFAL TRIAL
A. Formation of the Iraqi High Tribunal and the Dujail Trial
Despite lobbying from at least one human rights group that Ba'ath
Party officials should be tried before an international or hybrid tribunal,'
the United States announced in the spring of 2003 that justice in Iraq
would be pursued through an "Iraqi-led" process On December 10,
2003, "[t]he U.S.-appointed Iraqi Governing Council approved a statute
establishing the Iraqi Special Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity
.... Ambassador L. Paul Bremer signed the statute into law on behalf
of the Coalition Provisional Authority.
7
In early August 2005, Iraq's Transitional National Assembly revoked
the first statute and replaced it with an amended statute,8 which the Iraqi
Government re-enacted in September 2005.9 It was this amended statute
that officially created the Iraqi High Tribunal. '° The new law was prom-
ulgated in the Official Gazette on October 18, 2005, one day before the
start of the Dujail trial.'
The IHT has jurisdiction to try Iraqis and Iraqi residents for geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and certain offenses under
Iraqi law' 2 committed between July 17, 1968, and May 1, 2003." The
IHT is "staffed by Iraqis, [and was] assisted technically and logistically
by internationals (primarily [U.S. nationals]) via the Regime Crimes
4. See, e.g., id.
5. Rachel S. Taylor, Models for Justice in Iraq, WORLDPRESS.ORG, May 8, 2003,
http://www.worldpress.org/specials/Justice.htm (quoting remarks of Pierre-Richard Prosper,
then-U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues).
6. Human and Constitutional Rights, Iraqi Special Tribunal to Try Crimes Against
Humanity (May 18, 2007), http://www.hrcr.org/hottopics/iraqitribunal.html.
7. Id.




12. The non-international crimes are "[i]nterference in the affairs of the judiciary or
attempting to influence its functioning," "[tlhe wastage and squandering of national re-
sources," and "[t]he abuse of position and the pursuit of policies that [led] to the threat of war
or the use of the Iraqi armed forces against an Arab country." Law of the Supreme Iraqi
Criminal Tribunal (Law No. 10), Oct. 18, 2005, AL-WAQA'I AL-IRAQIYA [OFFICIAL GAZETTE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ], art. 14 [hereinafter IHT Statute]. An English translation of the
statute is available at http://www.ictj.org/static/MENA/Iraq/iraq.statute.engtrans.pdf.
13. INT'L CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE [ICTJ], THE ANFAL TRIAL AND IRAQI
HIGH TRIBUNAL UPDATE NUMBER ONE: THE COMPLAINANT PHASE OF THE ANFAL TRIAL 2,
available at http://www.ictj.org/static/MENA/Iraq/AnfalUpdateOne.eng.pdf (last visited Feb.
18, 2009) [hereinafter UPDATE I]; see also IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. I ISecond.
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Liaison Office, which is based out of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. 14
The IHT courthouse is located in Baghdad's International Zone."5
The Tribunal's first trial, the Dujail trial, commenced on October 19,
2005.16 Trial Chamber One 7 rendered its judgment on November 5,
2006, finding former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and six other de-
fendants guilty of "crimes against humanity based on torture, forced
deportation, imprisonment, willful killing, and other inhumane acts
committed against hundreds of villagers in southern Iraq after an assas-
sination attempt against Saddam Hussein in 1982."'" On December 26,
2006, the Cassation Chamber announced its decision and issued a writ-
ten judgment the next day.'9 Saddam Hussein was executed on December
30, 2006, in a hanging that drew "widespread international condemna-
tion."20 On January 15, 2007, two other defendants, Barzan Ibrahim al-
Hassan and Awad Hamad al-Bandar, were also executed.2' A fourth de-
fendant, Tahan Yassin Ramadan, was executed on March 20, 2007, after
the Cassation Chamber ordered the Trial Chamber to commute his sen-
tence of life in prison to a death sentence.2 Two non-governmental
organization (NGO) observers of the trial have been highly critical of
how it was conducted,23 although others have been less critical.2"
14. UPDATE I, supra note 13, at 2-3.
15. Id. at3.
16. Id. The account of the trial process contained in this Article is taken from descrip-
tions of a non-governmental organization (NGO) observer at the trial, the International Center
for Transitional Justice (ICTJ).
17. Trial Chamber One was composed solely of Iraqi judges. Human Rights Watch has
explained:
The ... [IHT] Statute as originally promulgated permitted the appointment of non-
Iraqi judges with expertise in international criminal proceedings to the trial cham-
ber. The amended version ... provides that non-Iraqi judges may be appointed only
if a foreign [S]tate is a party to proceedings before the IHT. To date, no non-Iraqi
judges have been appointed to any chamber of the IHT.
JUDGING DUJAIL, supra note 1, at 11.
18. UPDATE I, supra note 13, at 3.
19. Id.; Al Anfal, Case No. lI/CSecond/2006, Cassation Chamber Judgment, 2-10 (Iraqi
High Trib. 2007) [hereinafter Al Anfal Cassation Chamber Judgment]. The Dujail Cassation
Chamber judgment is available online, in Arabic, at http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/ihtdf.pdf.
A preliminary English translation is available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/content.
asp?id=88.
20. UPDATE I, supra note 13, at 3; see, e.g., Romesh Ratnesar, Saddam's Botched
Trial, TIME, Jan. 5, 2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/worldlarticle/0,8599,
1574349,00.html.
21. UPDATE I, supra note 13, at 3.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., DUJAIL: TRIAL AND ERROR, supra note 1; JUDGING DUJAIL, supra note 1.
24. See generally MICHAEL A. NEWTON & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, ENEMY OF THE STATE:
THE TRIAL AND EXECUTION OF SADDAM HUSSEIN (2008).
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B. Overview of the Anfal Trial
The Anfal trial began on August 21, 2006.2 The defendants were
"referred to trial based on their alleged roles in planning, authorizing and
executing the 1988 Anfal campaign. '26 According to the chief prosecutor,
Iraqi forces killed up to 182,000 civilians during the campaign, forcibly
displaced hundreds of thousands more, repeatedly used chemical weap-
ons, and almost completely destroyed local infrastructure." The Anfal
campaign was well-documented by human rights groups. Indeed, in the
1990s, Human Rights Watch unsuccessfully urged States to bring Iraq
before the International Court of Justice for breach of the Genocide
Convention.29
The Anfal trial was conducted before five judges.30 The defendants,
all of whom pled not guilty on all counts, were: (i) Saddam Hussein,
former President of Iraq (1979-2003); (ii) Ali Hassan al-Majid (Majid or
Chemical Ali), the alleged architect of the Anfal campaign and cousin of
Saddam Hussein, who served as Secretary General of the Ba'ath Party's
Northern Bureau from March 1987 to April 1989, with authority in the
Kurdish region during this period; (iii) Sultan Hashim Ahmad (Sultan
Ahmad), former commander of the 1 st Corps, based in northern Iraq and
involved in several, but not all, of the eight Anfal operations;
(iv) Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti (Hussein Rashid), Army Deputy Chief of
Staff for Operations during the Anfal campaign; (v) Sabir Abd al-Aziz
al-Douri (al-Douri), former general director of Iraq's Military Intelli-
gence Service; (vi) Farhan Mutlaq al-Jaburi (al-Jaburi), former director
of the Military Intelligence Service of the northern and later eastern re-
gions; and (vii) Tahir Tawfiq al-'Aani (al-'Aani), Governor of Mosul
during the Anfal campaign.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 3. According to the ICTJ, "Iraq's Code of Criminal Procedure (Law 23 of
1971) stipulates a two-step charging process. Defendants are first referred to trial (article 131),
and a charging instrument is drawn up by the court after [the] prosecution has presented its
evidence (article 181)." Id. at 3 n.10.
27. Id. at 3 (citing Prosecutor's Opening Statement, Aug. 21, 2006 (ICTJ Observer
Notes)).
28. Id.; see, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, IRAQ'S CRIME OF GENOCIDE: THE ANFAL
CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KURDS (May 1994), available at http://www.hrw.orglreports/1993/
iraqanfall.
29. Kenneth Roth, Indict Saddam, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 2002, at A 14; see Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78
U.N.T.S. 277.
30. UPDATE I, supra note 13, at 4.
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1. The Trial Phases
The "'complainant' phase of the Anfal trial spanned [twenty-three]
sessions, from August 21 to November 27, 2006."" During this time, the
IHT heard the testimony of seventy-seven32 complainants-most, but not
all, identified in court-as to their harrowing experiences during the An-
fal campaign.33
Complainants' testimony generally described one or more of the fol-
lowing three aspects of what happened to them:
Attacks on Kurdish towns with chemical and conventional weap-
ons. According to the International Center for Transitional
Justice (an NGO observer at the trial), complainants' testimony
established that: "civilians and villages suffered unprovoked ar-
tillery and aerial bombardments with chemical and conventional
weapons, after which virtually all buildings were completely de-
stroyed by bulldozers or explosives. 34 Complainants also
testified that "[m]osques were leveled, water sources destroyed,
and livestock that survived the first attacks was killed or sto-
len. 35 Complainants recalled the "rotten apple smell of chemical
weapons, and the aftermath of vomiting, bums, choking, blind-
ness and death.' 36 "Some escaped from attacks on one village,
only to be bombed again after fleeing to another"37 and
"[s]urvivors hid in caves or mountains, but most fell into the
hands of the Iraqi authorities., 38 Most complainants testified that
"Kurdish Peshmerga or other armed groups were not active in
",39these areas.
Imprisonment and mistreatment in detention camps. Complain-
ants testified that, "of those who escaped execution, many were
sent to concentration camps, where inmates were tortured,
beaten, raped, and died of hunger and disease.'"0 They were
"[1]eft for months with little food or water, inadequate shelter,
and no medical care[;] complainants testified to burying family
members and other inmates .... ."" Complainants testified that
31. Id. at 5. For a more detailed description of the complainant phase, see id. at 5-13.
32. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 146-212.
33. UPDATE I, supra note 13, at 5.
34. Id. at 8.
35. Id. at 8-9.
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 9. The Peshmerga were the Kurdish insurgents, aligned with Iran.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id. at 9.
Michigan Journal of International Law
"Iraqi soldiers separated the men from the women and children,
after which many complainants never saw their relatives again.
' 42
Executions and burial in mass graves. A few of the complain-
ants testified that they were "blindfolded and driven to isolated
desert sites, where they somehow survived mass executions and
escaped."4'3 Many stated "that close relatives, and in some cases
their entire families, had been 'Anfalized'; their fates were
known only once their identity cards were found in mass graves
after the fall of the regime.""
From November 28 to December 7, 2006, "[d]uring the prosecution
witness phase of the trial, nine witnesses were heard over the course of
five trial sessions.4 5 These fact witnesses gave testimony similar to that
of the complainants.46 In addition, a forensic experts testified, for exam-
ple, to the existence of mass graves and to finding traces of chemical
weapons, including mustard and sarin gas, on the bodies of the de-
ceased.47
The documentary evidence phase spanned nine sessions, from
December 18, 2006, to January 29, 2007.48 During this phase, some
4,935 documents in the dossier were presented.4 '9 The prosecution intro-
duced these documents in two stages. "The first phase involved the
introduction of evidence designed to prove the general existence of the
Anfal campaign, [and] the use of chemical weapons against the Kurdish
civilian population .... The second phase involved the introduction of
documentary evidence specifically targeted to prove the responsibility of
the individual defendants., 50 The prosecution also introduced audio and
video evidence." The defendants were then provided with an opportunity




45. ICTJ, THE ANFAL TRIAL AND THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL UPDATE NUMBER Two:
THE PROSECUTION WITNESS AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE PHASES OF THE ANFAL TRIAL 6,
available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/7/2n725.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) [here-
inafter UPDATE I.
46. Id. (testimony of "Witness One").
47. Id. (testimony of forensic anthropologist Dr. Clyde Snow).
48. Id. at 9.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 10.
51. Id. at 11. The audiotapes implicating defendant Majid are discussed below. See
infra Part I.B. 1. For further discussion of the prosecution witness and documentary evidence
phases of the trial, see UPDATE II, supra note 45, at 6-19.
52. UPDATE I, supra note 45, at 10.
[Vol. 30:305
Winter 2009] Guide to Iraqi High Tribunal's Anfal Judgment
The defense phase commenced with statements by each defendant,
followed by questioning by the presiding judge, the prosecution, and
complainants' lawyers. 3 This questioning concerned the defendants'
statements, their prior testimony before the Investigative Judge, and de-
tails from the witness testimony and documentary evidence presented
against them. 4 The presiding judge concluded by asking the defendants
whether they were satisfied with or regretted what happened during the
Anfal campaign.5 The Tribunal formally charged all six remaining de-
fendants56 with genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes on
February 20, 2007. . Each defendant pled not guilty to all charges. 8 Dur-
ing the remainder of the defense phase, "only five witnesses appeared,
none of whom could speak specifically to the substance of the crimes
alleged."59 The defense opened with four character witnesses on February
26, 2007.60 The fifth and final defense witness to testify was Tariq Aziz,
former Deputy Prime Minister, who appeared as a general defense wit-
61
ness.
The prosecution presented its closing statement to the Tribunal over
two sessions on April 2-3, 2007.62 The prosecution "asked for the death
penalty for five of the six defendants, and requested that defendant al-
'Aani be released for insufficient evidence." 63 The prosecution also asked
that the IHT "show leniency towards defendant al-Douri because of the
outpouring of support he had received from the people of Karbala. 64 As
part of the closing, the prosecution also requested that the judges find the
53. See ICTJ, THE ANFAL TRIAL AND THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL UPDATE NUMBER
THREE: THE DEFENSE PHASE AND CLOSING STAGES OF THE ANFAL TRIAL, available at
http://www.ictj.org/images/content/7/2/726.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2009) [hereinafter UP-
DATE Ill]. For details of the defendants' statements, see id. at 6-9. See also infra Part II
(discussing the defendants' arguments).
54. UPDATE III, supra note 53, at 6.
55. Id.
56. As noted above, Saddam Hussein was executed on December 30, 2006. See, e.g.,
Ratnesar, supra note 20.
57. UPDATE III, supra note 53, at 10 (citing Trial Session No. 46, Feb. 20, 2007 (ICTJ
Observer Notes)).
58. Id. The defendants originally pleaded not guilty to the charges during the trial's first
session. UPDATE I supra note 13, at 5.
59. Id. at 11.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 12. Tariq Aziz testified that "the Halabja chemical attacks were beyond the
capability of the Iraqi army, and pointed to U.S. military intelligence reports from the late
1980s (since discredited) that blamed Iran for the attack." Id. (citations omitted).
62. UPDATE III, supra note 53, at 13.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Trial Session No. 53, Apr. 2, 2007 (ICTJ Observer Notes)).
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defendants guilty of rape under Article 12(1)(g) of the IHT Statute.65
Rape had not been formally charged previously during the trial.
66
Defense closing statements spanned five sessions from May 6-10,
2007.67 The defendants presented legal and factual arguments. Some of
the legal arguments included: (i) the Tribunal's wrongful exclusion of
exculpatory evidence; (ii) the insufficiency of the charging instruments;
(iii) the inclusion of international crimes that had not previously been
incorporated into Iraqi criminal law, thereby violating the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege (no crime without law, no
punishment without law); (iv) the Tribunal's failure to facilitate defense
witness testimony; (v) the Tribunal's failure to appoint a military expert
witness to illuminate the structure and function of the Iraqi military;
(vi) the illegitimacy of the proceedings; (vii) the excessive redaction of
transcripts; (viii) the defense's lack of sufficient time and resources to
review all the necessary documents; and (ix) the failure to recognize that
• 68
"following orders" was a defense under Iraqi law.
The Tribunal delivered its verdicts on June 24, 2007.69 It sentenced
defendants Majid, Sultan Ahmad, and Hussein Rashid to death, and de-
fendants al-Douri and al-Jaburi to multiple life sentences.7° Charges
against al-'Aani were dismissed for lack of evidence.7 Defendants were
provided thirty days from the trial verdict to file their appeals.72 On
September 4, 2007, the Cassation Chamber affirmed the Anfal verdict.73
To date, the death sentences have not been carried out.
74
65. Id. (citing Prosecution Closing Statement, Apr. 2-3, 2007); see IHT Statute, supra
note 12, art. 12(1)(g).
66. UPDATE III, supra note 53, at 13.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 13-16 (summarizing the defense counsel's closing arguments).
69. Id. at 18.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 16 ("The Tribunal shall follow the rules of
procedure provided for in the Criminal Procedure Law 23 of 1971 and the Rules of Procedures
and Evidence appended to this Law"); Rules of Procedure and Gathering of Evidence with
Regard to the Supreme Iraqi Criminal Tribunal, Oct. 18, 2005, AL-WAQA'I AL-IRAQIYA [OmvI-
CIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ], Rule 68(b) [hereinafter IHT Rules of Procedure
and Gathering of Evidence] (similar); Code of Criminal Procedure (Law 23 of 1971) (Iraq),
art. 252(A) [hereinafter Iraq Code of Criminal Procedure] (stating that a petition for appeal
must be presented "within a period of thirty days, starting from the day after the judgement
was issued").
73. For a discussion of the Cassation Chamber judgment, see infra Part III.
74. There appears to be political disagreement as to whether the death sentences should
be carried out, particularly as regarding Sultan Ahmad, who appears to have strong political
support among Sunni Arabs. See, e.g., Ross Colvin, U.S. Rebuffs Iraq Demand for Handover
of Prisoners, REUTERS, Nov. 12, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/middleeastCrisis/
idUSL12601515.
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C. Fair Trial Issues
It is extremely difficult to establish a tribunal, particularly where a
domestic judiciary has been cut off from legal developments and is then
asked to adjudicate complex crimes pursuant to international fair trial
standards. 5 Yet, that was what was required of the IHT judges. Some
might argue that a nascent tribunal established in a country facing these
circumstances and undergoing civil war should not be expected to adhere
vigilantly to all of the fair trial standards of, for example, Article 14 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).76 Nev-
ertheless, most of those standards were directly incorporated into Article
19 of the IHT Statute, making it clear that the IHT was indeed obligated
to adhere at least to those benchmarks 7
Article 19 of the IHT Statute provides:
First: All persons shall be equal before the Tribunal.
Second: The accused shall be presumed innocent until proven
guilty before the Tribunal in accordance with this law.
Third: Every accused shall be entitled to a public hearing, in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this law and the rules of
procedure made hereunder.
Fourth: When bringing charges against the accused pursuant to
this Law, the accused shall be entitled to a fair impartial trial in
accordance with the following minimum guarantees:
A. To be informed promptly and in detail of the content,
nature and cause of the charge against him;
B. To have adequate time and facilities for the preparation
of his defense and to communicate freely with counsel of his
own choosing and to meet with him in private. The accused
is entitled to have non-kaqi legal representation so long as
the principal lawyer of such accused is Iraqi;
75. It was for such reasons that Human Rights Watch argued for the creation of an
international or mixed-tribunal for Iraq. See HRW, Justice for Iraq, supra note 3.
76. Iraq ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on
January 25, 1971, and the Covenant entered into effect on March 23, 1976. International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978),
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; see also Off. of the U.N. High Commn'r for Hum. Rts.,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights New York, Dec. 16, 1966, http:/I
www2.ohchr.org/englishlbodies/ratification/4.htm.
77. See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 19. Iraq, of course, was also legally obligated to
adhere to these standards by virtue of having ratified the ICCPR.
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C. To be tried without undue delay;
D. To be tried in his presence, and to be assisted by counsel
of his own choosing, or to be informed of his right to request
legal assistance if he cannot afford it; and to have the right to
seek such assistance that will allow him to appoint a lawyer
without paying the fees;
E. To have the right to call and examine defense and prose-
cution witnesses, and to present any evidence in his defense
in accordance with the law;
F. Not to be compelled to confess guilt, and to have the right
to remain silent and not to testify without such silence being
interpreted as evidence of guilt or innocence."8
It is not the focus of this Article to provide an in-depth analysis of
the fair trial problems associated with the Anfal trial 79 but, at minimum,
they should be acknowledged. Briefly, these problems included: (i) gov-
ernment interference with the judicial panel (the Government removed
Presiding Judge Abdallah al-Amiri near the start of the trial and replaced
him with Judge Muhammad Uraybi al-Khalifa after Judge Amiri com-
mented that Saddam Hussein was "not a dictator"); ° (ii) the framing of
charges (both times they were presented)8 ' in very general terms that did
not detail the individual roles that the defendants allegedly played;
2
(iii) investigation and flight of two private defense counsel involved in
the trial,83 which may have had a chilling effect on defense representation
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. These issues are anticipated to be more fully addressed in a forthcoming report by
the ICTJ. The details provided in this Article are based on the ICTJ's analysis.
80. See UPDATE I, supra note 13, at 13. Governmental interference would violate the
IHT Statute's guarantee of a "fair and impartial trial." See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art.
191Fourth.
81. Charges are presented at two stages under Iraqi law: the "qirar al ihala," before
proceedings open, and then the "qirar al tuhm," at the close of the prosecution's case. Iraq
Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 72, arts. 131, 181.
82. A failure to charge with appropriate specificity would violate the right "[t]o be
informed ... in detail of the content, nature and cause of the charge against [the defendant]."
IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 19/Fourth.
83. On March 15, 2007 (Trial Session No. 49), defense attorney Badia Aref was cited
for contempt of court and taken into detention. UPDATE III, supra note 53, at 17. Aref wanted
to introduce as evidence a CD indicating that Iranians had used chemical weapons during the
period of Anfal, as well as evidence that U.S. researchers had confirmed that fact. Id. The
Presiding Judge also cited media comments Aref had made on December 28, 2006, to al-
Arabiya Television comparing the Tribunal to a "slaughterhouse." Id. He later left the country.
Counsel for another defendant was also referred for investigation for allegedly forging his
Iraqi Bar Association credentials, and has also left the country. Id.
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generally; 4 (iv) the defendants' relative inability to introduce any
defense witnesses because potential witnesses located outside of Iraq
were afraid to return to Baghdad to testify and the Tribunal judges re-
fused to hear testimony by video-link (though such testimony was
allowed under the IHT's rules);8 5 (v) the extreme passivity of the as-
signed defense counsel who filled in when private counsel walked out of
• 86
the proceedings; (vi) the apparent failure of the Trial Chamber to pro-
vide reasoned, articulate responses to the defendants' many motions; 87
(vii) the requirement that appeal papers be filed within thirty days of the
Trial Chamber verdict despite the length and complexity of the Anfal
proceedings; 8 and (viii) as described in more detail below,8 9 the Cass-
ation Chamber's apparent lack of analysis of the legal and factual
issues.9
As best as can be determined, no adequate response to these issues
has been articulated. Certainly, there is no discussion of them in the Trial
Chamber judgment. Nor do they appear to have received reasoned re-
sponses during motion practice. It is possible that some of the issues
mentioned above may not have amounted to fair trial violations. How-
ever, the lack of reasoned discussion of the issues was a lost opportunity
for the Trial Chamber to demonstrate that at least some of them were
84. It is unclear whether the investigations of defense counsel were properly opened or
done simply to send a chilling message to the defense. The latter could undermine both the
right to a "fair impartial trial," and the right "to be assisted by counsel of [the defendant's]
own choosing." IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 19/FourthlD.
85. See IHT Rules of Procedure and Gathering of Evidence, supra note 72, Rule 57
(stating that the Trial Chamber has the power to hear evidence submitted "via such media
communications, including video or satellite channels, and as the Tribunal may order"). The
lack of witnesses potentially undermines the defendants' "right to call and examine defense
and prosecution witnesses," IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 191FourthlE, and contradicts the
principle of "equality of arms" see id. art. 19/First ("All persons shall be equal before the
Tribunal.").
86. This lack of zealous representation potentially violates the right "to be assisted by
counsel." See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 191FourthID. It is unclear whether (a) the passiv-
ity of assigned counsel was a result of being unprepared; (b) assigned counsel were afraid to
provide more effective representation, due, for example, to threats by Saddam Hussein (while
he was still alive), to a fear of being seen as publicly defending the defendants; or (c) coun-
sel's silence was due to instructions from their clients.
87. The lack of reasoned rulings, which particularly affected the defense, potentially
frustrates both the right to a "fair impartial trial," see id. art. 19/Fourth, and the defendant's
right to appeal his conviction, see ICCPR, supra note 76, art. 14.5 ("Everyone convicted of a
crime shall have the right to his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal
according to law.").
88. This timeframe potentially violates the right "[t]o have adequate time and facilities
for the preparation of [the] defense." IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 19/FourthlB.
89. See infra Part llI.
90. The lack of a reasoned appellate ruling potentially frustrates the right to an appeal.
See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 25 (providing for appeals); see also ICCPR, supra note
76, art. 14.5 (providing for the right to an appeal).
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duly considered and resolved. This of course leads to the critical ques-
tion of whether the Anfal convictions ought to stand. For example, if the
charges were never adequately presented, and if the defects were not
cured,9' then some (or even potentially all) of the convictions should be
vacated. 92 A second opportunity to resolve these fair trial issues lay in the
appeal. However, because the Cassation Chamber never seriously ad-
dressed fair trial issues,93 the Tribunal once again missed an opportunity
to demonstrate that the Anfal trial was fairly adjudicated. Thus, the
aforementioned fair trial issues cast a long shadow over the IHT's work.
II. THE ANFAL TRIAL CHAMBER JUDGMENT
A. Overview of the Convictions
Despite these significant fair trial issues, it cannot be denied that the
Anfal trial revealed, through a large volume of solid documentary evi-
dence and eye-witness and expert testimony, how Iraqi armed forces,
security, and intelligence units perpetrated the Anfal campaign against
the Iraqi Kurds. The remaining sections of this Part describe the key
evidence94 against each of the five convicted defendants.9 Then, as to
91. Both the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have recognized, for example, that a de-
fect in the specificity of the indictment can potentially be cured through subsequent timely,
clear, and consistent information, set forth in the prosecution's opening statement and pre-trial
brief. See Prosecutor v. Simid, Case No. IT-95-9-A, Appeals Judgment, 24 (Nov. 28, 2006);
Prosecutor v. Kvo~ka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeals Judgment, 44-46 (Feb. 28,
2005) [hereinafter Kvo~ka Appeals Judgment] (considering the pre-trial brief and the prosecu-
tor's opening statement); Prosecutor v. Kordi6 and ('erkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-A, Appeals
Judgment, 140 (Dec. 17, 2004) [hereinafter Kordi6 and Oerkez Appeals Judgment] (indict-
ment supplemented by the prosecution's pre-trial brief); id. 169 (presenting information in
an opening statement of the prosecution may cure a defective indictment).
92. Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Trial Judgment, 47 (June 10,
2007) ("If insufficient notice has violated the accused's right to a fair trial, no conviction may
result." (citations omitted)); see also Kordi6 and Oerkez Appeals Judgment, supra note 91,
142 ("[I]f an indictment is insufficiently specific, such a defect 'may, in certain circum-
stances cause the Appeals Chamber to reverse a conviction.'"); Prosecutor v. Kuprelkid et al.,
Case No. IT-95-16-A, Appeals Judgment, 114 (Oct. 23, 2001).
93. See infra Part III.
94. This Article discusses only the key evidence. It does not attempt to summarize all of
the evidence cited in the Tribunal's 963-page decision. In writing this Article, the author did
not reexamine the underlying evidence, but rather relied on the evidence relied on by the
judges to support their conclusions.
95. When this Article argues that a conviction of a defendant sentenced to death ap-
pears sound, the author does not suggest that the sentence given-the death penalty-is
appropriate. Iraq should join the growing number of States that have abolished the death pen-
alty. See Amnesty Int'l, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, http://www.amnesty.org/
en/death-penalty/abolitionist-and-retentionist-countries (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (noting that
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each defendant, this Part contains a detailed legal analysis of whether the
convictions as to each crime were warranted based on the evidence as
found by the Tribunal.96 This Article does not examine the charges
against Tahir Tawfiq Yusif al-'Aani, who was acquitted, or Saddam Hus-
sein al-Majid (Saddam Hussein), who was executed following his
conviction by the IHT after the conclusion of the Dujail trial.97
In general, a fair number of the convictions appear to have been war-
ranted, with certain caveats.98 The IHT's judgment, however, is
frequently unclear in its logic, rambling in its analysis, disorganized, and
occasionally lacking discussion of the elements of some of the crimes. 99
The IHT's analysis of "individual criminal responsibility" is generally its
weakest part. Specifically, the IHT sometimes insufficiently analyzed
each defendant's "intent" or mental state (at least under international
standards). '°° The lack of analysis often appears to be harmless error,
however, because the factual conclusions required for finding individual
criminal responsibility were nonetheless present in the judgment. Ulti-
mately, it appears that the judges operated in good faith, and that many
of the convictions were well-supported by the evidence. However, the
unresolved fair trial problems mentioned above'O and the lack of serious
appellate review'0 2 prevent this Article from concluding that the convic-
tions should stand, even where all elements of the crime were shown.0 3
"[m]ore than half of the countries in the world have now abolished the death penalty in law or
practice").
96. A summary of the conclusions as to each convicted defendant can be found in the
appendix to this Article.
97. The execution occurred during the course of the Anfal trial.
98. Specifically, this Article does not conclude that the convictions should ultimately
stand, due to the unresolved fair trial problems, see supra Part I.C, and lack of serious appel-
late review, see infra Part m.
99. In compiling this Article, the author used an English translation of the Trial Cham-
ber Judgment, which in places appears to be quite rough. Accordingly, it is possible that where
the Article quotes the Judgment, the translation may not be entirely accurate. In addition, the
author's conclusion that the elements of crimes appear "roughly" shown arguably gives too
much leeway to the IHT because the Tribunal's findings in many instances only approximate
the correct legal standards. Therefore, the author is hesitant to conclude that any of the convic-
tions are necessarily valid.
100. It is possible that, in analyzing individual criminal responsibility, the judges were
drawing on Iraqi law. However, their work should have been governed by the IHT Statute,
which sets forth the international standards regarding individual criminal responsibility. See
IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 15. And, in fact, the trial judgment made frequent references
to the forms of responsibility under Article 15. Thus, it appears that the judges were applying
that article.
101. See supra Part I.C.
102. See infra Part Il.
103. Some of the fair trial issues discussed above suggest that some or all of the convic-
tions should be vacated. See supra Part I.C.
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This Article analyzes the findings made by the Trial Chamber, but
does not mean to suggest that those findings were necessarily correct.
While the Trial Chamber judges do, throughout their judgment, point to
specific evidence to support their conclusions, there may have been
exculpatory documents or testimony that should have negated those find-
ings. It is beyond the scope of this Article to determine whether the facts
as found by the Trial Chamber were warranted. Nonetheless, given this
acknowledged limitation to the methodology employed-taking the Tri-
bunal's factual findings as true-it is possible both to explain the IHT's
holdings and deduce certain legal errors.
B. Ali Hassan al-Majid
The Tribunal found defendant Majid "was the absolute leader in the
northern area ' at the time of the Anfal campaign. He was the author of
arguably the two most incriminating documents presented at trial-
Document Nos. 4008 and 3650' 0-which essentially laid out the plan to
commit genocide against the Iraqi Kurds, including explicit orders to use
chemical weapons and to "kill every person whose age is between 15
and 70 years included."'0 6 The IHT also found that Majid ordered mem-
bers of the Iraqi military and others to implement those plans. 0 7 The
evidence against Majid also included audiotapes, played at trial, in
which he discussed using chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds. °8
As detailed below, this Article concludes that the facts found by the IHT
clearly suggest that genocide was committed. Majid's convictions for
committing genocide, as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise, and
for ordering genocide appear warranted.' °9 His crimes against humanity
and four of the five war crimes convictions also appear well-founded.'"
1. The Tribunal's Conclusions as to Majid's Role in the Anfal
Some of the key evidence that the IHT relied on include documents
authored by Majid that, in effect, lay out the plans for the Anfal cam-
paign. The Tribunal found that Majid served as a member of the
Revolutionary Command Council,"' State Command of the Ba'ath Party,
104. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 478 (relying on Decree No. 160,
Mar. 29, 1987).
105. As to Document Nos. 4008 and 3650, the IHT stated: "These two letters are consid-
ered the pillars upon which all attacks after [April 6, 1987] were based." Id. at 512.
106. Id. at 481.
107. See id. at 492.
108. Id. at 483.
109. See caveats supra note 98.
110. See caveats supra note 98.
111. The Revolutionary Command Council was the "top decision-making body" in Iraq.
IRAQ: A COUNTRY STUDY (Helen Chapin Metz ed., Fed. Res. Div., Libr. of Cong. 1988),
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and head of the Northern Organization Office for the period 1987-
1989."' The Revolutionary Command Council gave Majid wide author-
ity to implement policies in northern Iraq and to command all of the
"[S]tate's civil, military, security and party[] systems.""' 3 Later, Majid,
through the Northern Organization Office, directed that "supplies of food
and medicine to the Kurdish villages [be] prohibited in addition to agri-
culture, gas, human beings and animals .... More explicitly, Majid
ordered military commanders to "prohibit human and animal existence"
in certain areas, and to "kill every person whose age is between 15 and
70 years included.""' 5 He also requested "the Corps Commanders to
carry on special strikes (using chemical weapons).""6 He also stated that
"[w]e have no objection [to].beheading the traitors.., but it is better to
send them first to the security [directorates] and interrogate them[;] they
may find . .. more useful information before their execution."' 17
A telegram issued by Irbil Security Directorate stated that "Comrade
'Ali Hassan Al-Majid has ordered [us] to destroy all [the Kurds'] houses
and dislocate them to the residential compounds and [they] will never be
compensated ... ,,"8 The telegram also included Majid's "instructions
[that] ... all plowing or planting [o] winter crops within the prohibited
villages are [sic] prohibited.""' 9 Another document accepted into evidence
by the Tribunal stated: "[B]ased on Comrade 'Ali Hassan Al'Majid['s]
request, [the] First Corps' Commander issued an order of execution
available at http://countrystudies.us/iraq/7 l.htm. "It was first formed in July 1968, and since
then it has exercised both executive and legislative powers." Id. The chairman of the Revolu-
tionary Command Council was Saddam Hussein.
112. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 481.
113. Id. at 481, 511 (relying on Doc. No. 160, Mar. 29, 1987). The IHT provided some
of the background behind this grant of authority:
In light of correspondence[] between [the] Presidency of the Republic and [the]
General Military Intelligence Director, dated [March 1987], including the provision
of an intelligence report to [the] Presidency, regarding Kurdish fighters' activities
and the impact of air strikes against them, . .. Saddam Hussein replied by forming a
committee of specialists to strike with special ammunition. The General Military
Intelligence Directorate [GMID] specified targets in Balisan basin including Bali-
san village, Tutma, Khati and Shaykh Wasanan, and Qara Dagh basin including
Takya, Balak Jar and Siwsinan. It also reviewed the [possibility] of [using] 3 differ-
ent agents Mustard, Sarin, and Tabun .... Suddam Hussein['s] approval had been
granted [as to] using chemical weapons. [Then] the ... Revolution[ary] Command
Council met with [Ba'ath] Party State Command to discuss the Kurds situation in
[the Northern] area in order to draw [a] ... policy or plan targeting [the] Kurds ....
Id. at 511.
114. Id. at 481, 610 (quoting Doc. No. 3650, June 3, 1987) (emphasis added).
115. Id. at 481, 623 (quoting Doc. No. 4008, June 20, 1987) (emphasis added).
116. Id. at 481, 610 (quoting Doc. No. 5083, July 22, 1987) (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 482 (quoting Doc. No. 5083, July 22, 1987) (emphasis added). But see id. at
611 (attributing the comments to Saddam Hussein).
118. Id. at 483 (emphasis added).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
Michigan Journal of International Law
against wounded civilians, after that Party Organization, as well as [the]
Police and Security Directorates affirmed the hostility of the ... wounded
to the regime. [The order] also included the devastation of Kani-Ashqani
neighborhood via bulldozers.' 2°
The prosecution supplemented the documentary evidence against
Majid with several audiotaped recordings of his plans for bulldozing
Kurdish victims into mass graves,12 1 striking the Kurds with chemical
weapons,2 and offering false amnesties.' Below are some of the strik-
ing words heard on recordings at Trial Session No. 36:
"[A]lright ... where [can] I put them? All those people? I
tried to distribute them among the governorates .... I will
send [bulldozers] and [shovels] to them." (The IHT then ex-
plained: "[t]he accused is describing how to transport the
victims to the other governorates, and sending the [bulldozer
and shovels] from the northern region to the other gover-
norates for burying the victims in the mass graves.") 24
" "I went to Al-Sulaymaniyyah on [sic] 7:30 and I bombarded
them with the special ammunitions.' 25
* "[W]hen I strike them with the chemical I will cause them
high casualties ... and I will not strike them with chemical
... only one day, but (15) days, two days, ten, five and so on
,,126
"I will tell them there is an amnesty .... I will print a mil-
lion pamphlet[s] and spread them in the north ... and I will
not mention that it is from the [S]tate of Iraq."'' 27
" "I will tell [sic] them with the new weapon which will eradi-
cate you, God willing; all God's vehicles are not enough to
carry them; I told the specialists, I need gangs ... the good
ones in Europe to kill them wherever they catch them."'
2 8
* "Strike them chemically and eradicate them all .... They
thought the International community will rescue them ....
120. Id. at 512 (quoting Doc. No. 3329, May 14, 1987).
121. Id. at 483.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 484.
124. Id. at 483.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 484.
128. Id.
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Damn this International community ... and any of God's
States who back them."'
129
In addition to the documentary and audio evidence, Majid testified
at trial. At one point, he stated, "I do not regret what I did and I did not
mean to harm any human being if it was not for defending Iraq."'3° Ac-
cording to Majid, the northern area was facing a state of emergency,
and he "therefore reacted and declared a state of emergency."'' 3 Majid
confirmed that he ordered military commanders to prohibit "human
and animal existence" in certain areas and to "kill every person whose
age is between 15 and 70 years included.' 32 He also confessed several
times to the Tribunal that all of the military, security, civil, and party
organizations in northern Iraq were under his command. Majid further
confessed "that he ordered the security organizations to dislocate the
residents to the residential compounds" and that "he gave instructions
to the military units to destroy what was left of the villages.' 33 Finally,
Majid also "admitted to the court, that executions were carried [out]
without trial." '34
In his defense, Majid argued: (i) the deeds committed were not
crimes at the time that they were committed;' 31 (ii) he had no knowl-
edge about the "mass graves," or the "detention camps, ravishment,
torture, indignity, death from starvation, [and lack] of medical care and
[cleanliness] that the victims were subject[ed] to";' 36 (iii) families were
moved from the restricted areas for "security reasons"; 3' and (iv) he
"did not [personally] take part [in] AI-Anfal Operations."'38 Majid's
attorney argued that his client had no intention to commit genocide,
was not aware of the detention of civilians or the use of chemical
weapons (the audiotape speeches were a form of "psychological war"),
and was "not involved in what occurred [at] mass graves."'39 Although
the Tribunal did not appear to respond to each of Majid's arguments, it
129. Id. at 514.
130. Id. at 479.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 481.
133. Id. at 487.
134. Id. at 513. He also "admitted to the court, that executions were carried [out] without
trial since he was authorized [to do] so by [the] Revolution[ary] Command Council." Id.
135. Id. at 478.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 479.
139. Id. at 480.
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is fairly clear from the facts discussed below that these arguments were
either contradicted by the evidence'4 ° or legally not controlling. 4'
2. Majid's Genocide Convictions
The Trial Chamber convicted Majid of three counts of genocide
based on the commission of three different underlying crimes: (i) killing
members of a group; (ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to mem-
bers of a group; and (iii) deliberately inflicting on a group living
conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or
in part.'
42
This Article's preliminary conclusion is that Majid's genocide con-
victions appear well-founded.4 The elements of the chapeau, or the
elements that must be proven regardless of which underlying crime sup-
ports the charge, are: (i) intent to destroy; (ii) in whole or in part; (iii) a
national, ethnical, racial, or religious group; (iv) "as such."'" This Article
examines the IHT's findings as to each element in turn (although the Tri-
bunal has not organized its findings this clearly). 45 Each of these
elements appears to have been met, based on the facts as found by the
Tribunal.
140. For example, as to Majid's assertion that he was not aware of the use of chemical
weapons, the IHT concluded:
His allegations [that the chemical weapons] were an intention to scare the Kurds...
[are proven false] by Letter [4008], dated 1987 June 20, where he ordered corps
commanders to use [special] ammunition [i.e., chemical weapons] to kill the [larg-
est] number of those within Prohibited Zones. [Majid] affirmed authenticity of the
letter, in addition to other letters ... [discussing the use of] special ammunition[s]
Id. at 515.
141. For example, it is largely irrelevant that Majid "did not take part [in] A1-Anfal Op-
erations," as Majid maintained, id. at 479 (emphasis added), because the IHT found that he
had ordered them, see id. at 492 (noting that according to the Tribunal, Majid "ordered them
all to execute what's mentioned in the letter . . . [Doc. No. 4008]"). "Ordering" is a separate
form of individual criminal responsibility from "committing." Compare IHT Statute, supra
note 12, art. 15/Second/A (covering "committing"), with id. art. 151SecondIB (covering "or-
dering"). Even for a joint criminal enterprise, which, as discussed below, was also found to
exist in this case, a participant need not personally commit the crimes. See IHT Statute, supra
note 12, art. 15/Second/A.
142. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 517.
143. See caveats supra note 98.
144. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 11; see also Prosecutor v. Blagojevi6 and Joki6,
Case No. IT-02-60-T, Trial Judgment, 655 (Jan. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Blagojevi6 and Joki6
Trial Judgment] ("[T]he specific intent of the crime of genocide [is] the 'intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.' ").
145. This Article necessarily contains a distillation of the Tribunal's findings.
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Intent to Destroy
The first element necessary to prove genocide is "intent to destroy."
The law permits "intent to destroy" to be inferred.'4 6 Some of the factors
courts have looked to for inferring such intent include: (i) the extent of
the actual destruction; (ii) the existence of a genocidal plan or policy;
(iii) the perpetration and/or repetition of other destructive or discrimina-
tory acts committed as part of the same pattern of conduct; and (iv) the
utterances of the accused.
47
Here, the IHT concluded that there was "intent to destroy" based on
a variety of factors, including: (i) the use of aircraft, tanks, artillery, heli-
copters, rocket launchers, infantry, and "special ammunitions" (i.e.,
chemical weapons) to attack the Iraqi Kurds;' 48 (ii) direct orders from
Majid to carry out the attack;'4 9 (iii) direct orders from Majid to kill the
largest possible number of people;'5° (iv) that the attacking troops pre-
vented individuals from escaping so that none were able to cross the
border into Turkey;' 5' (v) that attacking troops "did not distinguish be-
tween the victims . . . [as] civilians or fighters ([Peshmerga])";'52 (vi) that
thousands of children, women, and elderly were killed by chemical
weapons;'" (vii) that the former regime "prevented ... humanit[arian]
organizations from entering Kurdistan to ... find out the circumstances
of the victims"; 54 (viii) that the attacking troops destroyed "the electric-
ity and [water filtration systems]";'55 and (ix) that animal and human
existence was prohibited in the restricted areas.1
5 6
146. Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Appeals Judgment, 34 (Apr. 19, 2004)
[hereinafter Krsti6 Appeals Judgment] ("Where direct evidence of genocidal intent is absent,
the intent may still be inferred from the factual circumstances of the crime."). This Article
looks to ICTR and ICTY law, as well as to the International Criminal Court (ICC) Elements of
Crimes, Int'l Crim. Ct., Elements of Crimes, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/l/Add.2 (2000) [here-
inafter ICC Elements of Crimes], to interpret the definitions of genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity contained in the IHT Statute.
147. Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment, 971-89 (Sept. 1,
2004) [hereinafter Brdanin Trial Judgment]; see also Prosecutor v. Jelisid, Case No. IT-95-10-
A, Appeals Judgment, 47 (July 5, 2001) (inferring "intent to destroy" from "the general
context, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group,
the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their mem-
bership of a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts").
148. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 493.
149. Id. at 494.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 500.
153. Id. at 494.
154. Id. at 498.
155. Id.
156. Id.
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The IHT also found a "strategy and prepared policy by the regime to
target the Kurds."'' 57 Evidence of the plan came from the "repetition" and
"systematization" of the attacks. "[T]he Anfal Operations [were divided]
into eight phases," each having
the same style and system in all phases concerning the attack,
and usage of chemical weapons, village demolition, coercive
dislocation of the population, prohibiting .. . human and animal
presence in the area, death from starvation in the detention
camps, the similarity in digging the mass graves and the means
of execution.58
The Tribunal saw further evidence of the plan in the way mass execu-
tions were prepared:
[W]hen they were transferred to the prepared places for... exe-
cutions, th[e victims] saw the gravediggers in ... place and the
holes were ready and then they were pushed towards these holes
where the execution teams were shooting them .... The grave-
diggers and [shovels] then covered these holes with dirt.'5 9
The IHT ultimately concluded that this "plan or policy was preplanned
and reviewed by ... Saddam Hussein and his Command's Members,including ... Majid.' ' 60
The Tribunal further relied on the intentions expressed by Majid in
audiotaped recordings, and considered the derogatory phrases Majid and
other government officials used to describe the Kurds as evidence of
their "intent to destroy." For example, Saddam Hussein was recorded
saying that "[t]he Kurds learned their bad habits from the 'Ajam' [the
Persians]"' 6 Majid himself was taped saying that he did not trust Kurds,
who were accepted as "second [class citizens]" in Iraq, if at all.'62 Con-
temptuous and abusive phrases were also used by guards at the Tup
Zawa and Nuqrat al-Salman detention camps and by execution teams.161
The IHT summarized: "The disdain, vituperation, and blasphemies are
clear evidence[] [of the] [Ba'ath] organization's real intent, headed by
... Saddam Hussein and ... Majid."' 6
157. Id. at 497. Case law states that a plan or policy is not required to prove intent to
destroy, although it may be an important factor. See Krsti6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 146,
T 225.
158. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 499.
159. Id. at 500.
160. Id. at 513.
161. Id. at 498.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 498.
164. Id. at 514.
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Finally, the Tribunal concluded that "[tihe real intention [of] the re-
gime" was also revealed in "honoring... those who committed the ...
crimes," particularly "through granting medal[s] [of bravery] to each
of Hashim Sultan and Ayad Zaki for their distinguished roles in Al-Anfal
operations."'' 65 Based on all of the evidence, the IHT concluded that Ma-
jid had "intent to partially or totally eradicate Kurdish civilians due to
their ethnicity. ' 66
In Whole or In Part
The next requirement of the chapeau of genocide is that the "intent
to destroy" be directed at a group "in whole or in part." As to this re-
quirement, the IHT appeared to find that the destruction was aimed at
"partial eradication" of the Iraqi Kurds. 67 The Tribunal noted that "some
sources estimate Al-Anfal victims to reach 182 thousand[],' ' 68 although
it did not make that finding itself. The IHT found that the operations
"stretched over most of Kurdistan, within it four governorates [Kirkuk,
al-Sulaymaniyyah, Irbil, and Dujuk], devastating and dislocating vast
regions [more than 3,000 villages], murdering, relocating and arresting
tens of thousands of victims, preventing... human and animal existence
as well as agronomy, and shutting down [wells] via reinforced con-
crete.
,,1 69
The IHT did not evaluate whether the part of the group targeted was
44 170
"substantial," as courts have generally required for genocide cases.
However, based on the Tribunal's factual findings, this requirement is
arguably satisfied. In analyzing whether the "in part" requirement is met,
ICTY case law establishes the importance of examining both the targeted
group's size as well as its significance within a given community.
7
1
Here, it would seem reasonable to conclude both that (i) the number tar-
geted was numerically significant-there were, according to the IHT,
165. Id. at 499.
166. Id. at 516.
167. Id. at 501 ("Targeting this [large number] of civil inhabitants, which is not to be




170. As explained by the ICTY:
It is well established that where a conviction for genocide relies on the intent to de-
stroy a protected group "in part," the part must be a substantial part of that group.
The aim of the Genocide Convention is to prevent the intentional destruction of en-
tire human groups, and the part targeted must be significant enough to have an
impact on the group as a whole.
Krsti6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 146, V 8-9.
171. Id.
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"tens of thousands of victims," more than 3,000 villages destroyed, and,
by some estimates, 182,000 ViCtims; 7 2 and (ii) the targeted group had
considerable importance within the community-this is suggested by the
IHT's finding that Majid's acts led "to the deaths of a vital, immense
majority of Kurd[ish] inhabitants in Northern Iraq."'73 Thus, the Tribu-
nal's factual findings arguably satisfy the "substantial part" requirement.
National, Ethnic, Racial, or Religious Group
The Genocide Convention and other statutory definitions of geno-
cide protect only four groups from targeted destruction-specifically,
"national, ethnic, racial or religious group[s].' 174 Here, the IHT appears
to have found that the Kurds were both a "national" and an "ethnic"
group, and therefore protected. The Tribunal correctly observed that an
"ethnic group is generally known as a group [whose] members ...
shar[e] the same language [and] culture. 1 7' The IHT stated:
The Kurds are considered as a national and ethnic group living
in the northern region of Iraq and their region named... (Kurdi-
stan ... )[.] The Kurds share a language, culture and history[,]
and the Kurdish language [has been] considered as an official
language in [the] Kurdish region since 1970 ... [,] and ... the
[second] official language in Iraq... according to the ... consti-
tution [of] 2005[.] [A]lso the Iraqi temporary constitution [of]
1970 ratified that the Kurdish nationality [was the second most
predominant] after the Arab in Iraq. 76
The conclusion that the Kurds were a separate ethnic group, based on
having a different language and culture from Arab Iraqis, appears war-
ranted.'77 It makes less sense to say that Iraqi Kurds were targeted
172. AlAnfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 501.
173. Id. at 517 (emphasis added). Because the IHT does not purport to firmly conclude
how many Kurds were targeted or killed in the Anfal campaign, the IHT does not analyze that
number as a percentage of the total Kurdish population at the time, although that is a typical
method of examining the "in part" requirement. See, e.g., Krsti6 Appeals Judgment, supra note
146, 12 ("The number of individuals targeted should be evaluated not only in absolute terms,
but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group.").
174. See, e.g., IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 1 lFirst.
175. Id. at 488; see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment,
$ 510, 516 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu Trial Judgment] ("An ethnic group is gener-
ally defined as a group whose members share a common language or culture.").
176. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 490 (emphasis added); see also
id. at 493 ("The Kurds are a national and ethnic group living in [the] Kurdistan area for many
thousands of years in ... northern Iraq and the Iraqi temporary constitution [of] 1970 had
endorse[d] them as [the] second nationality in Iraq." (emphasis added)).
177. Perceived stigmatization of the group, by either the perpetrator or the victim, on the
basis of "perceived national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics" is also relevant. As
the ICTY Trial Chamber in Brdanin explained:
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because of their nationality, because Arab Iraqis and Iraqi Kurds were all
Iraqi nationals (although perhaps the Tribunal is simply making the dis-
tinction that it was the Kurds in Northern Iraq, and not all Kurds, who
were targeted). Nevertheless, targeting such an ethnic group suffices for
purposes of genocide; thus, this requirement appears to have been met.
As Such
The final requirement of the chapeau of genocide is that the na-
tional, ethnic, racial, or religious group be targeted "as such." That is,
"[t]he victims of the crime must be targeted because of their membership
in the protected group .... ,17' Here, the IHT concluded that "[t]he Kurds
were targeted for their ethnicity.0 79 While this appears to have been true,
it also appears oversimplified. There was also a potential political moti-
vation for the targeting-specifically, the Peshmerga militia, which was
aligned with Iran in the then-ongoing Iran-Iraq war, was operating in
northern Iraq's Kurdish areas, with support from local civilians. The
judge who wrote the section of the Trial Chamber judgment discussing
Sultan Ahmad, 8° however, persuasively explains that the existence of
such a political motivation for targeting the Kurds does not negate geno-
cidal intent.'8 ' This is a correct conclusion, given the differentiation that
the law draws between motive and intent.
82
[Tihe relevant protected group may be identified by means of the subjective crite-
rion of the stigmatisation of the group, notably by the perpetrators of the crime, on
the basis of its perceived national, ethnical, racial or religious characteristics. In
some instances, the victim may perceive himself or herself to belong to the afore-
said group.
Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, ' 690; see also Prosecutor v. Jelisi6, Case No. IT-95-
10-A, Trial Judgment, 70 (Dec. 14, 1999). The ICTY Appeals Chamber has held: "Although
the objective determination of a religious group still remains possible .... it is more appropri-
ate to evaluate the status of a national, ethnical or racial group from the point of view of those
persons who wish to single that group out from the rest of the community." Id. During the
Anfal campaign, the facts certainly demonstrate that the Kurds were singled out from other
Iraqis.
178. Blagojevi6 and Joki6 Trial Judgment, supra note 144, 669 (emphasis added).
179. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 490.
180. Based on differences in writing style and analysis (as well as duplication of effort),
it seems clear that different judges wrote different sections of the trial chamber judgment-
perhaps each judge wrote on one of the five convicted defendants.
181. Regarding the "as such" requirement, the judge who wrote the portion of the judg-
ment discussing Sultan Ahmad stated: "It is important to mention that the relation between
ethnic group and political program, which practically merge between ethnic and political
identifies, does not [negate] the intention of genocide which moves the given convict." Al
Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 629 (citing Prosecutor Nahimana et al., Case
No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, 969 (Nov. 28, 2007) [hereinafter Nahimana Appeals
Judgment]). In other words, the fact that there is also a political motivation for targeting an
ethnic group (for example, punishing the Kurds for supporting Peshmerga forces) does not
negate the intent to destroy the group on the basis of their ethnicity.
182. See Jennifer Trahan, Why the Killing in Darfur Is Genocide, 31 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 990, 1037-40 (2008) (discussing the case law distinguishing motive and intent).
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Accordingly, all of the elements of genocide's dolus specialis appear
to be satisfied. Of course, a genocide conviction must also be based on at
least one type of "underlying crime." Here, the IHT found that three un-
derlying crimes had occurred: (i) killing members of the group;
(ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; and
(iii) deliberately inflicting on the group living conditions calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.
First Underlying Crime: Killing Members of the Group
"Killing" will only support a genocide conviction if the individuals
killed are members of the protected group."' This crime also has a mens
rea requirement: the Prosecutor must show that there was intent to kill
members of the group (though this intent need not reach the level of
premeditation,' 4 and need not necessarily belong to the defendant).
Here, the IHT relied primarily on the following evidence of killing
members of the group: (i) the wide authority given to Majid over the
northern area; ' and (ii) Majid's express directives, including his order
"banning the human[s] and animals in the area, banning travel, [and]
cultivation," his order to use "artillery, helicopters and aircrafts to kill the
largest possible number of those who exist within these restricted areas
day and night," and, finally, his orders to kill individuals from the ages of
fifteen to seventy, after extracting useful information.8 6 The IHT summa-
rized the evidence by stating that Majid had issued "killing orders,"'87
and concluded that "[t]he troops ... carried out attacks killing thousands
of Kurds using chemical and conventional weapons based on [the] orders
or encouraging letters from [Majid]."'8' It is clear from the facts that a
good deal of this killing was done with intent, Majid's orders contributed
to the killing, and that the IHT found that Majid acted with premedita-
tion. ' Thus, the elements of the underlying crime of "killing members
of the group" certainly appear met.
183. Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 689.
184. Prosecutor v. Staki6, Case No. IT-97-34-T, Trial Judgment, 515 (July 31, 2003)
[hereinafter Staki Trial Judgment].
185. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 491 (relying on the grant of
authority in Doc. No. 160, Mar. 29, 1987).
186. Id. at 492 (referring to Majid's orders in Doc. No. 4008, June 20, 1987).
187. Id. at 494.
188. Id. at 496.
189. Id. at 517 ("Majid contributed, individually, in executing [a] joint criminal plan
with others ... premeditatedly, through issuing orders to murder, cause severe physical or
mental damages [sic], and [subject] them to harsh living conditions aiming to exterminate
them all." (emphasis added)).
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Second Underlying Crime: Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to
Members of the Group
International case law defines this underlying crime as "an inten-
tional act or omission causing serious bodily or mental suffering." '9°
"[B]odily harm refers to harm that seriously injures the health, causes
disfigurement or causes any serious injury to the external [or] internal
organs or senses""' Acts that have been recognized to constitute "serious
bodily or mental harm" include: "torture, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment, sexual violence including rape, interrogations combined with
beatings, threats of death, [and] deportation,"' 92 as well as other "harm
that damages health or causes disfigurement or serious injury."' 93 This
crime also requires that "the harm ... be inflicted intentionally.' 94 Fi-
nally, causation or at least substantial contribution is also required.'95
As to this crime, the IHT found that "[t]he ex-regime waged a large
scale[] military attack over Kurdistan [through] an elaborate[] and sys-
tematic plan or policy targeting Kurds as national ethnic communities.'
96
The Tribunal also determined that the harm inflicted by the former re-
gime-including killing thousands, "destroying and ruining ...
thousands of villages," and dislocating inhabitants by "driving them
away to detention . . . camps, or to mass graves"-"[constituted] severe
mental or physical [harm to] civilians ....
Additionally, based on victim and witness testimony, the IHT found
that detainees were exposed to "a diversity of physical and psychological
tortures.' ' 98 For example, Kurdish women in the Tupzawa and Nuqrat al-
Salman detention camps were raped.' 99 Some victims witnessed the
190. Prosecutor v. Krsti6, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Trial Judgment, 513 (Aug. 2, 2001)
[hereinafter Krsti6 Trial Judgment].
191. Blagojevi6 and Joki6 Trial Judgment, supra note 144, 645 (citing Prosecutor v.
Kayishema and Ruzindana, Case No. ICTR-95- I -T, Trial Judgment (May 21, 1999)).
192. Blagojevik and Joki6 Trial Judgment, supra note 144, 646; see also Krsti6 Trial
Judgment, supra note 190, 513 ("[I]nhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual abuse and depor-
tation are among the acts which may cause serious bodily or mental injury.").
193. See Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 690; see also Staki5 Trial Judgment,
supra note 184, 1516.
194. Blagojevi6 and Joki6 Trial Judgment, supra note 144, 645; Brdanin Trial Judg-
ment, supra note 147, 690.
195. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, art. 6(b)(1) (requiring a showing that
"[t]he perpetrator caused serious bodily or mental harm to one or more persons"); see also
Nahimana Appeals Judgment, supra note 181, 492 ("Where a person is accused of having
planned, instigated, ordered or aided and abetted the commission of [a crime], the Prosecutor
must establish that the accused's acts or omissions substantially contributed [thereto].").
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deaths of family members, °° and other detainees were "exposed to un-
bearable starvation" or forced to walk on smashed glass.2 ' Finally, some
individuals were hung with "gas bottles" tied to their sexual organs.20 2
The IHT concluded that these techniques were designed "to oppress,
humiliate, disdain and harm. 2 3 The Tribunal additionally noted that
when the victims/witnesses stood before the IHT, most of them still bore
scars on their bodies, had respiratory problems due to chemical gas at-
tacks, and suffered from psychological harm from their time spent in
prison.2 4 The IHT stated that if it "wanted to tell the details of each
crime, it would be in need of volumes and volumes of books. 2 5
Ultimately, based on this evidence, the IHT found Majid "legally re-
sponsible [for the] crimes committed," as he was "the highe[st]
commander in the Northern area, issuing detention orders, instigating
such acts, and contributing with other individuals ... to perpetrate a
crime, aiming to reinforce [Ba'ath] and security systems' criminal activ-
,,2016ity or purpose. Accordingly, the facts found by the IHT show that: (i)
Kurdish civilians suffered "serious bodily or mental harm" during the
Anfal campaign; (ii) at least some of the infliction of serious bodily or
mental harm was intentional (and, in Majid's case, premeditated);207 and
(iii) Majid clearly had a role in causing, or substantially contributing to,
the serious bodily or mental harm.00 Thus, the elements of this underly-
ing crime also appear met.
Third Underlying Crime: Deliberately Inflicting on the Group Living
Conditions Calculated to Bring About Its Physical Destruction in Whole
or in Part
The third underlying crime involves subjecting the targeted group to
living conditions calculated to cause its destruction, in whole or in part.
Case law demonstrates that the conditions inflicted on the group "must
be calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the targeted




204. Id. at 505.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 505-06.
207. Id. at 517 (finding that "Majid contributed, individually, in executing [a] joint
criminal plan with others ... premeditatedly, through issuing orders to murder, cause severe
physical or mental damages [sic], and [subject] them to harsh living conditions aiming to
exterminate them all" (emphasis added)).
208. Id. (noting that Majid's orders were "implemented by his subordinate[s,] leading to
the deaths of a vital, immense majority of Kurds [sic] inhabitants in Northern Iraq, killing
them, causing severe physical or mental damage[] and [subjecting] people to harsh living
conditions, [calculated to bring about their destruction]" (emphasis added)).
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group in whole or in part and must be inflicted on it deliberately., 209 The
crime covers "methods of destruction by which the perpetrator does not
immediately kill group members, but which, ultimately, seek their physi-
cal destruction., 2' ° Acts covered by this crime include, but are not limited
to, "subjecting the group to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from
homes, and denial of the right to medical services.,,2 1' Also included in
this crime is "the creation of circumstances that would lead to a slow
death, such as lack of proper housing, clothing and hygiene or excessive
work or physical exertion. 21 2
In concluding that this crime occurred, the IHT cited: (i) the prohibi-
tion on agronomy, agriculture, and industry in the "prohibited zones" ;213
(ii) the dislocation of civilian Kurds to prison camps;1 4 (iii) the subjec-
tion of those in camps to "harsh living conditions"; 215 (iv) the denial in
camps of "suitable health care," causing many to suffer from "diarrhea,
vomiting and skin illnesses"; 21 6(v) the beatings that occurred in prison
camps;2 7 (vi) the provision of non-potable water;211 (vii) the daily food
rations of bread only; 9 (viii) the deprivation of suitable clothing;22 and
(ix) the segregation of families. 22' The IHT found that such conditions
led to the deaths of over 700 detainees at the Nuqrat al-Salman prison
camp alone.22  The Tribunal also concluded that Majid's orders had a
direct link to the perpetration of this crime,223 and that Majid acted with
209. Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 692.
210. Staki6 Trial Judgment, supra note 184, 518 (citing Akayesu Trial Judgment, supra
note 175, 1505).
211. Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 691; see also Staki6 Trial Judgment,
supra note 184,$ 517.
212. Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, [691; see also Staki6 Trial Judgment,
supra note 184,% 517.




217. Id. at 508.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 508-09.
221. Id. at 509.
222. Id. at 508.
223. See id. at 517 ("These were the orders implemented by his [Majid's] subordinate[s]
leading to the deaths of a vital, immense majority of Kurds inhabitants [sic] in Northern Iraq,
killing them, causing severe physical or mental damage [sic] and [subjecting] people to harsh
living conditions, aimed [at heir] [sic] eradication." (emphasis added)).
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premeditation.22 Accordingly, this third and final underlying crime also
appears persuasively established.22
Individual Criminal Responsibility
The final inquiry when determining whether an individual commit-
ted genocide is whether the defendant was sufficiently connected to the
crimes to warrant "individual criminal responsibility." The IHT Statute
allows for a defendant to be convicted under various theories of individ-
ual criminal responsibility, namely, committing the crime (individually
or with others); ordering, soliciting, inducing, aiding and abetting, or
attempting to commit the crime; committing a crime with a group of per-
sons sharing a common criminal intent; or, in the case of genocide,
inciting genocide.226 The Statute also permits convictions for "command
responsibility."227 Here, the IHT convicted Majid of both committing
genocide and "ordering, soliciting or inducing" genocide.228
224. Id. ("Majid contributed, individually, in executing [a] joint criminal plan with others
... premeditatedly, through issuing orders to murder, cause severe physical or mental dam-
ages [sic], and [subject] them to harsh living conditions aiming to exterminate them all."
(emphasis added)).
225. See caveats supra note 98.
226. See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 151SecondIA-F (individual criminal responsibil-
ity).
227. Id. art. 15/Fourth (command responsibility).
228. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 517 (citing IHT Statue, supra
note 12, art. I l/Second/A (committing genocide)); id. art. 15/Second/B (ordering, soliciting,
and inducing)). At another point, the IHT suggested that Majid had command responsibility
over the troops that committed the crimes. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note
2, at 510. The IHT ultimately did not convict Majid of command responsibility for genocide,
perhaps out of concerns that it would have been impermissibly cumulative with the convic-
tions for individual responsibility as to genocide. See JENNIFER TRAHAN, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: A DIGEST OF THE CASE
LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 524-27
(2006) [hereinafter TRAHAN, ICTY DIGEST] (discussing sentencing where there is both indi-
vidual and command responsibility).
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First, as to "committing," the Tribunal appears to have found229 that
Majid was a participant in a joint criminal enterprise, which is consid-
ered a form of responsibility for committing a crime. It determined that
Majid "contributed, with ... Saddam Hussein, in carrying on their joint
criminal plan, aim[ed at] and intending to eradicate the Kurds in North-
ern Iraq ... aged 15 [to] 70 years old."23' The IHT further held that
"Majid contributed, individual[ly], in executing [a] joint criminal plan
with others through issuing orders to murder, [to] cause severe physical
or mental damage[], and [to subject the Kurds] to harsh living conditions
aiming to exterminate them all.
' 232
Although the IHT did not conduct its analysis in this fashion, the re-
quirements for joint criminal enterprise responsibility-assuming that
was the form of responsibility determined-are:
(i) a plurality of persons... ;
(ii) the existence of a common plan, design or purpose which
amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for
in the Statute... ; and
229. The IHT Statute includes "common purpose" as a form of individual criminal re-
sponsibility. Specifically, the IHT Statute criminalizes:
Contributing by any other means, together with a group of persons with a common
criminal intent, to the commission or attempted commission of... a crime [covered
by the Statute] provided such contribution is intentional and is either:
1. [m]ade with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose
of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a
crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; [or]
2. [mlade with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the
crime.
IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 151SecondID. The IHT Statute does not expressly include joint
criminal enterprise. These forms of responsibility are similar, but distinct. Joint criminal en-
terprise has been an accepted form of responsibility, for example, at the ICTY, as well as at the
ICTR and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, see, e.g., TRAHAN, ICTY DIGEST, supra note
228, at 390-438 (discussing joint criminal enterprise under ICTY law), without being explic-
itly included in any of those tribunals' statutes. Therefore, if the judges in fact used joint
criminal enterprise instead of common purposes, that would not seem problematic. It is also
possible that the judges intended to use "common purpose" and not joint criminal enterprise.
230. Kvo~ka Appeals Judgment, supra note 91, 79 ("[Tlhe Appeals Chamber has held
that participation in a joint criminal enterprise is a form of 'commission'....").
231. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 516 (emphasis added).
232. Id. at 517 (emphasis added). The IHT found that "[Ba'ath] Party Command and the
Revolutionary Command Council found that the only trustable person able to carry [out] their
policy in Northern Iraq is none but... Majid." Id. at 516.
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(iii) participation of the accused in the common design involving
the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Stat-
ute.
233
A "type 1" joint criminal enterprise-which applies where the crimes are
part of a joint criminal plan 2"-also requires a showing of "shared in-
tent.' 235 Here, the IHT found that "Majid contributed.., in executing [a]
joint criminal plan with others ... premeditatedly . which ap-
proximates the intent finding. The facts found by the IHT also clearly
establish that (i) a group of individuals was involved in creating and exe-
cuting the Anfal operations (Majid, Saddam Hussein, the other
defendants, as well as others); (ii) the Anfal operations constituted a joint
criminal plan to attack and kill civilians in "prohibited zones" in the
Kurdish areas of Iraq, either transferring survivors to "camps" or execut-
ing them; and (iii) Majid clearly was involved in both creating and
implementing both the criminal plan and one or more of genocide's un-
derlying crimes.13' Thus, it appears that the elements of joint criminal
responsibility regarding genocide are met.
Second, as noted above, Majid was also convicted of "ordering"
genocide. Although the IHT again did not go through this type of analy-
sis in a clear fashion, the elements of "ordeing''238 as a form of
individual criminal responsibility require: (i) "that a person in a position
of authority instructs another person to commit an offence";2 39 (ii) "a
causal link between the act of ordering and the physical perpetration of a
233. See Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1 -A, Appeals Judgment, 227 (July 15,
1999) [hereinafter Tadie Appeals Judgment].
234. A "type I" joint criminal enterprise is
a "basic" form of joint criminal enterprise. It is represented by cases where all co-
perpetrators, acting pursuant to a common purpose, possess the same criminal in-
tention. An example is a plan formulated by the participants in the joint criminal
enterprise to kill where, although each of the participants may carry out a different
role, each of them has the intent to kill.
Prosecutor v. Vasiljevi6, Case No. IT-98-32-A, Appeals Judgment, 97 (Feb. 25, 2004) [here-
inafter Vasiljevi6 Appeals Judgment] (citation omitted).
235. Prosecutor v. Krnojelad, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, 84 (Sept. 17,
2003).
236. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 517 (emphasis added).
237. The IHT's factual findings as to both the nature of the joint criminal plan and Ma-
jid's involvement in it were based on assertions found in Document Nos. 3650 and 4008.
238. As mentioned above, the IHT convicted Majid under provisions covering both
"committing" genocide, and "ordering, soliciting or inducing" genocide. Id. While this Article
analyzes the latter conviction as though the IHT found Majid responsible for "ordering" geno-
cide, it is possible that the Tribunal intended to suggest that he was additionally responsible
for "soliciting or inducing" genocide, which also appears to be a reasonable conclusion.
239. Kordih and Cerkez Appeals Judgment, supra note 91, 28.
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crime";'40 and (iii) that the person in a position of authority ordered "an
act or omission with the awareness of the substantial likelihood that a
crime will be committed in the execution of that order" (mens rea).T4
Here, these elements appear met based on the facts as found by the IHT.
First, the Tribunal concluded that Majid was in a position of authority.
242
The IHT also found a causal link between Majid's orders and the perpe-
tration of numerous crimes.243 Finally, the IHT found that Majid both
intended to commit genocide and "acted with premeditation,, 24 there-
fore satisfying the mens rea requirement for "ordering" genocide.
Preliminarily, then, the IHT's conclusion that genocide occurred
looks warranted. Although the Tribunal could have analyzed the ele-
ments of individual criminal responsibility more clearly and thoroughly,
Majid's convictions for committing and ordering genocide appear war-
ranted based on the findings of fact.246
3. Majid's Crimes Against Humanity Convictions
The Trial Chamber convicted Majid of seven counts of crimes
against humanity based on the following underlying crimes: (i) willful
killing;247 (ii) extermination; 24' (iii) deportation or forcible transfer of
population; 29 (iv) imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental norms of international law;250 (v) tor-
ture; T5 (vi) enforced disappearances; 252 and (vii) other inhumane acts of
similar character intentionally causing great suffering or serious injury to
the body or to mental or physical health.253
Based on the IHT's findings, Majid's crimes against humanity con-
254
victions appear well-founded. The Tribunal seems to have found Majidindividually responsible as a participant in a joint criminal enterprise for
240. Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-T, Trial Judgment, T 332 (Jan. 31, 2005)
[hereinafter Strugar Trial Judgment].
241. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 and Cerkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Trial Judgment, 1 30 (Feb.
26, 2001) (emphasis added).
242. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 481 (citing Doc. No. 160).
243. Id. at 512 (citing Doc. Nos. 4008 and 3650 and Majid's orders therein, as to which
the IHT stated: "These two letters are considered the pillars upon which all attacks after [April
6, 1987] were based").
244. Id. at 516.
245. Id. at 516-17.
246. See caveats supra note 98.
247. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 526-27.
248. Id. at 537.
249. Id. at 545.
250. Id. at 552.
251. Id. at 560.
252. Id. at 568.
253. Id. at 574.
254. See caveats supra note 98.
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all of the underlying crimes except torture. As to that crime, the IHT ap-
pears to have convicted Majid on the basis of command responsibility.
These conclusions seem reasonable based on the facts as found by the
Tribunal.
The chapeau requirements for crimes against humanity have been
defined as follows: (i) there must be an attack; (ii) the acts of the perpe-
trator must be part of the attack; (iii) the attack must be directed against
any civilian population; (iv) the attack must be widespread or system-
atic; and (v) the perpetrator must know that his or her acts constitute part
of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes directed against a civil-
ian population and know that his or her acts fit into such a pattern (i.e.,
are part of the attack).255 Additionally, the IHT Statute requires that the
attack directed against the civilian population be "pursuant to or in fur-
therance of a [S]tate or organizational policy."'256
Here, the IHT explicitly found several of the chapeau requirements
met.257 As to an "attack," (prong i), the Tribunal found that the "acts
[committed] against Northern Iraq[i] Kurds and Kurdish villages ...
using massive Military Force and mistreatment ... constitute an attack
within the concept [of the Tribunal Statute] .,,258 The Tribunal also noted
that, during the course of the attack, "[a]ll [of the] [S]tate's military and
civil[ian] capabilities were exploited" and bombing from "aircraft[], ar-
tillery, rocket launchers, special ammunition [i.e. chemical weapons] and
conventional weapons, caus[ed] the death of thousands of Kurdish
civil[ian] inhabitants and injury [to] thousands [more] ....
The IHT also found that the attacks were "widespread or systematic"
as required under prong iv.26° Specifically, the IHT relied on the fact that
more than three thousand villages were targeted and that the operations
"relied on organized plans laid down and applied by officials in the for-
255. Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Trial Judgment, 181 (Nov. 30, 2005)
[hereinafter Limaj Trial Judgment]; see also Blagojevie and Jokid Trial Judgment, supra note
144, 91 541; Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 9 130; Prosecutor v. Gali, Case No. IT-
98-29-T, Trial Judgment, 91 140 (Dec. 5, 2003) [hereinafter Gali6 Trial Judgment]; Prosecutor
v. Simi6, Tadi6, and Zari6, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Trial Judgment, 37 (Oct. 17, 2003) [hereinaf-
ter Simi, Tadi6, and Zari6 Trial Judgment]; Staki/ Trial Judgment, supra note 184, 621;
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovac, and Vukovi6, Case No. IT-96-23-T, Trial Judgment, T 410 (Feb.
22, 2001).
256. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 12/Second/A.
257. The IHT did not, however, group its findings by "prongs" or "elements," and does
not use the term "chapeau." This Article does so to facilitate analyzing whether all of the re-
quired elements have been satisfied.
258. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 519 (emphasis added).
259. Id. at 521.
260. Id. at 519 ("[T]he attacks carried [out] throughout the operations known as Al Anfal
... were large scale [and] systematic.").
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mer regime., 26' As to whether the attack was "pursuant to or in further-
ance of a state or organizational policy," the IHT concluded that "all
attacks, which occurred after [June 1987] were an implementation of a
stipulated policy ... [reflected] in the instructions issued by ... Majid
,,262
The IHT does not explicitly address what this Article identifies as
prongs ii, iii, and v of the chapeau; however, based on the Tribunal's
findings, these requirements appear to be satisfied . It appears clear that
Majid's acts were part of the attack (prong ii), because according to the
IHT, it was Majid's orders that provided the catalyst for the entire Anfal
campaign.2 6 As to whether the attack was "directed against any civilian
population" (prong iii), the IHT found that "civil[ian] inhabitants in
Kurdish villages" were attacked.2 65 Finally, it appears that Majid knew
that his acts were part of a pattern of widespread or systematic crimes
directed against the civilian population, and knew of the wider context in
which his acts occurred (prong v), because Majid gave the orders for the
Anfal campaign.266 Accordingly, it appears that all of the chapeau re-
quirements of crimes against humanity were either expressly found or
are contained in the IHT's findings.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 520 (emphasis added) (referring primarily to the instructions contained in
Doc. No. 4008).
263. Minor discrepancies between this Article's analysis and the Tribunal's findings may
also be explained by the fact that the IHT may have relied on the ICC Elements of Crimes,
whereas this analysis also relies to some extent on ICTY case law.
264. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 524. The Tribunal noted:
All these tragedies and calamites, which affected the civil[ian] Kurds, were the re-
sult of orders issued by ... Majid to his henchmen ... as per a joint criminal plan,
according to Decree [160] .... To effectuate this plan or policy ... Majid issued
Letters [3650] and [4008] ....
Id.
265. See, e.g., id. at 522. The IHT also found that the attackers did not comply with "war
codes' requirements" (i.e., international humanitarian law) when the military forces carried out
the attack. Id. at 522-23. Because Iraqi forces were also clearly targeting Peshmerga as part of
the Anfal campaign, the Tribunal's omission to examine this requirement more thoroughly is
somewhat troubling, because the Anfal operations were clearly not aimed purely at civilians.
For crimes against humanity purposes, the law requires that the attack be "predominantly"
civilian in nature. Limaj Trial Judgment, supra note 255, 186. Based on the large number of
villages attacked (an estimated 3,000), Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 501,
and the fact that all individuals in the villages between the ages of fifteen and seventy (in-
cluded) were ordered killed, id. at 523, this requirement appears to be met.
266. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 524. The IHT analyzed what this
Article terms "prong v" for each of the underlying crimes, apparently finding it satisfied as to
each.
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First Underlying Crime: Willful Killing
As with genocide, a conviction for crimes against humanity requires
proof of the existence of underlying "crimes" or "acts. 267 In Majid's
case, the first underlying crime analyzed by the IHT is willful killing,
which has been defined as "the intentional killing of a person without
any lawful justification or excuse or the intentional infliction of grievous
bodily harm leading to death with knowledge that such harm will likely
cause the victim's death. 268
Here, there was no question that killing occurred without any lawful
justification or excuse as a result of the military attack on Kurdistan. The
IHT found that "thousands faded away in camps or were driven to mass
graves or field executions. '269 The IHT also examined particular killings,
such as an order by Majid "to execute 28 persons, among who[m] were
four women from Shaqlawa,"270 and an instance "when officers gathered
33 men in the village of Kurimi and shot them down, murdering 27,




As for causation (or substantial contribution), the IHT was "con-
vinced that ... Majid ordered the murder of all those found within
the Prohibited Zone ' 272 and that Majid ordered civilians to be executed
without trial.273 As to mens rea, the IHT found proof of Majid's "intent
and knowledge" based on his orders "to kill any one exist[ing] in the
restricted security area from age (15) to (70).,274 The IHT therefore con-
cluded that Majid's actions were premeditated. 275 Thus, the elements of
willful killing appear satisfied.
Second Underlying Crime: Extermination
The IHT also convicted Majid of extermination as a second underly-
ing crime against humanity.276 The IHT Statute defines "extermination"
267. See, e.g., IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 121First.
268. Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-T, Trial Judgment, 1558 (Dec. 7,
2007); see also Prosecutor v. Muhimana, Case No. ICTR-95-1 B-T, Trial Judgment, 568
(Apr. 28, 2005).
269. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 521.
270. Id. at 523.
271. Id. at 522.
272. Id. at 526 (basing its conclusion on Majid's orders in Doc. Nos. 3650 and 4008);
see also id. at 521 ("[Majid] issued instructions to all military commanders in the region, as
per Letter [4008] ... prohibiting the existence of any human or animal ... within Prohibited
Zone[s], killing any person found there... .
273. Id. at 526.
274. Id. at 532 (relying on orders appearing in Doc. No. 4008). The IHT also concluded
that Majid had "intent and will." Id. at 523.
275. Id. at 536, 526.
276. Id. at 537.
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as the "intentional infliction of [harsh] living conditions, such as the dep-
rivation of access to food and medicine, with the intent to bring about the
destruction of part of the population. 277 Case law also defines extermina-
tion as murder on a mass scale that is intentionally inflicted . The IHT's
conclusion that extermination occurred appears supported under either
definition.
First, as to the occurrence of murder on a mass scale, the IHT looked
279
at the size of the attack over Kurdistan, which "covered four gover-
norates, ' '28 0 as well as Majid's expressed intentions to target everyone
from the ages of fifteen to seventy and to kill the greatest number possi-
ble.28 ' The IHT also looked to evidence of mass graves.282 The Tribunal
noted that estimates of the dead as a result of the Anfal campaign
reached as high as 182,000.283 It also found an estimated 1,800 died in
prison. Second, the IHT found facts showing the intentional infliction
of harsh living conditions. The IHT looked to conditions at the detention
camps of Tupzawa, Nuqrat al-Salman, and Nazarki, and concluded that
the detainees "were exposed to harsh conditions[,] such as [a] lack of
medical care and food shortage[s]., 285 "Most of the victims confirmed
that the daily personal ration was one or two loaves of bread[,] and hun-
dreds of them died in those horrible prisons.'286 The IHT further
concluded that Majid "premeditated issuing orders to carry out [extermi-
nation] against the Kurdish civilian inhabitants in northern Iraq. 287
Accordingly, the elements of this underlying crime appear met.
277. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 12/Second/B. The IHT Statute was probably in-
tended to track the ICC Statute, under which "extermination" "includes" (but is not limited to)
"the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and
medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population" ICC Elements of
Crimes, supra note 146, art. 7(l)(b). The more limited definition under the IHT Statute,
caused by the absence of the word "includes," may thus be a typographical error.
278. For example, the ICTY stated that the elements of the crime of extermination are:
a) [an] act or omission that results in the death of persons on a massive scale (actus
reus), and
b) the intent to kill persons on a massive scale, or to inflict serious bodily injury or
create conditions of life that lead to the death in the reasonable knowledge that such
act or omission is likely to cause the death of a large number of persons (mens rea).
Blagojevie and Joki6 Trial Judgment, supra note 144, 1 572.
279. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 529.
280. Id. at 530.
281. Id. at 529.
282. Id. at 530, 531, 536.
283. Id. at 501.
284. Id. at 533.
285. Id. at 532.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 536.
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Third Underlying Crime: Deportation or Forcible Transfer
The third underlying crime against humanity of which Majid was
convicted was deportation or forcible transfer of a population. 288 The IHT
Statute defines this crime as "forced displacement of the persons con-
cerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they
are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international
law."'289 The IHT concluded that, during the Anfal, Iraqi military forces
"destroyed more than three thousand villages and transferred the civilian
inhabitants, men, children and women ... forcibly dislocat[ing] them
after arresting them contrary to ... national and international law.' 2
90
The IHT also specifically found that the populations transfers (i) were
against the will of the individuals being transferred, 9' (ii) were not justi-
fied by military necessity, 92 and (iii) were not justified on the basis of
protecting the individuals involved2 93 (an argument Majid invoked).9
As to Majid's role, the IHT concluded that he ordered "dislocation to
compounds" 295 and that civilian inhabitants were threatened "to leave
their houses and area or else they [would] be held responsible."'2 96 The
IHT also found that Majid "confessed [to] dislocating families to com-
pounds prepared for such purposes. ' 297 The Tribunal concluded that
288. Id. at 545.
289. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 12/SecondID; see also Simi6, Tadi6, and Zari6 Trial
Judgment, supra note 255, 121 ("Both deportation and unlawful or forcible transfer relate to
the involuntary and unlawful displacement, or movement, or relocation, or removal of persons
from the territory in which they reside."); id. 122 ("Forcible transfer [as opposed to deporta-
tion] has been defined as a forced removal or displacement of people from one area to another
which may take place within the same national borders.").
290. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 539 (emphasis added).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 541. The IHT found:
[T]he existence of Kurdish resistance ([Peshmerga]) does not justify such system-
atic wide scales [sic] attack against more than three thousands [sic] villages,
exploiting all [the] government's military capabilities from aircrafts [sic], helicop-
ters, armors [sic] rocket launchers and special ammunitions ... All this super power
was targeted against civil[ian] villagers ... [T]he IHT is totally convinced that there
was no justification for such an attack ....
Id. In looking at whether there was military necessity, the IHT may be confusing this underly-
ing crime (where necessity is no defense), with the underlying crime of "ordering the
displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security
of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand." See IHT Statute, supra
note 12, art. 131FourthIH.
293. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 544 ("[T]o allege or say that
coercive dislocation was implemented for the security of civilians, will not convince the [HT,
because] letters number 3650 and 4008 [note that] civil[ian] inhabitants escaped their villages
after... [being] bombard[ed] with... [chemical] and conventional weapons.").
294. Id. at 478.
295. Id. at 542 (relying on Doc. Nos. 3650 and 4008).
296. Id. at 543.
297. Id.
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"[h]uge numbers of civil[ian] inhabitants were coercively dislocated as
the number of burned down and demolished villages reached more than
3000 ... .,,298 Thus, the IHT found that there were mass displacements,
the displacements were coercive, and the displacements were not per-
missible under international law.2 Also, the IHT concluded that Majid
acted with "criminal intent" in dislocating civilian inhabitants from their
villages, arresting them, and detaining them in camps.3°° Accordingly, the
elements of forcible population transfer appear met.
Fourth Underlying Crime: Imprisonment or Unlawful Confinement
The elements of the crime against humanity of imprisonment or
unlawful confinement have been defined as: (i) an individual is deprived
of his or her liberty; (ii) the deprivation of liberty is imposed arbitrarily
(that is, with no legal justification); and (iii) there is an act or omission
performed by the accused "with the intent ... or in the reasonable
knowledge that his act or omission is likely to cause arbitrary deprivation
of physical liberty."3 1
The IHT found that Majid ordered the detention of arrested102
persons, and that imprisonment or detention "had been proved by
victims who stayed for a variety of periods at Tupzawa, Nazrki Bahirka
or Nuqrat Al-Salman camps. ' ' For example, detainees at the Bahiraka
camp "remained for a year and [a] half."3°4 The IHT also found that the
deprivations of liberty were imposed "randomly[,] without trials or
considering [the victims'] rights."30 5 Finally, the facts also suggest that
Majid acted with the requisite intent, as he admitted to the IHT that "no
detainee [could] be released unless he [said] so."306 Accordingly, the
298. Id. One victim testified that there were 7,000 children, women, and elderly detained
at Nuqrat Al-Salman alone. Id.
299. There is no suggestion that the individuals subject to displacement were not law-
fully present.
300. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 544.
301. Simi6, Tadi6, and Zari6 Trial Judgment, supra note 255, 64; see also Prosecutor v.
Kmojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-T, Trial Judgment, 115 (Mar. 15, 2002). The ICC Elements of
Crimes state the elements of imprisonment or severe deprivation of physical liberty to be: "(i)
the perpetrator imprisoned one or more persons[,] or otherwise severely deprived one or more
persons of physical liberty, and (ii) the gravity of the conduct was such that it was in violation
of fundamental rules of international law." ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, art.
7(1)(e) (including also the chapeau requirements).




305. Id. at 551. As part of the discussion of this crime, the IHT also examined the "in-
human maltreatment" and "physical assault" suffered by detainees at the camps. Id. at 549.
However, such conditions do not appear relevant to this crime.
306. ld. at 547.
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elements of imprisonment or unlawful confinement roughly appear to
have been shown.
Fifth Underlying Crime: Torture
Majid was also convicted of torture as an underlying crime against
humanity.37 The IHT Statute defines torture as "the intentional infliction
of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in
the custody or under the control of the accused .... Based on the evi-
dence before it, the IHT determined that torture took many forms during
the Anfal, including summary executions, beatings, solitary confinement
for long periods of time while blindfolded, hangings, deprivation of
food, deprivation of basic hygiene and medical care, rape, and other acts
of sexual violence that occurred at the prison camps, including acts by
camp commanders and guards.3 9 These findings clearly suggest that tor-
ture occurred.3 °
Sixth Underlying Crime: Enforced Disappearances
The IHT further convicted Majid of enforced disappearances as an
underlying crime against humanity.3 ' The IHT Statute defines "enforced
disappearances" as:
[i] the arrest, detention or abduction of persons [ii] by, or with
the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a po-
litical organization, [iii] followed by a refusal to acknowledge
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or
whereabouts of those persons, [iv] with the intention of remov-
ing them from the protection of the law for a prolonged period
of time.
312
Here, as to the first requirement, the IHT relied on extensive victim
and witness testimony about family members who "disappeared" with-
out explanation.33 In fact, these disappearances were so pervasive that,
as explained above, the Kurds developed a term to describe the victims:
307. Id. at 560.
308. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 12/Second/E.
309. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 553.
310. As to the requirement that the person tortured was in the custody or under the con-
trol of the accused, the IHT found that Majid "was the absolute leader in the northern area."
Id. at 478 (relying on Decree No. 160). In fact, Majid admitted to the Tribunal that "no de-
tainee [could] be released unless he [said] so'" Id. at 547. Thus, the IHT concluded that Majid
ordered the imprisonments, id. at 548, which suggests that the requirements of "custody" or
"control" were essentially met.
311. Id. at 568.
312. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 121SecondG.
313. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 563-64.
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the "Anfalized.'31 4 The IHT noted that each victim who appeared before
the IHT submitted a list of between thirty and seventy names of persons
missing from his or her village.3"5 The Tribunal concluded that thousands
of these persons are still missing.36 The IHT also found that the State
contributed to the detentions, arrests, and coercive harboring (the second
requirement),3  and found that victims were denied information about
the fate of those who had disappeared, 3 " despite instances of personal
demand (the third requirement) .39 Finally, the facts suggest the intent to
remove the victims from "the protection of the law for a prolonged pe-
riod of time" (the fourth requirement). 320 As to Majid's role, the IHT
concluded that he "premeditated and ordered the harboring of individu-
als, coercively, 321 and that "[t]his order had been carried [out] by his
subordinates[,] causing the harbor [disappearance] of countless numbers
of civil[ian] inhabitants. 322 Accordingly, the elements of this crime ap-
pear satisfied.
Seventh Underlying Crimes: Other Inhumane Acts
The IHT additionally convicted Majid of "other inhumane acts" as a
crime against humanity.323 This underlying crime was "deliberately de-
signed as a residual category. ' 324 For an act to qualify as an "other
inhumane act," (i) the victim must have suffered serious bodily or mental
harm, the degree of severity being assessed on a case-by-case basis with
due regard for individual circumstances; (ii) the suffering must be the
result of an act or omission of the accused or his subordinate; and, (iii)
when the offense was committed, the accused or his subordinate must
have been motivated by the intent to inflict serious bodily or mental
harm on the victim.1
25
314. Id. at 565.
315. Id. at 566-67.
316. Id. at 566.
317. Id. ("[A]ll [of the] [S]tate's capabilities had been exploited to implement AI-Anfal
campaigns.").
318. Id.
319. Id. at 567.
320. For example, detainees at the Bahiraka camp "remained for a year and [a] half." Id.
at 548.
321. Id. at 568.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 574.
324. Kordi6 and Cerkez Appeals Judgment, supra note 91, 839; see also Prosecutor v.
Kupregki et al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, 563 (Jan. 14, 2000).
325. Kordid and Cerkez Appeals Judgment, supra note 91, 117; see also Prosecutor v.
Blagki, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Judgment, 243 (Mar. 3, 2000) [hereinafter Blagkie Trial
Judgment].
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Here, based primarily on eye-witness testimony, the IHT concluded
that "Kurdish civil[ian] inhabitants in North[em] Iraq, [e]specially the
females, were exposed to harsh inhuman suffer[ing], physical and psy-
chological damages, and coercive sexual assault. 326 The Tribunal further
found that the crimes occurred under Majid's "full awareness and ac-
knowledgement .... Camp officers were "fully aware of [Majid's]
criminal intentions ... to partially or totally eradicate the Kurds in
Northern Iraq., 321 "[A]s a guard told one of the victims at Nuqrat al-
Salman prison camp: 'they brought you here to die not to live.' ,329 Thus,
the findings of the IHT show that (i) serious bodily or mental harm oc-
curred; (ii) the suffering appears to have been the result of Majid's
ordering individuals to be detained in camps in circumstances in which
camp officers were "fully aware of [Majid's] criminal intentions" that
many Kurds not survive; and (iii) subordinates of Majid-camp
guards-clearly acted with intent when they perpetrated these crimes.
Although the IHT failed to apply the law to these facts in a precise man-
ner, the factual findings seem to show that this underlying crime
occurred.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
The final inquiry in a crimes against humanity case is whether the
particular defendant is sufficiently connected to the crimes to warrant
individual criminal responsibility.33° Here, it appears that the IHT con-
victed Majid of being a participant in a joint criminal enterprise (a form
of "committing") with regard to six of the underlying crimes.33" ' As to the
underlying crime of torture, it appears that the Tribunal convicted Majid
of "command responsibility."332 This Article's preliminary conclusion is
that the IHT's finding of these forms of responsibility is warranted.333
326. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 572. In particular, the Tribunal
focused on findings of rape and psychological harm. Id. at 366-67.
327. Id. at 573 (page 573 is erroneously labeled as a second page 572).
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 15 (listing forms of individual criminal respon-
sibility).
331. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 526 (finding a joint criminal
enterprise regarding murder); id. at 537 (finding a joint criminal enterprise regarding extermi-
nation); id. at 545 (finding a joint criminal enterprise regarding deportation or forcible
transfer); id. at 552 (finding a joint criminal enterprise regarding imprisonment or other severe
deprivation of physical liberty); id. at 568 (finding a joint criminal enterprise regarding en-
forced disappearances); id. at 573-74 (finding a joint criminal enterprise regarding other
inhumane acts).
332. Id. at 560.
333. See caveats supra note 98.
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Although the IHT did not go through the elements required for joint
criminal enterprise responsibility (or did not do so in a clear fashion), the
elements appear present in the IHT's factual findings.114 Here-as al-
ready shown above regarding genocide 335-the facts clearly established
that (i) a group of individuals was involved in creating and executing the
Anfal operations; (ii) the Anfal operations constituted a joint criminal
plan to attack and kill civilians in "prohibited zones" in Kurdish areas of
Iraq, either transferring survivors to "camps" or executing them;3 6 and
(iii) Majid clearly was involved in both creating and implementing the
criminal plan involving one or more of the underlying crimes.
Additionally, as mentioned above, for a "type 1" joint criminal en-
terprise,"7 it is necessary to show shared intent.38 Here, the IHT appears
to find that Majid had the requisite intent for all of the underlying crimes
except "other inhumane acts., 339 Thus, as to five of the underlying
crimes, the IHT's conclusion that there was a joint criminal enterprise-
a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise, to be specific-seems appropriate.
As to "other inhumane acts," the IHT suggests that the acts, such as
rape, were "logic[all to expect.' 340 This finding suggests that as to that
crime, Majid's role should perhaps have been characterized as a partici-
pant in a "type 3" criminal enterprise,' which exists when the crimes
were a "natural and foreseeable consequence" of the joint criminal en-
terprise, even if, for example, rape was not part of Majid's original plan.
The mental state required for a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise also
334. For a list of the elements of joint criminal responsibility, see supra note 233 and
accompanying text.
335. See supra Part U.B.2 (offering a discussion of "[i]ndividual criminal responsibility"
regarding Majid's genocide convictions).
336. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 524 ("All these tragedies
and calamites, which affected the civil[ian] Kurds, were the result of orders issued by ...
Majid to his henchmen ... as per a joint criminal plan, according to Decree [160] .... To
effectuate this plan or policy ... [Majid] issued Letters [3650] and [4008]... .
337. See supra note 234 (defining a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise).
338. Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, 84 (Sept. 17,
2003) [hereinafter Krnojelac Appeals Judgment].
339. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 526 (concluding that Majid's
actions were premeditated as to willful killing); id. at 536 (concluding that Majid's actions
were premeditated as to extermination); id. at 544 (concluding that Majid acted with "criminal
intent" as to deportation or forcible transfer); id. at 547-48 (finding facts suggesting that Ma-
jid acted with intent as to imprisonment); id. at 568 (concluding that Majid acted with
premeditation as to enforced disappearances).
340. Id. at 573 (page 573 is erroneously labeled as a second page 572).
341. The ICTY has found that "[tlhe third, 'extended' form of joint criminal enterprise
entails responsibility for crimes committed beyond the common purpose, but which are never-
theless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the common purpose." Kvoka Appeals
Judgment, supra note 91, 83. The actus reus of the joint criminal enterprise is the same
whether it is "type 1" or "type 3." Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 1 260.
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appears to have been shown.3 4' Accordingly, the IHT's conclusion that
there was a joint criminal enterprise as to "other inhumane acts" also
seems appropriate, provided it was a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise.'
As to torture, the IHT appears to have found Majid responsible
under a theory of command responsibility. ' The elements of command
responsibility are: (i) the existence of a superior-subordinate relation-
ship; (ii) the superior's real or constructive knowledge that the criminal
act was about to be or had been committed; and (iii) the superior's
failure to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal act or punish the perpetrator thereof.-45
Effective control (necessary to prove the first requirement)3 46 was ar-
guably shown, for example, by the IHT's findings that Majid "was the
absolute leader in the northern area,' 347 that Majid had ordered the im-
prisonments,34 ' and by Majid's admission that "no detainee [could] be
released unless he [said] so.""' 9 As to the second requirement, the IHT
concluded that Majid knew of the crimes being committed by his subor-
dinates.3 ° In particular, the IHT looked at documentary evidence, in
which Majid wrote: "We don't mind cutting off the traitors['] heads, but
it had been [sic] preferable to send them to security for investigation,
hoping to extract some useful info[rmation], prior to execution. 35'
342. The mens rea for a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise requires:
First, the accused must have the intention to participate in and contribute to the
common criminal purpose. Second, ... the accused must also know that such a
crime might be perpetrated by a member of the group, and willingly take the risk
that the crime might occur by joining or continuing to participate in the enterprise.
Kvoika Appeals Judgment, supra note 91, 83. Here, the IHT found, first, that Majid had
criminal intentions "to partially or totally eradicate the Kurds in Northern Iraq"; and, second,
that the crimes occurred "under [the] full awareness and acknowledgement of ... Majid as he
included [in] his criminal plan or policy, the segregation of men and women, putting them
under strict surveillance of young guards." Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at
573 (page 573 is erroneously labeled as a second page 572).
343. It should be noted that the IHT does not discuss any of the "joint criminal enter-
prise" charges or findings by "type" of joint criminal enterprise. Given that the judges
involved had never adjudicated these types of crimes, and given the vagueness of the charges,
see supra Part I.C, their failure to be more specific is understandable. Yet, the lack of specific-
ity regarding the form of individual criminal responsibility is a failing, and also makes it
extremely hard for a defendant to craft arguments on appeal, thereby potentially frustrating
appellate rights.
344. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 560.
345. Kordie and ierkez Appeals Judgment, supra note 91, T 839.
346. See TRAHAN, ICTY DIGEST, supra note 228, at 451-57.
347. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 496.
348. Id. at 548.
349. Id. at 547.
350. Id. at 557.
351. Id. at 559 (citing Doc. No. 2083, also identified by the IHT as Doc. No. 5083).
There is some dispute over whether the writing is that of Majid, see id. at 482 (attributing the
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Moreover, in an audio recording, Majid stated: "I deprived them from
working in Kirkuk and its neighborhoods and villages, some I impris-
oned, detained or beating by stick [sic]. 35 2 The IHT concluded that these
statements showed "instigation and provocation to carry out torture
... .. The Tribunal also found that Majid did not take necessary meas-
ures to prevent the perpetration of these acts (part of the third
requirement).3 54 Thus, the elements of command responsibility appear
roughly met for this final underlying crime.
Accordingly, based on its factual findings, the IHT appears to have
correctly concluded that crimes against humanity occurred. It also ap-
pears that the IHT appropriately convicted Majid as a participant in a
joint criminal enterprise, or for command responsibility as to these
crimes.355
Failure to Charge and to Find Rape
This Article does have one remaining criticism with the Tribunal's
decision regarding Majid. When discussing "torture" and "other inhu-
356
mane acts," the IHT concluded that rape occurred in prison camps.
However, neither Majid, nor any other defendant, was charged with or
convicted of rape as a war crime or underlying crime against humanity.
While Majid may not have personally committed rape-the IHT did not
refer to evidence of this-the rapes committed during the Anfal clearly
were a foreseeable risk of the joint criminal enterprise. This suggests that
Majid could have been charged with, and convicted of, rape on the basis
of a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise. While the judges did place some
emphasis on crimes that particularly impacted Kurdish women,357 this
emphasis was not an adequate substitute. The lack of proper attention to
rape being committed per se results in: (i) insufficient acknowledgement
of the suffering of the victims of this crime; (ii) insufficient attention to
the criminal aspects of rape; and (iii) insufficient attention to the suffer-
ing of women, in particular, as victims of the Anfal campaign.
comments to Majid), or Saddam Hussein, see id. at 611 (attributing the comments to Saddam
Hussein).
352. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). This suggests that Majid might also have been con-
victed of "committing" torture, depending on the severity of the beatings.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 399. There is also no suggestion that Majid punished the perpetrators.
355. See caveats supra note 98.
356. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 556, 570.
357. See, e.g., id. at 569-70 ("All these crimes ... add[] up [to] other inhuman crimes
with [a] similar nature ... such as degrading human[] dignity, especially [that oA] the Kurdish
[women], as [they were] exposed to harsh suffering affecting [them] psychologically as well as
physically." (emphasis added)); id. at 572 ("Kurdish civil[ian] inhabitants in North[em] Iraq,
[e]specially the females, were exposed to harsh inhuman suffer[ing], physical and psychologi-
cal damages, and coercive sexual assault." (emphasis added)).
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4. Majid's War Crimes Convictions
The Trial Chamber convicted Majid of five counts of war crimes:
(i) intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population;358
(ii) ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons re-
lated to the conflict;359 (iii) intentionally directing attacks against
buildings dedicated to religious or educational purposes, or against hos-
pitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected;
31
(iv) pillage;36' and (v) destroying or seizing the property of an adver-
sary.162 This Article's preliminary conclusion, based on the facts as found
by the IHT, is that four of Majid's five war crimes convictions appear
well-founded.363
To obtain a conviction for war crimes, it is initially necessary to sat-
isfy the preconditions, or chapeau requirements. First, there must be
"armed conflict."3" Here, the IHT concluded that there was internal
• / 365
armed conflict, not merely a domestic disturbance. Second, one must
show that the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that estab-
lish the existence of armed conflict.366 Here, the IHT concluded that
Majid was "fully aware" of such factual conditions.367 Third, there must
be a nexus between the crimes and the armed conflict. 368 The IHT held
358. Id. at 582.
359. Id. at 586-87.
360. Id. at 592.
361. Id. at 596.
362. Id. at 600-01.
363. See caveats supra note 98. It is the fifth war crime, destroying or seizing the prop-
erty of an adversary, as to which this Article has concerns.
364. The armed conflict may be "international" or "internal" in character, and that de-
termination will determine which war crimes are covered. Here, the war crimes of which the
defendants were convicted all pertain to internal armed conflict. See IHT Statute, supra note
12, art. 13/Fourth (governing "[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs of war appli-
cable in armed conflict not of an international character"),
365. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 579; see also id. at 584 ("All
[defendants] confirmed the existence of internal armed dispute."). The IHT seems to charac-
terize the Anfal as an "attack" against the civilian Kurdish population for purposes of crimes
against humanity analysis, see supra text accompanying note 258, but as a "military conflict"
for purposes of its war crimes analysis. The author questions whether it can simultaneously be
both, and suggests that both characterizations appear oversimplified.
366. See, e.g., ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, art. 8(2)(a)(i)(5).
367. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 595; see also id. at 579 ("[Ma-
jid] knew of... circumstances [indicating the existence of armed conflict] when he used this
huge [armed] force and special ammunition [chemical weapons] .... ).
368. Limaj Trial Judgment, supra note 255, 91 ("[T]o meet the jurisdictional precondi-
tions ... [for violations of the laws or customs of war], the Prosecution must establish not
only the existence of an armed conflict but also a sufficient link between the alleged acts of
the accused and the armed conflict...."); see also ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 146,
art. 8(2)(c)-(e) (listing the elements necessary to prove various war crimes, including, in all
cases, a showing that "[t]he conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an
armed conflict not of an international character" (emphasis added)).
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that the crimes "were committed in a time and geographic frame during
the military conflict (1987-88) linked to the attack on Kurdistan in Al-
Anfal operations. ' 69 Accordingly, the chapeau requirements appear met.
First War Crime: Intentionally Directing Attacks Against the Civilian
Population
The first war crime, intentionally directing attacks against the civil-
ian population, occurs where: (i) the perpetrator directed acts of violence
against the civilian population or individual civilians not taking direct
part in hostilities, causing death or serious injury to body or health
within the civilian population; and (ii) the offender wilfully (i.e., inten-
tionally) made the civilian population or individual civilians not taking
direct part in hostilities the object of those acts of violence."37 According
to the IHT, "[b]efore starting Al-Anfal operations and the wide scale at-
tacks on Kurdistan, there were scattered unorganized attacks [violating]
the [laws of war] and international conventions ... but during Al-
Anfal[,] the attacks, were more severe and cruel against the civilians. '31 '
In concluding that these attacks were aimed at civilians, the IHT relied
on documents revealing the use of chemical weapons,372 as well as victim
and witness testimony.373 Furthermore, because chemical weapons were
used, the IHT specifically rejected the argument that Majid had advanced
that the military operations were necessary, finding that "chemical
369. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 579 (referring to the war crime
of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population); see also id. at 584 ("These
orders are correlated to an existing conflict between [the] Iraqi regime and [Peshmerga]
Forces.").
370. Galie Trial Judgment, supra note 255, 56. The ICC Element of Crimes identify
similar elements:
I. The perpetrator directed an attack.
2. The object of the attack was a civilian population as such or individual civil-
ians not taking direct part in hostilities.
3. The perpetrator intended the civilian population as such or individual civilians
not taking direct part in hostilities to be the object of the attack.
4. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed
conflict not of an international character.
5. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the exis-
tence of an armed conflict.
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, art. 8(2)(e)(i).
371. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 576.
372. Id.
373. See id. at 577-79. For example, some witnesses stated that they found corpses of
children holding baby bottles in their mouths, and one witness testified to losing more than
seventy persons in his family, including his mother, daughter, brother, and four young sons
and nephews. Id.
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weapons' usage means [a] lack of distinguishing between civilians and
fighters." '374 The IHT concluded that "Majid issued orders to conduct at-
tacks against civil[ian] inhabitants, 375 and that he acted with intent.376
Accordingly, the elements of this war crime appear met.
Second War Crime: Ordering the Displacement of the Civilian
Population for Reasons Related to the Conflict
The comparable war crime of "displacing civilians" under the ICC
Statute has the following elements: (i) the perpetrator ordered a dis-
placement of a civilian population; (ii) such order was not justified by
the security of the civilians involved or by military necessity; and (iii)
the perpetrator was in a position to effect such displacement by giving
such order.377
As to this crime, the IHT relied on documentary evidence that re-
ported that "all saboteurs' families were dislocated '3 78 and on Majid's
admission that "I am the one in charge of dislocation or relocation into
compounds ... ,,37' The IHT concluded "it is clear that orders of disloca-
tion and relocation were issued by . .. Majid.' 380 The IHT also observed
that "most of [the] plaintiffs and victims stated that civilians were dislo-
cated from more than 300[0] villages., 38' These findings appear to
establish both that Majid ordered civilian displacements and that he was
in a position to do so.
Additionally, the IHT rejected the argument that displacements were
for the security of the civilians, as the civilians "were dislocated to de-
tention and prison camps, where they were put under firm surveillance
by the Iraqi government."82 The IHT also rejected the argument that dis-
placement was based on "military necessity. ' 383 The IHT instead
concluded that the displacements were politically motivated and served
374. "Military necessity" is not an affirmative defense to the crime in any event. See ICC
Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, art. 8(2)(e)(i).
375. AlAnfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 581.
376. Id. at 582.
377. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, art. 8(2)(e)(viii). These elements are in
addition to the chapeau requirements.
378. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 584 (quoting Doc. No. 4151).
"Saboteurs" refers to Peshmerga.
379. Id.
380. Id. (citing Doc. Nos. 3650 and 4008).
381. Id.
382. Id. at 586. The way in which the IHT words this finding of fact raises concerns that
the IHT may have put the burden of proof on the defendant.
383. See id. at 584 ("Is it logic[al] to claim [that] the destruction of all those villages and
dislocation of civilians [was] for military [necessity] ... as the majority of those victims are
elder[ly], children and women?"). The way in which the IHT words this finding of fact again
raises concerns as to whether it put the burden of proof on the defendant.
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to further the "Arabization of vast regions in Kurdistan, changing the
demography of Kirkuk."3" Accordingly, all of the elements of this war
crime appear to have been established.
Third War Crime: Intentionally Directing Attacks Against Buildings
Dedicated to Religious or Educational Purposes, or Against Hospitals
and Places Where the Sick and Wounded Are Collected
This crime occurs where: (i) an attack has caused damage or destruc-
tion to protected property; (ii) the damaged or destroyed property was
not used for military purposes at the time that the acts of hostility di-
rected against these objects took place; and (iii) the act was carried out
with the intent to damage or destroy the property in question!"
The IHT found that, during the Anfal campaign, "more than 3000
villages were totally destroyed," including approximately 1,000 primary
and preparatory schools, more than 2,000 mosques, and a medical
clinic. The Tribunal concluded that these buildings were destroyed as a
result of Majid's orders38 and that Majid "ordered [forces] to launch
raids over protected buildings ....,,38 The IHT's findings also roughly
suggest that the buildings were not "military objectives" (i.e., were not
used for military purposes at the time of the attack),38 9 and that Majid
acted with intent.3 90 Accordingly, the elements of this war crime appear
roughly established.
Fourth War Crime: Pillage
Majid was also convicted of the war crime of pillage. Its elements
require that: (i) the perpetrator appropriated certain property; (ii) the
perpetrator intended to deprive the owner of the property and to appro-
priate it for private or personal use; and (iii) the appropriation was
without the consent of the owner.391
In a letter used as evidence at trial, Majid wrote: "'Whatever na-
tional defense regiments' consultants and fighters confiscate belong[s] to
384. Id. at 586.
385. Strugar Trial Judgment, supra note 240, 312; see also ICC Elements of Crimes,
supra note 146, art. 8(2)(e)(iv) (war crime of attacking protected objects).
386. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 589.
387. Id. at 590 (citing Doc. Nos. 3650 and 4008).
388. Id. at 591.
389. Id. at 592. The IHT stated: "There is no excuse to justify the total destruction as ...
military necessity." Id. at 592. The IHT is possibly confusing "military necessity" with
whether the buildings were used for military purposes. The IHT certainly alluded to no evi-
dence that the schools, mosques, and medical clinic were used for military purposes.
390. See id. at 591 (noting that, as "part of this joint plan and intent," Majid "aimed" and
ordered the launching of raids on protected buildings).
391. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, art. 8(2)(e)(v). These elements are in
addition to the chapeau requirements.
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them, free of charge.' ,3 92 Additionally, witnesses provided testimony as
to the looting of, among other things, food, blankets, watches, money,
livestock, jewelry, and a tractor.393 The IHT concluded that the soldiers,
as well as intelligence and security personnel, "coercively confiscated
Kurds' properties and money[, and] ... the spoils were declared as their
rights, following... Majid['s] orders."394 The IHT also found that Majid
"permitted robbery, instigating and encouraging ... it by granting the
right, for National Defense Regiments' fighters, to confiscate Kurdish
villagers' properties. This was a clear signal to military and security sys-
tems, to perpetrate these acts as they will not be legally charged for it."'39
The IHT concluded that Majid acted "premeditatedly" when he "incited
others to loot. 396 Accordingly, the elements of this crime appear roughly
met.
397
Fifth War Crime: Destroying or Seizing the Property of an Adversary
As to this crime, the Tribunal found that there was extensive destruc-
tion of property during the Anfal. 98 Specifically, the IHT concluded that
"[m]ore than 3000 villages, including schools, clinics, mosques, houses,
fountains, and electricity stations were burned down."3 99 Furthermore,
Majid "confessed [to] giving orders to destroy Kurdish villages in
Northern Iraq." ° The IHT additionally found that the destruction was
not demanded by the necessities of the conflict.
40°
392. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 593.
393. Id. at 594.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 596.
396. Id. at 595.
397. Because the ICC Elements of Crimes is worded as if the defendant were always
personally committing the crimes, it is not easily applied to other forms of responsibility (such
as, for example, responsibility for "ordering" the commission of the crime).
398. See, e.g., Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 598 (recalling testi-
mony as to villages being destroyed).
399. Id.
400. Id. at 599.
401. The IHT stated that
[Majid] confessed many times to [the] IHT that he ordered the destruction of vil-
lages [thought] to contain or shelter [Peshmerga] fighters. .... Targeting villages
claiming that they provide shelter for Kurdish fighters does not justify eradication,
or total demolition of [the] villages, as military necessities. If we assume that war
efforts imposed a security belt all along [the] Iraqi borders, such condition[s] will
not also justify the implementation of murders, massacres, [and] large scaled prop-
ert[y] devastation without differentiation.
Id. at 600.
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An issue arises here as to whether the IHT found that the destroyed
property was that "of an adversary," as the crime appears to require.' If
"adversary" is read to mean a military adversary, then that element has
not been shown because civilians are not "adversaries," and the testi-
mony cited pertained only to the destruction of villages and villagers'
property."3 Accordingly, it is unclear if this final war crime was proven.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
The final inquiry is whether the particular defendant involved is suf-
ficiently linked to the crimes to warrant individual criminal
responsibility. Here, it appears that the IHT convicted Majid of being a
participant in a joint criminal enterprise with regard to all war cimes.4 4
This Article's preliminary conclusion is that the IHT's finding of this
form of responsibility appears warranted.4 5
All of the acts required for showing joint criminal enterprise respon-
sibility-such as the existence of a group of perpetrators, the existence
of a joint criminal plan, and participation by the accused-appear to
have been established, as discussed above406Additionally, for a "type 1"
402. The elements of the war crime of destroying or seizing the enemy's property re-
quire:
1. The perpetrator destroyed or seized certain property.
2. Such property was property of an adversary.
3. Such property was protected from that destruction or seizure under the inter-
national law of armed conflict.
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established the
status of the property.
5. The destruction or seizure was not required by military necessity.
6. The conduct took place in the context of and was associated with an armed
conflict not of an international character.
7. The perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the exis-
tence of an armed conflict.
ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, art. 8(2)(e)(xii) (emphasis added). The sixth and
seventh prongs are analyzed in this Article as chapeau requirements because they are common
to all of the war crimes.
403. See, e.g., Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 594.
404. See id. at 582 (finding a joint criminal enterprise regarding intentionally directing
attacks); id. at 585 (finding a joint criminal enterprise regarding ordering displacement); id. at
591 (finding a joint criminal enterprise regarding intentionally directing attacks against pro-
tected buildings); id. at 595 (finding a joint criminal enterprise regarding pillage); id. at 599
(finding a joint criminal enterprise regarding destroying or seizing the property of an adver-
sary).
405. See caveats supra note 98.
406. See discussion of individual criminal responsibility regarding Majid's convictions
for genocide and crimes against humanity supra Parts II.B.2, II.B.3.
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joint criminal enterprise, it is necessary to show "shared intent.' 407 Here,
the IHT found that Majid intended or premeditated all of the war
crimes.48 Accordingly, the IHT's conclusion that there was a joint crimi-
nal enterprise as to these war crimes appears appropriate, if one accepts
the IHT's findings of fact.
Even if there were not a joint criminal enterprise, the Tribunal's con-
clusions generally suggest that it could have convicted Majid
additionally or alternatively under other theories of individual criminal
responsibility. For example, as to intentionally directing attacks against
the civilian population, the IHT found that "Majid issued orders to con-
duct attacks against civil[ian] inhabitants, 409 which suggests "ordering"
as a form of responsibility. With respect to ordering displacement, the
IHT also concluded that Majid "perpetrat[ed] coercive dislocation of
civil[ian] inhabitants ... through his orders,4 10 which suggests "commit-
ting" and/or "ordering" as possible forms of responsibility. Next, as to
intentionally directing attacks against protected buildings, the IHT con-
cluded that Majid "ordered [forces] to launch raids, ' '411 which also
suggests "ordering" as a form of responsibility. Finally, as to destroying
or seizing the property of an adversary, the IHT found that Majid "con-
fessed [to] giving orders to destroy Kurdish villages in Northern Iraq,, 412
which again suggests "ordering" as a form of responsibility.
4 13
Accordingly, this Article concludes that four of the five war crimes
convictions of Majid appear to have a solid basis, based on the facts as
found by the Tribunal.44 Furthermore, while Majid's war crimes convic-
tions appear supportable under a joint criminal enterprise theory, he
407. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, T 84.
408. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 582 ("[Majidl intentionally
contributed and issued orders to direct attacks against civil[ian] inhabitants in Northern
Iraq."); id. at 585 ("[Majid] issued orders premeditating the dislocation of civil[ian] inhabi-
tants."); id. at 591 (noting that, as "part of this joint plan and intent," Majid "aimed" and
ordered the launching of raids over protected buildings); id. at 595 (noting that, as to pillage,
the IHT found that Majid acted "premeditatedly"); id. at 599 (noting that, as to destroying or
seizing the property of an adversary, the IHT found that Majid "intended and ordered the de-
struction of [the] hostile side's property without... military necessity").
409. Id. at 581 (emphasis added).
410. Id. at 586 (citing Doc. Nos. 3650 and 4008) (emphasis added).
411. Id. at 591 (emphasis added).
412. Id. at 599 (emphasis added).
413. A determination of "intent" would also be needed for these alternative convictions;
the IHT here has essentially already found such intent. See supra note 408 and accompanying
text. As to the crime of pillage, the IHT concluded that Majid "incited" others to loot. Al Anfal
Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 595. The IHT Statute, however, only criminalizes
"incitement" as to genocide, not other crimes, so incitement would not be an alternative con-
viction regarding pillage. See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 151SecondlE.
414. See caveats supra note 98.
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could have been convicted under additional theories of individual crimi-
nal responsibility as well.
C. Sultan Hashim Ahmad
Many of the convictions of Sultan Ahmad appear sound-although,
as discussed above, due to fair trial problems and a lack of serious appel-
late review, this Article does not necessarily suggest that the convictions
should stand.45 In short, the IHT found that Sultan Ahmad led the 1st
Corps, which was one of the three contingents of troops that carried outthe Afal •416
the Anfal campaign. While Sultan Ahmad maintained that he never
knew about the use of chemical weapons, the IHT found that position
refuted by documentary evidence."7 Furthermore, based on the extensive
targeting of civilians, the IHT also rejected Ahmad's claim that the Anfal
• 411
was purely a military operation.
As to his genocide convictions, the principle weakness appears to be
the Tribunal's analysis of individual criminal responsibility. Although the
IHT appears to invoke joint criminal enterprise responsibility, it also
suggested that it was Majid who possessed genocidal intent, not Sultan
Ahmad.4' 9 Thus, the IHT arguably should have convicted Sultan Ahmad
for aiding and abetting genocide. Under international legal standards
(which the IHT Statute expressly makes relevant), an aider and abettor
would receive a lesser penalty than a primary perpetrator.4 2 0 Furthermore,
the fact that Sultan Ahmad invoked the defense of "following orders,"
also suggests that mitigation of his sentence would be appropriate.
As for Ahmad's crimes against humanity conviction, the weakest
part of the Tribunal's analysis is its discussion of individual criminal re-
sponsibility. This Article concludes that only three of the five crimes
against humanity convictions, and only two of the four war crimes con-
victions, appear well-founded. 42 Thus, several factors suggest that the
death penalty should not be imposed: (i) Sultan Ahmad, unlike Majid,
was not consistently found to have genocidal intent; (ii) Sultan Ahmad
testified-and the IHT apparently accepted-that he acted under orders;
(iii) certain counts as to which he was convicted do not seem to have all
415. See supra Part .C (discussing fair trial problems); see also infra Part II (discussing
a lack of serious appellate review).
416. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 624.
417. Id. at 694.
418. Id. at 639.
419. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing individual criminal responsibility for crimes of
genocide of defendant Sultan Ahmad).
420. See, e.g., Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, 73 ("[A]iding and abet-
ting is a form of responsibility which generally warrants lower sentences than responsibility as
a co-perpetrator.").
421. See caveats supra note 98.
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the required elements of the crimes proved; and (iv) as with all of the
defendants, the fair trial problems and lack of serious appellate review
are defects that raise questions as to all of the convictions.
1. The Tribunal's Conclusions as to
Sultan Ahmad's Role in the Anfal
The IHT found that Sultan Ahmad "command[ed] many of [the] Al-
Anfal Operations and participat[ed] in other operations. 422 Documentary
evidence showed Sultan Ahmad to be a recipient of a variety of orders
related to the Anfal. Specifically, he received orders from Majid to im-
pose economic sanctions on the northern area, prohibiting "supplies of
food and medicine to the Kurdish villages ... in addition to agriculture,
gas, human beings and animals .... ,,42' He also received orders to pro-
hibit "human and animal existence" in certain areas, and to kill every
person whose age is between fifteen and seventy years included.424 Sultan
Ahmad further received requests "to carry on special strikes (using
chemical weapons)," and was directed to "attack [concentrations of the
population] using intensive special strikes 48 hours prior to starting the
operation in order to create panic .... ,,425 Evidence also revealed that
Sultan Ahmad received instructions from the Northern Organization Of-
fice stating that "[w]e have no problem in chopping the traitors' heads
[off] ... but it would [be] better if they were taken to the security direc-
torates to be interrogated[;] maybe they have some information we can
benefit from ... before their execution."4 26 Finally, Sultan Ahmad re-
ceived additional commands to "[use] special ammunition (Chemicals)
against the enemy's gatherings as long as it is possible" 427 and to destroy
all villages and eliminate all houses within any village.428 Documentary
evidence also revealed that Sultan Ahmad was granted a medal of brav-• 429
ery for his role in the Anfal operations.
Sultan Ahmad admitted that he led the first Anfal operation, 430 but
stated that he had no involvement in the fifth, sixth, and seventh Anfal
422. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 649.
423. Id. at 610 (citing Doc. No. 3650).
424. Id. at 632 (citing Doc. No. 4008).
425. Id. at 610 (citing Doc. No. 1122, Aug. 21, 1988, directed to the I st and 5th Corps).
426. Id. at 611 (quoting Doc. No. 5083, July 22, 1987). Here, the IHT attributes the
comments to Saddam Hussein. Elsewhere, however, the IHT attributed the comments to Ma-
jid. See id. at 482.
427. Id. at 611 (citing Doc. No. 349, Apr. 27, 1988).
428. Id. at 611, 723 (citing Doc. No. 1182, Aug. 28, 1988).
429. Id. at 611; see also id. at 612-13 (discussing evidence regarding sending individuals
to various security directorates).
430. Id. at 624.
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operations."' As to the first Anfal, Sultan Ahmad stated: "Our mission
was to expel the saboteurs, cleans[e] the area, dislocat[e] citizens and
families [in] Prohibited Zones, and hand[] them over to [the] Northern
Organization Office, through the intelligence system.' 32 He claimed that
he "did not exceed the limits of executing orders issued to [him]." 33
When questioned about the legitimacy of dislocating and demolishing
villages, he responded that he was "a military officer who carried [out]
orders whether these orders were legitimate or not.''414 He stated, "'If I
object to the implementation of any order I will be sentenced to death as
per Military law in a state of war.' "035
In his defense, Sultan Ahmad argued, inter alia, that he had nothing
to do with mass graves and was never in charge of security or police per-
sonnel. 36 In leading the first Anfal, Sultan Ahmad argued that he was
merely following orders of Nazar 'Abd-al-Kafim 431 or Hussein Rashid.4
31
Similarly, while he admitted that military troops moved civilians and
their belongings to Kirkuk, 3' he took the position that in "dislocating
civilians" he followed orders from the Northern Organization Office
(i.e., Majid). 44° He maintained that the aim of the Anfal operations was to
simply intercept Peshmerga forces,"' and claimed that he did not know
•• 442
about any special weapons or ammunition.
In light of the evidence, the IHT ultimately concluded that Sultan
Ahmad "implemented a military plan through wide-range attacks by
ordering his soldiers and the forces under his command to attack the
Kurdish villages in the north of Iraq with ... chemical and conventional
weapons[,] carrying out the orders of the accused [defendant Majid]
... . 3"' The Tribunal rejected Sultan Ahmad's arguments that he did not
know about the use of chemical weapons, after reviewing documentary
evidence which suggested that he did."" Noting how the Anfal operations
431. Id. at 627. It is reasonable to infer that this limited denial is an admission that Sul-
tan Ahmad was involved in the other Anfal operations.
432. Id. at 624.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 625.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Elsewhere, the IHT stated that Sultan Ahmad claimed to have received orders from
Nazar 'Abd-al-Karim Al-Khazraji, Chief of Army Staff. Id. at 668.
438. Id. at 624. Hussein Rashid admitted that he had ordered Sultan Ahmad to lead the
first Anfal operation. Id. at 623.
439. Id. at 626.
440. Id. at 625.
441. Id. at 627.
442. Id. at 624.
443. Id. at 695.
444. Id. at 694 (citing Doc. Nos. 160, 3650, and 4008).
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were conducted, the IHT also rejected Sultan Ahmad's argument that the
operations were purely military operations."5 While the defense of
"following orders," which Sultan Ahmad also invoked, is not available as
an affirmative defense under the IHT Statute, it is permitted as a
mitigating factor to reduce a sentence. 446 However, in this situation, there
clearly was no mitigation, because Sultan Ahmad received the death
penalty.
2. Sultan Ahmad's Genocide Convictions
The Trial Chamber convicted Sultan Ahmad of three counts of geno-
cide based on the following underlying crimes: (i) killing members of
the group;" 7 (ii) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;448 and (iii) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in part. 49 Based
on the facts as found by the Tribunal, the conclusion that these underyly-
ing crimes of genocide occurred appears sound, but the Tribunal's
findings as to Sultan Ahmad's form of responsibility does not.450 Because
this Article has already examined the Trial Chamber's findings as to the
chapeau requirements for genocide in discussing Majid's convictions, it
will not separately discuss similar findings made regarding Sultan Ah-
mad.4 5 ' This Article does, however, separately examine the underlying
445. The IHT found that (i) the attacking military forces began killing "without differenti-
ating between civilians and combatants ([Peshmerga])"; (ii) the "intensive special strikes"
targeted "all inhabitants whether civilians, combatants, children or woman"; (iii) "[a]n area that
exceeded (2000) villages were all demolished"; and (iv) "[t]he aggressors did not differentiate
between their victims regardless [of] their age, sex, health or pregnancy, which is clearly indi-
cated by the murder of thousands of children by poisonous gases... " Id. at 639.
446. See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 15/Fifth ("The fact that an accused person acted
pursuant to an order of the Government or of his superior shall not relieve him of criminal
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines
that justice so requires."). This follows the approach taken by the International Military Tribu-
nal at Nuremberg. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 8, Aug. 8, 1945, 59
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter]. The IHT should have examined
whether this rule was customary international law, and thereby demonstrated that it applied in
Iraq at the time of the Anfal, in order to avoid the problem of nullum crimen sine lege. This
analysis was particularly called for because, under Iraqi law, acting pursuant to orders had
previously been an affirmative defense. See Penal Code with Amendments (Iraq), 40(2), STS
251/88 (1969), available at http://www.ictj.org/static/MENA/Iraq/iraq.penalcode.1969.
eng.pdf. The statute reads: "There is no crime if the act is committed by a public official or
agent in the following circumstances ... [i]f he commits the act in performance of an order
from a superior which he is obliged to obey or which he feels he is obliged to obey ...." Id.
447. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 640, 696.
448. Id. at 643, 696.
449. Id. at 649, 696.
450. See caveats supra note 98.
451. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 628-34 (discussing the
chapeau requirements for genocide); see also supra text accompanying notes 178-182 (dis-
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crimes, in order to discuss Sultan Ahmad's role and individual criminal
responsibility regarding each.
First Underlying Crime: Killing Members of the Group
The first underlying crime of which Sultan Ahmad was convicted is
killing members of the group.452 As to evidence of this crime, the IHT
relied on documentary evidence in which Majid directed Sultan Ahmad
(and other commanders) to prohibit "human and animal existence" in
certain areas, and to "kill every person whose age is between 15 and 70
years included.'"5 3 The IHT found that "thousands were killed in their
villages by conventional and chemical weapons. 4 4 The Tribunal further
found that Sultan Ahmad's command over "[t]he usage of aircrafts,
tanks, artilleries, armors [sic] and infantry ... in the 1st Anfal operation
. and [his] participation in implementing Al-Anfal operations includ-
ing the Closure (8th Al-Anfal operation), all are ... proof[] . .. [of] his
perpetration [of] killing . . . ,'4" The IHT concluded that the killing con-
stituted "premeditated murder."
456
Second Underlying Crime: Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to
Members of the Group
As to this second underlying crime, the IHT found that "grievous
bodily and psychological harm" 458 had occurred. This conclusion was
based on, among other things, (i) the launching of the attacks against
villagers, resulting in the deaths of thousands of civilians; 459 (ii) that vil-
lagers were dislocated into detention centers;460 (iii) the fatal deprivation
of food and water in camps; 461 (iv) that victims were subject to awful
treatment in camps-such as witnessing a dog eat a loved-one's dead
body;462 and (v) the injuries that the victims sustained due to exposure to
chemical weapons. 46' As to Sultan Ahmad's role in the infliction of seri-
ous bodily or mental harm, the IHT concluded that he caused "severe
mental or physical damages to the community's members.. . by issuing
cussing the "as such" requirement); see infra Part lI.C.2 (offering an analysis of Sultan
Ahmad's intent).
452. For the elements of this underlying crime, see supra Part II.B.2.
453. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 623.
454. Id. at 635.
455. Id. at 634.
456. For the full analysis, see id. at 633.
457. For the elements of this underlying crime, see supra Part II.B.2.
458. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 641.
459. Id.
460. Id.
461. Id. at 641-42.
462. Id. at 642.
463. Id.
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order to 1st Corps' forces to launch a systematic large scaled attack over
Kurdish civil inhabitants [villagers] . .. .,,4The JHT also stated that Sul-
tan Ahmad was "fully aware of his acts [i.e., orders,] which eminently
assisted in perpetrating genocide by causing severe mental and physical
damages .... ,,465 This conclusion is less than a finding of "intent,' '46 but
from the fact that Sultan Ahmad issued the orders, it would seem possi-
ble to infer his intent or the intent of troops under his command.
Third Underlying Crime. Deliberately Inflicting on the Group Living
Conditions Calculated to Bring About Its Physical Destruction in Whole
or in Part
As to the underlying crime of deliberately inflicting on the group liv-
ing conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole
or in part,467 the crux of the IHT's findings are that Sultan Ahmad played
a role in dislocating "women, children and elders to prison camps" as
well as "ruining houses and devastating villages., 468 The IHT found that,
at the camps, "detainees were exposed to harsh living conditions,"
"lack[ed] suitable hygiene and care," and suffered from "ailments like
diarrhea, vomiting, and skin illnesses. 4 69 Famine was also prevalent.470
The IHT concluded that it was clear that those in charge of the camps
did not provide even minimal health services. 47' The detainees had in-47' 473
adequate clothing, and some, particularly the women, were raped.473
Those victims who survived murder by chemical and conventional
weapons in the initial attacks, and were not executed at mass graves, suf-
fered "humiliation, degradation ... lack of hygiene, and segregation ....
,474 As to Sultan Ahmad's role in inflicting these conditions, the IHT
concluded that "through commanding many of A1-Anfal Operations and
participating in other operations ... [Sultan Ahmad] is criminally re-
sponsible ... in premeditatedly subjecting the group to hard living
conditions intend[ed] to eradicate them totally or partially . . . ,.7' Ac-
cordingly, the elements of the three underlying crimes roughly appear to
464. Id. at 634.
465. Id.
466. To satisfy the crime's mens rea standard, "the harm must be inflicted intentionally."
Blagojevik and Joki6 Trial Judgment, supra note 144, 645; see also Brdanin Trial Judgment,
supra note 147, 690.
467. For the elements of this underlying crime, see supra Part II.B.2.
468. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 645.
469. Id. at 645.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 646.
472. Id. at 647.
473. Id. at 647-48.
474. Id. at 648.
475. Id. at 649.
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have been shown, and the IHT's finding that the three underlying crimes
occurred in its discussion of Majid would have sufficed in any event.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
As to individual criminal responsibility, the IHT at one point seems
to suggest that Sultan Ahmad bore all forms of responsibility. The Tribu-
nal states that Sultan Ahmad "aided in assisting, participating,
contributing [to] and.., committing the crime of genocide against the
Kurdish civilians as a national and ethnic group, through the mass mur-
der [of] which he was clearly aware. 476 More consistently, however, the
IHT finds that there was joint criminal enterprise responsibility. For ex-
ample, the Tribunal concluded that Sultan Ahmad "perpetrated actions
through[] his contribution in a ... joint criminal plan to perpetrate geno-
cide by causing severe mental or physical damages to the community's
members .... "
For Sultan Ahmad's involvement to qualify as a "type 1" joint crimi-
nal enterprise, it would be necessary to show that Sultan Ahmad himself
possessed genocidal intent.4 ' However, while the IHT does, at one point,
suggest such intent, it more consistently found that it was Majid who
had genocidal intent, and that Sultan Ahmad participated while knowing
of Majid's intent.4 0 The IHT stated that Sultan Ahmad "was aware of the
wide-range operations against the Kurds in the north of Iraq ... [and
was] also aware of the accused ('Ali Hasan Al-Majid's) intention [to]
commit[]... genocide ... against them ... ,,48" The Tribunal concluded
that by giving orders to his forces to attack with conventional and
chemical weapons, Sultan Ahmad "helped in committing ... geno-
cide."
4812
476. Id. at 640 (emphasis added).
477. Id. at 643; see also id. at 649 (finding a joint criminal plan to subject a group to
living conditions calculated to bring about destruction of the group in whole or in part).
478. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, 84 (noting that a "type 1" joint
criminal enterprise requires a showing of shared intent).
479. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 639.
480. The IHT states:
[T]he accused (Sultan Hashim Ahmad) was fully aware of what 'Ali Hasan Al-
Majid and Saddam Hussein intended to do with the Kurdish civilians in Northern
Iraq and he knew that he was ordered to attack the civilians using lethal weapons
(Chemical weapons) .... The accused (Sultan Hashim Ahmad) knew that ... ('Ali
Hasan AI-Majid) intended to commit genocide against the Kurdish civilians in
Northern Iraq ... and he was required to take necessary actions to achieve the aims
and intentions of [Majid].
Id. at 693 (emphasis added).
481. Id. at 695 (emphasis added).
482. Id.
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Accordingly, on balance, the IHT seems to find that Sultan Ahmad
knowingly participated in the Anfal campaign, but that it was Majid
who possessed the genocidal intent. As a result of this finding, Sultan
Ahmad arguably should have been convicted of aiding and abetting
genocide, rather than committing genocide.8 3 Under international legal
standards-which are expressly made relevant by the IHT Statute48-a
finding of aiding and abetting would warrant a lesser sentence than what
4815Sultan Ahmad received (death). An additional factor suggesting that a
483. See Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 730. The Chamber noted:
Complicity in genocide, where it consists of aiding and abetting genocide, does not
require proof that the accomplice had the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a protected group. In that case the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt "that an accused knew that his own acts assisted in the commission of geno-
cide by the principal offender and was aware of the principal offender's state of
mind; it need not show that an accused shared the specific intent of the principal of-
fender."
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Additionally, to convict of aiding and abetting genocide, the prosecutor must show that
"[tihe aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral
support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture,
wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and [that] this support has a substantial effect
upon the perpetration of the crime .... " Vasiljevi6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 234, 102.
The IHT's findings satisfy both parts of this test, showing that Sultan Ahmad assisted in the
commission of genocide's three underlying crimes and suggesting that his actions had a sub-
stantial effect on the perpetration of the crimes.
It is also possible that the IHT was attempting to characterize Sultan Ahmad's responsi-
bility under the "common purpose" doctrine, under which a defendant can be found guilty if
(i) they belong to a group of persons with a "common criminal intent," and (ii) they contribute
to that group "with the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime." See IHT
Statute, supra note 12, art. 15/SecondID. If analyzed that way, it still seems that Ahmad should
have been found responsible for something less than possessing genocidal intent. It is possible
that the IHT also intended to base some of the other joint criminal enterprise convictions on
the "common purpose" doctrine. In that case, this Article incorrectly analyzes them as a "type
I" or a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise. This confusion illustrates why it is so important for
the IHT to be explicit in the future as to the form of individual criminal responsibility it is
finding.
484. The IHT Statute states:
The penalty for any crimes under Articles 11, 12, 13 [genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, and war crimes] which do not have a counterpart under Iraqi law shall be
determined by the Trial Chambers taking into account such factors as the gravity of
the crime, the individual circumstances of the convicted person, guided by judicial
precedents and relevant sentences issued by the international criminal tribunals.
Id. art. 241Fifth (emphasis added).
485. As explained by the ICTY Appeals Chamber,
[A]iding and abetting is a form of responsibility which generally warrants lower
sentences than responsibility as a co-perpetrator. This principle has also been rec-
ognized in the ICTR and in many national jurisdictions. While Radislav Krsti's
crime is undoubtedly grave, the finding that he lacked genocidal intent significantly
diminishes his responsibility. The same analysis applies to the reduction of Krstid's
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lesser sentence would be more appropriate is that Sultan Ahmad testified
that he acted under orders486 (a position that the IHT does not appear to
dispute). As mentioned above, the IHT Statute permits mitigation of
punishment for acting pursuant to orders. 87
3. Sultan Ahmad's Crimes Against Humanity Convictions
The Trial Chamber convicted Sultan Ahmad of five counts of crimes
against humanity based on the following underlying crimes: murder;
488
extermination;489 deportation or forcible transfer of population;4 9 impris-
onment; 9' and other inhumane acts.4 92 Based on the facts as found by the
Tribunal, it appears that three of Sultan Ahmad's five convictions for
crimes against humanity are warranted. 93 While the IHT did not thor-
oughly analyze the chapeau requirements of crimes against humanity, as
discussed above, the facts clearly suggest that the requirements were
met.4 94 The weakest link regarding the crimes against humanity convic-
tions is the analysis of individual criminal responsibility. Because the
IHT does not analyze Sultan Ahmad's intent satisfactorily with respect to
two underlying crimes (deportation or forcible transfer and extermina-
tion), those two convictions are not warranted.
First Underlying Crime: Willful Killing
As to the first underlying crime of willful killing, the elements,
roughly stated, require: (i) killing; (ii) causation (or at least a substantial
responsibility for the murders as a violation of laws or customs of war .... As
such, the revision of Krsti 's conviction to aiding and abetting these two crimes
merits a considerable reduction of his sentence.
Krsti6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 146, 268 (citations omitted). The ICTY Appeals
Chamber reached a similar conclusion in Krnojelac. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note
338, 73 (" '[T]he seriousness of what is done by a participant in a joint criminal enterprise
who was not the principal offender is significantly greater than what is done by one who
merely aids and abets the principal offender'...." (citation omitted)).
486. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 624-25.
487. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 151Fifth.
488. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 655, 699.
489. Id. at 660, 701.
490. Id. at 665-66, 704.
491. Id. at 671,706.
492. Id. at 675, 708.
493. See caveats supra note 98.
494. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the chapeau requirements for crimes against hu-
manity as applied to defendant Majid). As to the chapeau requirements that are defendant-
specific-showing that Sultan Ahmad's acts were part of the attack and that he knew of the
context in which his acts occurred-the former would be satisfied by Sultan Ahmad's role in
leading the first Anfal operation, and the latter would be satisfied by the evidence that the IHT
examined in concluding that Sultan Ahmad was aware of the factual circumstances that proved
the existence of armed conflict. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 679.
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contribution to the killing);4 95 and (iii) intent.4 96 With regard to killing, the
IHT looked to evidence that the victims killed by bombing "were
women, children and [the] elderly," and that "Land Forces attacked the
civilians after finishing the air bombing.' 49' Numerous groups of young
men, women, and children were executed and buried in mass graves, and
"[t]housands of the civilian inhabitants were killed as a result of using
... chemical gases., 498 As to Sultan Ahmad's role in the killing, the IHT
found that "he directed the First Al-Anfal operations, directed other op-
erations, participated in preparing the plans, [and] supported the other
Al-Anfal Operations. 4 99 This clearly suggests that Sultan Ahmad at least
substantially contributed to the killings. The IHT also concluded that the
killings were "premeditated."5 °° Thus, the elements of this crime appear
met.
Second Underlying Crime: Extermination
As explained above, "extermination" is alternately defined as (i) the
"intentional infliction of [harsh] living conditions ... with the intent to
bring about the destruction of part of the population,"' '5 or (ii) murder on
a mass scale that is intentionally inflicted.0 2 Here, the IHT found that
"hundreds were killed and wounded in the attack by artillery, rocket
launchers, aircraft and ... chemical weapons,"5 °3 The survivors, particu-
larly (but not exclusively) young men, were buried in mass graves ° The
IHT concluded that "thousands" of civilian villagers died,0 and that Sul-
tan Ahmad "participated in committing homicide with the coordination
of the other units, especially the Air Force."5 6 It also found that Sultan
Ahmad "moved the civilian inhabitants to the detention camps through
the military units [commanded] by him;" and, from there, many were
executed and taken to mass graves.' 7
495. See, e.g., Nahimana Trial Judgment, supra note 181, [492 ("Where a person is
accused of having planned, instigated, ordered or aided and abetted the commission of [a
crime], the Prosecutor must establish that the accused's acts or omissions substantially con-
tributed [thereto].").
496. For a full discussion of the elements, see supra Part II.B.3.
497. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 653.
498. Id. at 654.
499. Id.
500. Id. at 699.
501. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 12/Second/B.
502. For the ICTY definition of the elements of extermination, see supra note 278.
503. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 656.
504. Id. at 657.
505. Id. at 658.
506. Id. at 659.
507. Id.
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While these findings seem to suggest that mass killings occurred,
they appear silent as to Sultan Ahmad's intent. Although one might infer
that some or a large part of the killing was intentional, because the IHT
never adequately examined Sultan Ahmad's mental state in its discussion
of individual criminal responsibility, a required element of the crime ap-
pears to be missing.""
Third Underlying Crime: Deportation or Forcible Transfer
The IHT additionally convicted Sultan Ahmad of deportation or
forcible transfer as an underlying crime against humanity59 This crime
is defined in the IHT Statute to mean "forced displacement of the per-
sons concerned by expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in
which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under inter-
national law."5 ° The lHT found that the Kurdish villages had been
destroyed, and that the civilians, "including women, children and old
men[j" were relocated to concentration camps "[against] their desires
and forcibly.' 5 ' Furthermore, Sultan Ahmad admitted that he imple-
mented the military order to move them.1 2 These facts thus establish that
displacement occurred. Again, however, the required element of intent
513
appears to be missing,54 which, as discussed below, is problematic for
showing individual criminal responsibility.
508. This Article takes the position that, as to an underlying crime, the IHT's failure to
expressly find the requisite mental state is not problematic, because such mental state is often
inferred, and may be that of a perpetrator other than the defendant. However, this Article also
takes the position that, for purposes of individual criminal responsibility, the defendant's men-
tal state must have been expressly found by the Tribunal, and, if it was not, a finding of
responsibility is not warranted.
509. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 665-66, 704.
510. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 121SecondD. International case law provides a
similar definition: "Both deportation and unlawful or forcible transfer relate to the involuntary
and unlawful displacement, or movement, or relocation, or removal of persons from the terri-
tory in which they reside." Simi6, Tadi6, and Zari6 Trial Judgment, supra note 255, 1 121; see
also id. 122 ("Forcible transfer [as opposed to deportation] has been defined as a forced
removal or displacement of people from one area to another which may take place within the
same national borders.").
511. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 662.
512. Id.
513. See Staki6 Trial Judgment, supra note 184, 686-87 ("[T]he intent of the perpetra-
tor must be that the victim is 'removed, which implies the aim that the person is not
returning.'" (citation omitted)).
514. The IHT suggested that Sultan Ahmad acted with an "awareness" of what would
result. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 665. Awareness alone does not
amount to a finding of intent.
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Fourth Underlying Crime: Imprisonment or Severe Deprivation of
Physical Liberty
The fourth underlying crime against humanity of which Sultan
Ahmad was convicted was "imprisonment or other severe deprivation of
physical liberty in violation of fundamental norms of international
law."
515
The IHT found that, after the initial Anfal bombardments, "civilian
inhabitants were arrested and transferred in military vehicles to deten-
tion camps."5 6 Sultan Ahmad also admitted to dislocating villagers on
orders of defendant Majid, 5 7 and the IHT found that "the coercive hid-
ing [i.e., imprisonment] of these victims occurred officially and [was]
organized by the State ... [since] all Government civilian, military,
security and party Services in the Northern Area participated in this
operation ... ,,5 8 The IHT does not appear to analyze whether there was
a legal basis for the imprisonment, but in the portion of the Trial Cham-
ber judgment discussing Majid, the IHT found that there was no such
basis. 5' 9 The IHT also concluded that Sultan Ahmad had a "common
criminal intention to perpetrate the crime."52 Thus, all of the elements of
this underlying crime appear met.
Fifth Underlying Crime: Other Inhumane Acts
The JHT additionally convicted Sultan Ahmad of "other inhumane
acts" as an underlying crime against humanity.52' The elements of "other
inhumane acts," roughly stated, are: (i) serious bodily or mental harm;
(ii) caused by an act or omission of the accused or his subordinate; (iii)
522where the accused or his subordinate intended to cause such harm.
Here, it is clear that the victims suffered "serious bodily or mental
harm." The IHT found that when the troops eradicated the Kurdish vil-
lages, the villagers were prevented from plowing or farming their lands
and had their food supply "blockaded. 5 2 Those civilians in the detention
camps "suffered from hunger, disease and bad treatment," had their
property seized, and were subjected to mental and physical torture.524
515. Id. at 671, 706; see also IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 121FirstlE.
516. AlAnfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 668.
517. Id.
518. Id. at 670.
519. See id. at 551 ("Those victims were imprisoned via an order from ... Majid, ran-
domly without trials or considering their rights, violating international principles." (emphasis
added)).
520. Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
521. Id. at 650.
522. For a full articulation of the elements, see supra Part II.B.3.
523. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 672.
524. Id.
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Young women were also subjected to "sexual assault by the prison
guards."'525 Many of the 3,000 to 4,000 detainees died of hunger, as they
were supplied with nothing more than dry bread and salty water. 26 A
child who was three and a half years old was "beaten until he
swooned." '527 One victim further testified that prisoners were forced to
walk barefoot over broken glass and were ordered to beat one another.
Others were tied up, hung upside down, and their sexual organs tied to
gas cylinders. 29 The IHT suggested that this suffering was the result of
Sultan Ahmad's orders to the 1st Corps to attack Kurdish villages (satis-
fying the causation or substantial contribution requirement).53° However,
as to the intent, the IHT found that Sultan Ahmad launched the attacks
with "full awareness" of the consequences.53" ' As discussed below, this
again is less than a finding of intent.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
As to individual criminal responsibility, the IHT found Sultan
Ahmad responsible as a participant in a "joint criminal plan. 53 2 This
suggests that the IHT determined that there was joint criminal enterprise
responsibility.533 Here, as already explained, the facts found by the IHT
suggest: (i) a group of individuals was involved in creating and executing
the Anfal operations; (ii) the Anfal operations constituted a joint criminal
plan to attack and kill civilians in "prohibited zones" in Kurdish areas of
Iraq, either transferring survivors to "camps" or executing them; and
525. Id. at 673.
526. Id.
527. Id. at 674.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. Id. at 675. The IHT could have also cited Sultan Ahmad's role in forcibly transfer-
ring individuals to detention camps. Id. at 668.
531. Id. at 708.
532. See id. at 699 (finding that, as to murder, Sultan Ahmad was responsible as a par-
ticipant in a "joint criminal plan"); id. at 660 (characterizing Sultan Ahmad, as to
extermination, as having "personally" "participated" with other accused persons in a "joint
criminal plan"); id. at 665 (concluding that, as to deportation, Sultan Ahmad "participated
with others in a joint criminal plan"); id. at 671 (concluding that, as to imprisonment, he had
"common criminal intention to perpetrate the crime"); id. at 675 (finding, as to other inhu-
mane acts, a "joint criminal plan").
533. The elements of joint criminal enterprise responsibility require: (i) a plurality of
persons; (ii) the existence of a common plan, design or purpose that amounts to or involves the
commissioh of a crime provided for in the Statute; and (iii) participation of the accused in the
common design involving the perpetration of one of the crimes provided for in the Statute.
Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, 31; see also Tadi6 Appeals Judgment, supra
note 233, 227.
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(iii) Sultan Ahmad commanded or participated in many of the Anfal op-
erations. 34
As to mental state, a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise requires
shared intent. Here, the IHT seems to have found shared intent, or
something comparable, with regard to the underlying crimes of willful
killing and imprisonment.536 As to the crime of "other inhumane acts,"
the IHT appears to suggest that there was a "type 3" joint criminal enter-
prise37-i.e., that the crimes were a natural and foreseeable consequence
of the joint criminal enterprise in which Sultan Ahmad participated.538 As
to deportation, however, not only does the mental state finding appear
missing, but the IHT seems to vacillate between finding a "type 1" and
"type 3" joint criminal enterprise, rendering its analysis inconsistent and
confused. 39 Finally, as to extermination, the IHT does not appear to ana-
534. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 649.
535. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, 84.
536. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 699 (finding that the willful
killing was "premeditated"); id. at 671 (finding Sultan Ahmad had "common criminal inten-
tion to perpetrate" imprisonment).
537. Kvoeka Appeals Judgment, supra note 91, 83 (stating that "[t]he third, 'extended'
form of joint criminal enterprise entails responsibility for crimes committed beyond the com-
mon purpose, but which are nevertheless a natural and foreseeable consequence of the
common purpose"). As the ICTY has noted:
The requisite mens rea for the extended form is twofold. First, the accused must
have the intention to participate in and contribute to the common criminal purpose.
Second, in order to be held responsible for crimes which were not part of the com-
mon criminal purpose, but which were nevertheless a natural and foreseeable
consequence of it, the accused must also know that such a crime might be perpe-
trated by a member of the group, and willingly take the risk that the crime might
occur by joining or continuing to participate in the enterprise.
Id. 83.
538. As to the "other inhumane acts," the IHT suggested that the crimes were the "ex-
pected normal result" of the "joint criminal plan," and that Sultan Ahmad "[was] aware that
this criminal plan in which he participated ... by issuing his orders ... to conduct those at-
tacks will lead to the destruction of houses and civilian villages and the [forsaking] of
[villagers' lives.]" Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 675 (emphasis added);
see also id. at 708 (finding that Sultan Ahmad launched the attacks with "full awareness" of
the consequences which could lead to "destruction of houses, villages, all means of life, and
countless numbers of civilians; causing severe physical and mental damages, as well as de-
priving civilians [of] their lifestyles").
539. As to deportation, the IHT concluded that Sultan Ahmad
participated with others in a joint criminal plan in order to execute a wide-range and
systematic attack against the civilian inhabitants in the north of Iraq ... through is-
suing orders to the forces that were under his command (1st Corps Forces) during
AI-Anfal operation[s], with ... awareness [of] the normal result that might occur
during the attacks ....
Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 665 (emphasis added). The IHT also stated
that the "coercive dislocation of the civilian inhabitants" was part of the joint criminal plan. Id.
at 666. This appears to confuse "type 1" and "type 3" joint criminal enterprises, because either
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lyze Sultan Ahmad's intentions, so a requirement of individual criminal
responsibility appears to be missing.
Accordingly, this Article's preliminary conclusions are that: (i) as to
willful killing and imprisonment, the IHT found a "type 1" joint criminal
enterprise; (ii) as to other inhumane acts, the IHT found a "type 3" joint
criminal enterprise; and (iii) as to deportation and extermination, the in-
dividual criminal responsibility analysis appears inconsistent or
incomplete due to the IHT's failure to analyze, or to consistently ana-
lyze, Sultan Ahmad's intent. ° Thus, at least according to this analysis,
only three of the five crimes against humanity convictions appear well-
founded based on the facts as found by the Tribunal.54'
4. Sultan Ahmad's War Crimes Convictions
The Trial Chamber convicted Sultan Ahmad of four war crimes:
(i) intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population;5 42
(ii) intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religious
or educational purposes or against hospitals and places where the sick
and wounded are collected;543 (iii) ordering the displacement of the civil-
ian population for reasons related to the conflict;5" and (iv) destroying or
seizing the property of an adversary. 45 Based on the IHT's findings of
fact, it appears that only two of these war crimes convictions were well-
founded.5" Because this Article already examined the chapeau require-
ments for war crimes, 7 it will not do so again here. It will instead
analyze the underlying crimes and Sultan Ahmad's individual criminal
responsibility.
48
the displacement was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the joint criminal enterprise (a
"type 3") or it was part of the joint criminal enterprise (a "type 1"). It cannot be both.
540. It should be noted that because the IHT does not discuss "type I" or "type 3" joint
criminal enterprise, this analysis may be incorrect. The IHT needs to be more precise in terms
of which form of individual criminal responsibility it finds.
541. See caveats supra note 98.
542. A l Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 679, 710-11.
543. Id. at 682, 713.
544. Id. at 684, 715.
545. Id. at 717-18.
546. See caveats supra note 98.
547. See supra Part II.B.4.
548. As to whether the defendant was aware of the factual circumstances that proved the
existence of armed conflict, see ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, art. 8, the IHT
found this satisfied in Sultan Ahmad's case, see Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note
2, at 679.
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First Underlying Crime: Intentionally Directing Attacks Against the
Civilian Population
As to the first war crime, the IHT found that Sultan Ahmad "con-
ducted the first Al-Anfal ... and other campaigns ... wherein the
military units attacked ... the Kurdish villages[,] ... using all [the]
State's military capabilities ... to bombard the civilian inhabitants ....
[T]he bombardment resulted in the deaths of thousands of children,
women and elderly people. 549 The IHT also looked at village fatality
figures to conclude that the victims were "civilian."' 0 As to Sultan
Ahmad's role, the IHT found that he issued orders to the troops to effec-
tuate the attacks. 5' The Tribunal also concluded that there was "joint
criminal intent" to commit the crime,552 which suggests the required
mens rea.
Second Underlying Crime: Intentionally Directing Attacks Against
Buildings Dedicated to Religious or Educational Purposes, or Against
Hospitals and Places Where the Sick and Wounded Are Collected
The IHT found clear evidence of damage to, or destruction of, pro-
tected property, noting that Sultan Ahmad "issued orders to forces under
his command, to launch premeditated raids over protected buildings,"
and target them specifically.553 In total, the IHT concluded that more than
3,000 villages had been destroyed.554 Furthermore, the Tribunal found
that the damaged or destroyed property was not used for military pur-
poses and hence maintained its "legal[ly] protect[ed] status." '555 Finally,
the IHT concluded that the destruction was "premeditated. '556 Thus, the
elements of this crime appear satisfied.
Third Underlying Crime: Ordering the Displacement of the Civilian
Population for Reasons Related to the Conflict
As to this crime, the IHT "did not find any evidence which proves
that ... [Sultan] Ahmad issued ... orders to dislocate Kurdish civil in-
habitants or relocate them away from their villages."5 7 Rather, the IHT
concluded that Sultan Ahmad "should have been aware that his ... or-
549. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 677.
550. Id. at 678.
551. Id. at 679.
552. Id.
553. Id. at 712-13.
554. Id. at 68 1.
555. Id. at 713.
556. Id. at 712-13.
557. Id. at 714.
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ders to his forces ... [would] definitely lead to orders of dislocation." '58
Thus, it appears that the requirement of "ordering" is not satisfied by the
IHT's analysis. 9 Even if one were to analyze Sultan Ahmad's role as
somehow assisting the "ordering" by a primary perpetrator (such as
Majid), the crime still may well not have been shown, because the Tri-
bunal's analysis of individual criminal responsibility, discussed below,
otherwise seems internally inconsistent.
Fourth Underlying Crime: Destroying or Seizing the Property of an
Adversary
Sultan Ahmad's conviction for "destroying or seizing the property of
an adversary" is based primarily on the fact that he issued orders to
launch attacks over Kurdish villages in northern Iraq, and that the ensu-
ing destruction of villages was a "rational result that could have been
predicted."5'6 As mentioned above, 56' a question exists regarding whether
the property destroyed was that "of an adversary," as appears to be re-
quired,562 since the IHT has generally portrayed the Anfal operations as
attacking civilians and civilian property (rather than the Kurdish Pesh-
merga militia and its property). Accordingly, it is unclear whether all of
the elements of this crime have been established.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
As to Sultan Ahmad's individual criminal responsibility for war
crimes, the IHT characterized it as that of a participant in a joint criminal
enterprise.5 6' For the first two war crimes, the IHT appears to have found
a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise. It then appears to find a "type 3"
558. Id. It does, however, seem that troops under Sultan Ahmad's command caused dis-
placements. Sultan Ahmad's own admissions suggest his responsibility: "Our mission was to
expel the saboteurs, cleansing the area, dislocating citizens and families of those [in] Prohib-
ited Zones, and handing them over to [the] Northern Organization Office, through the
intelligence system." Id. at 624 (emphasis added).
559. The other elements may be satisfied. See id. at 584, 586 (discussing Majid's war
crimes convictions, and finding that the displacements did not occur for the security of the
civilians involved, nor for military necessity).
560. Id. at 717. The IHT also concluded that "Sultan Ahmad cannot [invoke] military
necessity [to justify] totally destroying and sweeping villages." Id.
561. See supra Part II.B.4 (discussing Majid's war crimes convictions).
562. See ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 146, art. 8(2)(e)(xii) (requiring, inter alia,
that the destroyed property "was [the] property of an adversary").
563. The IHT concluded that Sultan Ahmad "contributed with others in reinforcing a
joint criminal plan with a provisionary [sic] intent to carry out systematic large-scaled attacks
via chemical and conventional weapons against Kurdish civil inhabitants in Northern Iraq,
during Al-Anfal Operations." Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 709.
Michigan Journal of International Law
joint criminal enterprise for the other crimes (although the IHT does not
invoke these terms). 64
As to the first two war crimes-intentionally directing attacks
against the civilian population and intentionally directing attacks against
buildings dedicated to religious or educational purposes, or against hos-
pitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected-the finding
of a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise appears correct. The IHT con-
cluded that there was "joint criminal intention" to commit the crimes,
which appears to be a finding of shared intent. The facts also clearly
suggest that the remaining elements of a joint criminal enterprise were
established. 67
As to the third war crime-ordering the displacement of the civilian
population for reasons related to the conflict-the Tribunal's reasoning
appears confused. It vacillates between suggesting that there was a "type
1" joint criminal enterprise (when it found "joint criminal intention") 568
and a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise (when it concluded Sultan
Ahmad "should have been aware that his issued orders ... [would] defi-
nitely lead to orders of dislocation"). 69 This vacillation suggests a legal
error by the Tribunal. 7°
As to the fourth war crime-destroying or seizing the property of an
adversary-the IHT also suggested the existence of a "type 3" joint
criminal enterprise. Here, the IHT found that the destruction or seizure
of the property was a natural and foreseeable consequence resulting from
Sultan Ahmad's participation in a joint criminal enterprise, and found
that Sultan Ahmad knowingly took that risk.57' While these findings sug-
564. For discussion of "type 1" and "type 3" joint criminal enterprises, see supra Parts
II.B.2, l.B.3 (offering an analysis of Majid's genocide and crimes against humanity convic-
tions).
565. AlAnfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 679, 682.
566. As to intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, the IHT also
found that Sultan Ahmad "premeditatedly contributed" to the "joint criminal plan" by
"launching those large scaled attacks against civil inhabitants." Id. at 710. This suggests both
joint criminal enterprise responsibility and intent on the part of Sultan Ahmad. See id. at 712-
13 (finding that the destruction of protected buildings was "premeditated"). Because the IHT
found that Sultan Ahmad ordered the attacks, id. at 710, Ahmad could also have been held
responsible for "ordering" the commission of both war crimes.
567. See supra Part II.C.3 (discussing individual criminal responsibility as to Sultan
Ahmad's convictions for crimes against humanity).
568. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 684.
569. Id. at 714.
570. It is also unclear that the mental state found (that Ahmad "should have been aware"
of the destruction) would suffice for a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise. See Kvocka Appeals
Judgment, supra note 91, 83. Rather, this mental state appears to approximate more closely
the mental state for command responsibility (although the IHT does not otherwise attempt to
establish command responsibility). See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 151Fourth.
571. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 717 (finding that the "total
destruction of villages [was a] rational result[] that could have been predicted [by] contribu-
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gest the presence of a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise,1 2 they are not
alone sufficient. A problem arises in that another element of the crime-
the destruction of the property of an "adversary"-appears to be miss-
ing. Thus, it appears that only two of the four war crimes convictions
have foundation based on the facts as found by the Tribunal.573
D. Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti
The Tribunal's convictions of Hussein Rashid are generally not well-
organized. If, however, one attempts to group the IHT's findings accord-
ing to the elements of the crimes, most elements do appear met, although
the Trial Chamber's analysis of individual criminal responsibility is quite
limited and the IHT never responded to several of Hussein Rashid's legal
arguments. For a number of reasons, the Tribunal's imposition of a death
sentence seems too harsh.
In addition, for a number of reasons, the Tribunal's imposition of a
death sentence seems too harsh. First, the IHT finds that Hussein Rashid
primarily supplied and equipped military forces and provided them with
military maps. This finding suggests that Hussein Rashid played a sec-
ondary role in the operations, similar to that of al-Douri and al-Jaburi,
who received life sentences.574 Second, at least as to genocide, there is no
finding of genocidal intent, meaning that, as a matter of law, Hussein
Rashid's responsibility was arguably akin to that of an aider and abettor.
This lower degree of responsibility also suggests that a lesser sentence
was warranted. Third, Hussein Rashid invoked the defense of "following
orders," which can be used to mitigate a sentence.575 For all of these rea-
sons, Hussein Rashid's sentence appears too severe.576
1. The Tribunal's Conclusions as to
Hussein Rashid's Role in the Anfal
Some of the key evidence used by the IHT to convict Hussein
Rashid includes documents suggesting his awareness of both the use of
chemical weapons and the targeting of civilian villages as part of the An-
fal campaign. For example, Hussein Rashid admitted to seeing a copy of
a letter 77 issued by the Chief of Army Staff that includes instructions to
tion in [the] joint criminal plan"). The IHT found that Sultan Ahmad was "fully aware of the
rationale consequences which could have been predicted logically after such joint criminal
plan." Id.
572. For discussion of a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise, see supra note 537.
573. See caveats supra note 98.
574. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 725, 733.
575. IlT Statute, supra note 12, art. 15/Fifth.
576. See caveats supra note 98.
577. Id. at 729 (citing Doc. No. 349, Apr. 27, 1988).
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use "special ammunitions over foe's grouping" and to "strik[e] sabo-
teurs' headquarters with the aforementioned ammunitions." '578 Hussein
Rashid also admitted to receiving a copy of a letter that included instruc-
tions to demolish villages, and to destroy buildings within villages that
had survived previous bombings.57 9 Finally, Hussein Rashid admitted that
he received another letter including a request for "special air strikes," but
stated that he only received this letter for the purpose of updating
580
maps.
In addition to this documentary evidence, the IHT looked to witness
testimony in convicting Hussein Rashid. According to the testimony of
Sultan Ahmad, Hussein Rashid issued "orders" to Sultan Ahmad con-
cerning the military operations.5 ' Al-Douri also testified that "big plans
[such as Al Anfal] correlated to big operations," and that these operations
were preplanned by the Operations Directorate, headed by Hussein
Rashid.582
Throughout his trial, Hussein Rashid maintained that his role in the
operations was "consultative" only, and that his decisions were limited to
the "provision of resources" '583 and providing "technical information" to
the Chief of Army Staff.584 Elsewhere, he described his duties as limited
to "provid[ing] consultation and advice, and to participation in plan-
ning."5 5 Hussein Rashid admitted that he was asked about a study
regarding the Anfal operations, but claimed that he was only asked to
give a "technical military opinion concerning the provision of military
and human resources. 586 He testified that he never participated in plan-
ning strikes against non-military targets,"8 and that he had no authority
to issue orders to troops,588 but rather responded to orders by the Chief of
Army Staff. 89 Hussein Rashid also stated that his department did not
578. Id. at 723, 753 (emphasis added).
579. Id. at 723 (citing Doc. (R.A.C.)/40/1182, Aug. 28, 1988).
580. Id. (citing Doc. No. 183, Mar. 20, 1988).
581. Id. at 724. The IHT confusingly stated both that Hussein Rashid denied giving such
orders to Sultan Ahmad, id. at 726, and that Hussein Rashid admitted to ordering Sultan
Ahmad to lead the first Anfal operation, id. at 623. The latter, if correct, would certainly be an
admission of "ordering."
582. Id. at 724-25.
583. Id. at 725.
584. Id. at 727.
585. Id. at 733. This is basically an admission of "planning" as a form of individual
responsibility.
586. Id. at 732.
587. Id. at 725. Document No. (R.A.C.)\40\I 182, which discusses demolishing villages,
id. at 723, and which Hussein Rashid admitted receiving, id. at 729, suggests that Hussein
Rahshid at least knew of plans to demolish villages.
588. Id. at 726.
589. Id.
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handle prisoners or detainees.'90 He denied any responsibility for using
chemical weapons because "plans submitted to his department didn't
include any sign of using chemical weapons.
591
As to his legal arguments, Hussein Rashid argued that: (i) a prisoner
of war should not be prosecuted;5 92 (ii) the tribunal was illegitimate;
593
(iii) the "experts," as U.S. nationals, were biased;594 (iv) he merely "fol-
lowed orders";195 (v) displacement can be for beneficial purposes; 96 (vi)
the Anfal plans were for a "purely military operation ... targeting the
Iranian army and Kurdish insurgents during [the] Iraq-Iran war"; 97 and
(vii) the plans were to confront a regular army, not civilians. 98
After reviewing the evidence, the IHT ultimately concluded that
Hussein Rashid "participated in planning for the Anfal Operations, and
his affiliated directorates armed the military forces and supplied them
with ammunitions and other equipment [so that] the Anfal operations
[might succeed] . . . ,599 Hussein Rashid "offered support in planning
and preparing the human and physical resources, providing military
technical expertise and updated maps."
2. Hussein Rashid's Genocide Convictions
The Trial Chamber convicted Hussein Rashid of two counts of geno-
cide based on (i) killing members of the group; 6W' and (ii) causing serious
bodily or mental harm to members of the group. 6S Based on the evidence
590. Id.
591. Id. This position seems undercut by Document Nos. 349 and 183, both of which
reveal that chemical weapons were being used, and both of which Hussein Rashid admits that
he received. Id. at 729.
592. Id. at 727. Prosecution of prisoners of war is, of course, provided for under the
Geneva Conventions. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
[Third Geneva Convention] pt. III, sec. VI, ch. III, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S.
135 (covering penal and disciplinary sanctions regarding prisoners of war).
593. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 727. The legitimacy of the Tri-
bunal was a topic raised by defense motion early in the trial, and the Tribunal was found to be
legitimate. UPDATE I, supra note 13, at 7-8.
594. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 728.
595. Id. "Following orders," as mentioned above, is not an affirmative defense under the
IHT Statute, but only a mitigating factor. See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 15/Fifth.
596. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 728. This position was rejected
by the IHT in its discussion of Majid. See id. at 584 (discussing Majid's war crimes convic-
tions and finding that displacements did not occur for the security of the civilians involved).
597. Id. at 729.
598. Id. at 731. This position, as well as the previous one, appears undercut, for example,
by Document No. (R.A.C.)\40\1 182, which discusses demolishing villages, id. at 723, and
which Hussein Rashid admitted to having received, id. at 729.
599. Id. at 767.
600. Id. at 750.
601. Id. at 751.
602. Id. at 755.
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as found by the Tribunal, the genocide convictions appear warranted.
However, this case is perhaps the weakest of the five defendants con-
victed of genocide, because the IHT's reasoning as to Hussein Rashid is
the least well-articulated. As to individual responsibility, the Tribunal's
suggestion that joint criminal enterprise responsibility existed is argua-
bly erroneous because the IHT never found the required intent. Instead,
Hussein Rashid arguably should have been convicted of aiding and abet-
ting genocide.
Because this Article has already examined the Trial Chamber's find-
ings as to the chapeau for genocide,6°3 it will not separately discuss
similar findings made regarding Hussein Rashid.6°4 Instead, this Article
will analyze the IHT's findings as to the underlying crimes, as well as
Hussein Rashid's individual criminal responsibility.
First Underlying Crime: Killing Members of the Group
First, while not contained in the Tribunal's analysis of the underlying
crime of killing, the IHT did examine expert testimony as to the exis-
tence of mass graves when discussing Hussein Rashid's conviction.60'
The Tribunal concluded that Hussein Rashid "participated indirectly in
killing maybe hundreds of [the] Kurdish populace." Second, although
there is no clear finding of "intent" or "premeditation" with respect to
this particular crime, the IHT found, in its analysis of murder as a crime
against humanity that Hussein Rashid acted with "premeditation." ' 7 This
finding suggests that he also acted with premeditation regarding the
comparable underlying crime of "killing." '
Second Underlying Crime: Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to
Members of the Group
As to the underlying crime of causing serious bodily or mental harm
to members of the group, the IHT found that Hussein Rashid "contrib-
uted in planning [the] Al-Anfal operations" and "supplied the military
troops with all required ... personnel, equipment[], and ... weapons,"
which caused "severe physical and mental harm [to] Kurdish civil in-
habitants in Northern Iraq." ' That harm included "freez[ing] the
603. See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing Majid's genocide convictions).
604. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 743-51 (discussing Hussein
Rashid's genocide convictions, including the chapeau for genocide). Hussein Rashid's own
intent is discussed below in the analysis of individual criminal responsibility.
605. Id. at 735-40.
606. Id. at 754 (page 754 is erroneously labeled as a second page 757 in the English
translation).
607. Id. at 760.
608. There is no substantive legal difference between "murder" and "killing."
609. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 752-53.
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agronomy, prevent[ing] harvesting the crops, as well as pasturing and
plowing. '610 The Anfal plans also included directions "to kill any human
or animal found within the [prohibited] zones.
The IHT also concluded that the documentary evidence revealed
Hussein Rashid's awareness of "special strikes,, 61 2 and "indicate[d]
clearly that [Hussein Rashid] participated in causing mental and physical
[harm,] to Kurdish civil inhabitants in Northern Iraq ... ,,613 As to in-
tent,64 the IHT elsewhere found that serious bodily or mental harm was
• .- i 611
intentionally inflicted.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
The IHT never expressly addressed the form of individual criminal
responsibility on which it based Hussein Rashid's convictions. The Tri-
bunal, however, concluded that Hussein Rashid provided "human and
physical [resources] to the military troops,, 61 6 and "contributed and par-
ticipated in a joint criminal plan, with other [defendants], to target and
eradicate ... the Kurdish civil inhabitants of Northern Iraq.' '61 7 Else-
where, the IHT states that the Anfal crimes were "planned and
supported" by Hussein Rashid."' These conclusions suggest that the IHT
may have found joint criminal enterprise responsibility. Alternately, the
Tribunal certainly could have convicted Hussein Rashid on a theory of
"planning" or "aiding and abetting."69
610. Id. at 753.
611. Id.
612. Id. (citing Doc. Nos. 349 and 183).
613. Id. at 757.
614. As to the mens rea requirement for this crime, "the harm must be inflicted inten-
tionally." Blagojevi6 and Joki Trial Judgment, supra note 144, 645; Brdanin Trial
Judgment, supra note 147, 690.
615. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 517 (finding that Majid
acted "premeditatedly" as to this underlying crime).
616. Id. at 747.
617. Id. at 750 (emphasis added).
618. Id.
619. See Kordi6 and Oerkez Appeals Judgment, supra note 91, 31. TheAppeals Cham-
ber noted:
[I]n relation to "planning," a person who plans an act or omission with the aware-
ness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in the execution of
that plan, has the requisite mens rea for establishing responsibility under Article
7(1) of the Statute pursuant to planning. Planning with such awareness has to be re-
garded as accepting that crime.
Id. The Trial Chamber stated that
[a] person who plans an act or omission with an intent that the crime be committed,
or with an awareness of the substantial likelihood that a crime will be committed in
the execution of that plan, has the requisite mens rea for establishing responsibility
under Article 7(1) of the Statute for planning.
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As discussed above, the "basic" form of joint criminal enterprise re-
sponsibility ("type 1") requires a showing of shared genocidal intent.620
While the IHT does include one conclusory sentence that suggests a
finding of "joint criminal intent,' 62' it nowhere points to any evidence
suggesting that Hussein Rashid shared Majid's genocidal intent. Case
law requires that genocidal intent be proven by a "surplus" of intent.622
This clearly was not found.
On the other hand, the facts as found by the IHT could support a con-
viction for aiding and abetting genocide. To be responsible for "aiding and
abetting," it is sufficient to show that "'an accused knew that his own
acts assisted in the commission of genocide by the principal offender and
was aware of the principal offender's state of mind .... , ,623 Here, the
IHT did find that Majid had the requisite genocidal intent,624 and that
Hussein Rashid acted with an awareness of Majid's state of mind. Spe-
cifically, the IHT found that Hussein Rashid "reviewed... letter number
(4008), dated 1987 June 20, and realized the intention of [Majid to
commit genocide] .... 62 Given this finding, it seems implicit that Hus-
sein Rashid knew his acts assisted in the commission of the Anfal
(although the IHT should have expressly made such a finding).626 Ac-
cordingly, there would seem to be foundation for a conviction of aiding
and abetting genocide. As mentioned above, the responsibility of an
Limaj Trial Judgment, supra note 255, 513
620. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, $ 84 (noting that a "type 1" joint
criminal enterprise requires shared intent).
621. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 755 ("[T]he court finds
[Hussein Rashid] criminally responsible for perpetrated acts via contributing in a joint crimi-
nal intent with other group of convicts, through a joint criminal plan .... ").
622. Staki6 Trial Judgment, supra note 184, 520 ("Genocide is a unique crime where
special emphasis is placed on the specific intent. The crime is, in fact, characterized and dis-
tinguished by a 'surplus' of intent.").
623. Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 1 730. The Tribunal's findings might also
have provided foundation for a finding of "common purpose" responsibility. For a discussion
of the "common purpose" doctrine, see supra note 229.
624. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Majid's genocide convictions).
625. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 747; see also id. at 754 (page
754 is erroneously labeled as a second page 757) ("[Hussein Rashid] admitted attending regu-
larly the planning meetings of Al-Anfal which were held in Kirkuk, on 1988 April, where a
discussion and a study for AI-Anfal plans were laid down in detail[], including the usage of
Special Ammunition (Chemicals) .... ").
626. For aiding and abetting genocide, additionally, it must be shown that "[t]he aider
and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage or lend moral support to
the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wanton de-
struction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial effect upon the
perpetration of the crime...." Vasiljevi6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 234, 1 102. Here, the
Tribunal's findings as to Hussein Rashid's role in participating in planning the Anfal Opera-
tions, and supplying forces with maps, specific locations, and resources, would likely suffice.
See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 767, 750. Of course, such findings
should have been expressly made.
[Vol. 30:305
Winter 2009] Guide to Iraqi High Tribunal's Anfal Judgment
627aider and abettor is considered lesser than that of a co-perpetrator. Ac-
cordingly, if Hussein Rashid's responsibility is seen as that of, or akin to,
an aider and abettor, his sentence arguably is too stringent.
3. Hussein Rashid's Crimes Against Humanity Convictions
The Trial Chamber also convicted Hussein Rashid of two counts of
crimes against humanity based on the underlying crimes of murder628 and• 629
extermination. Based on the facts as found by the Tribunal, it appears
that Hussein Rashid's convictions for crimes against humanity are fairly
sound, even if not well-articulated.60 Although the IHT does not perform
the required analysis of individual criminal responsibility, the elements
of joint criminal enterprise responsibility appear present in the Tribunal's
findings. Finally, because the IHT previously found, and this Article pre-
viously examined, the chapeau requirements for crimes against
humanity, it does not do so again here.63'
First Underlying Crime: Willful Killing
The IHT based its finding that killings occurred on the fact that "the
military troops aimed fire from their different weapons toward Kurdish
villages, starting with light weapons, [moving to] artillery and rocket
launchers, [and] ending with helicopters and aircraft[] which [bombed]
the villages with conventional and chemical weapons.' 632 As to Hussein
Rashid's role in the killings, the IHT found that he attended "all meet-
ings regarding planning or organizing" the Anfal c . 633 Iing reardng ni  r niin  t  campaign. n his
627. See supra notes 484-485.
628. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 766.
629. Id. at 774.
630. See caveats supra note 98.
631. See supra Part II.B.3 (examining the chapeau elements of crimes against humanity
in the discussion of Majid's conviction). The part of the chapeau that is defendant-specific-
showing that Hussein Rashid's acts were part of the attack and that Hussein Rashid knew of
the context in which his acts occurred-was found:
[Hussein Rashid] was aware that his actions were part of a large-scale and methodi-
cal attack against civilian residents through the huge military forces used for that
attack against the Kurdish civilian residents during the [eight] Anfal . . . operations.
The government didn't spare the usage of any weapon by the military forces during
those attacks and the government used tens of thousands of soldiers in the attacks.
[Hussein Rashid] was [in] daily contact with the attacking military forces through
attending the planning meetings ... held at the Operations Department which [was]
headed by him or through the various official letters and correspondence that were
copied and sent to the Operations Department to let the [defendant know] about all
the military movements and [its] results against the Kurdish civilian residents.
Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 765.
632. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 758.
633. Id. at 759.
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testimony, Hussein Rashid also revealed that "all military plans were not
to be ... executed before being presented to the Operations Directorate"
(which was under Rashid's command), and that he and the Chief of
Army Staff briefed Sultan Ahmad about the A1-Anfal operation.63 In
separate testimony, Sultan Ahmad confirmed that plans would not be
executed unless discussed by the relevant Directorates.635 The IHT con-
cluded that Hussein Rashid "contributed in planning for Al-Anfal
,,636
operations.
As to premeditation or intent, the IHT found this requirement met
based on the fact that Hussein Rashid "contributed in planning for
A1-Anfal operations. '637 "[T]he Operations [D]irectorate that was under
the command of [Hussein Rashid] included six directorates, and each
had a particular mission to plan for the military operations": the
Organizing Directorate participated in planning; the Arming Directorate
organized the equipment; the Supply Directorate would provide human
resources; the Survey Directorate would prepare maps.638 The IHT
concluded that "[t]his entire operation indicates proof of premeditate[d]
murder ... .,,639 Accordingly, the elements of willful killing as an
underlying crime against humanity appear satisfied.
Second Underlying Crime: Extermination
As mentioned above, "extermination" is defined as either (i) the in-
tentional infliction of living conditions calculated to destroy the
population in whole or in part,6'0 or (ii) intentionally inflicted murder on
a mass scale.'4' Here, as to murder occurring on a mass scale, the IHT
relied on victim and witness statements that some villagers were arrested
and executed,62 while scores of others ended up in mass graves. 643 The
IHT concluded: "It is obvious that the military troops ... had carried
[out] a wide-range and methodical attack against the Kurdish civilian
inhabitants in the north of Iraq .... ,64 As a result, "thousands of civilian
inhabitants were killed and relocated, the same number of them were
transferred to . . . detention camps."645 As to Hussein Rashid's role, the
634. Id.
635. Id.
636. Id. at 760.
637. Id.
638. Id. at 760-61.
639. Id. at 761.
640. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 12/SecondB.
641. See Blagojevi6 and Joki6 Trial Judgment, supra note 144, 572.
642. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 768.
643. Id. at 769.
644. Id. at 773.
645. Id.
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IHT concluded that "some of the Anfal plans were prepared in the opera-
tions department headed by [Hussein Rashid] .... "646
As to Hussein Rashid's mental state, the IHT relied on his presence
at conferences in Kirkuk and meetings held at the armed forces general
command headquarters (where the use of chemical weapons against ci-
vilians was discussed) as evidence of his "intention. ' '64 7 It additionally
found that the living conditions imposed on the civilians were such that
would "cause the imminent eradication of a group of inhabitants"648-a
factor relevant to the mens rea of extermination.64 Accordingly, the ele-
ments of extermination as an underlying crime against humanity appear
roughly satisfied.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
Here, again, the IHT appears to suggest that there was a joint crimi-
nal enterprise, concluding that Hussein Rashid "participated with other
[defendants] in a joint criminal plan to boost the criminal activity of the
former regime and to achieve its criminal purposes.""65 This time, the
conclusion that there was a joint criminal enterprise appears warranted.
As previously discussed, the IHT's findings are that (i) a group of indi-
viduals was involved in creating and executing the Anfal operations;
(ii) the Anfal operations constituted a joint criminal plan to attack and
kill civilians in "prohibited zones" in Kurdish areas of Iraq; and
(iii) Hussein Rashid participated in planning the Anfal operations in that
"some of the Anfal plans were prepared in the operations department," of
which he was the head.65" ' The remaining requirement for a "type 1" joint
criminal enterprise is that Hussein Rashid shared the intent to commit
the joint criminal plan.6 ' The Tribunal's conclusions that Hussein Rashid
possessed intent as to both willful killing and extermination would ap-
pear to satisfy this requirement if the joint criminal plan is defined
646. Id.
647. Id. at 770.
648. Id.
649. See Blagojevi6 and Joki Trial Judgment, supra note 144, 572 (noting that the
mens rea element for the crime of extermination requires "the intent to kill persons on a mas-
sive scale, or to inflict serious bodily injury or create conditions of life that lead to the death in
the reasonable knowledge that such act or omission is likely to cause the death of a large
number of persons... ." (emphasis added)).
650. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 774 (emphasis added); see also
id. at 765 (finding that Hussein Rashid was "criminally responsible ... through his participa-
tion in a criminal intent [sic] along with [a] group of people").
651. Id. at 773.
652. See Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, 1 84.
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narrowly enough.6"3 Thus, the elements of crimes against humanity ap-
pear roughly satisfied.654
4. Hussein Rashid's War Crimes Convictions
The Trial Chamber additionally convicted Hussein Rashid of two
war crimes: (i) intentionally directing attacks against the civilian popula-
tion6- 5 and (ii) intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated
to religious or educational purposes or against hospitals and places
where the sick and wounded are collected.656 Based on the facts as found
by the Tribunal, it appears that Hussein Rashid's war crimes convictions
are justified. 7 While the IHT again provided limited analysis of
individual criminal responsibility, the elements of joint criminal enter-
prise responsibility again appear present. Because the chapeau
requirements for war crimes have already been examined,656 this Article
will not do so again here.
First Underlying Crime: Intentionally Directing Attacks Against the
Civilian Population
The IHT relied on victim and witness testimony to find that civilians
were attacked, concluding that "it was proved that these victims were
civilians[:] most of them were women, children, elderly and farmers and
had no relation [to] the conflict that was taking placed in Kurdistan." 66
653. See Krsti6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 146, 20 ("The proof of the mental state
with respect to the commission of the underlying act can serve as evidence from which the
fact-finder may draw the further inference that the accused possessed the specific intent to
destroy."); Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 706.
654. See caveats supra note 98.
655. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 783.
656. Id. at 788-89.
657. See caveats supra note 98.
658. See supra Part II.B.4.
659. As to the one chapeau requirement that is defendant-specific-that Hussein Rashid
was aware of the factual circumstances that established the existence of armed conflict--this
appears to have been established. The Tribunal found:
[Hussein] Rashid ... had a complete knowledge about the details of the events that
were happening, through his awareness of [various documents discussed], whereas
we proved that he [planned] or participated in the planning of al Anfal operations
and was attending all meetings and conferences that also planned and prepared for
that operation[].
Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 783; see also ICC Elements of Crimes,
supra note 146, art. 8(2)(a)(i) (requiring for war crimes committed during internal armed con-
flict that "[t]he perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the existence
of an armed conflict").
660. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 780. Although there were also
military targets (Peshmerga), the way in which the attacks occurred suggests that the civilian
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The IHT also noted that "artillery rockets, shells of multiple launchers[,]
and bombs" do "not differentiate between a civilian and a fighter."'"
Additionally, the Tribunal found that Hussein Rashid willfully made
the civilian population the object of attack, concluding that he "knew the
factual circumstances in all eight [Anfal] operations" and "planned or
participated in the planning of all Anfal operations .... The IHT also
found that Hussein Rashid bears "responsibility [for] premeditated mur-
der [for] executing attacks against civilian inhabitants ... [who] were
not directly participating in.. . military acts.",
663
Second Underlying Crime: Intentionally Directing Attacks Against
Buildings Dedicated to Religious or Educational Purposes or Against
Hospitals and Places Where the Sick and Wounded Are Collected
As to this crime, the IHT concluded, based on victim and witness
testimony,6 6 that the Anfal campaign involved destroying villages that
"contained schools, mosques, and infirmaries ... ."66' The IHT addition-
ally relied on documentary evidence referring to "removing all the
villages" and destroying all buildings in each village. 666 The IHT further
stated that it "did not find any evidence to [prove] that these protected
buildings [had lost their legal protection]. 667 Moreover, the IHT found
that the participants in the joint criminal plan, including Hussein Rashid,
"intended to target and to direct attacks against protected property."
668
casualties could in no way be explained as "collateral damage." As explained in Kordi6 and
Cerkez:
It is ... accepted that attacks aimed at military objectives, including objects and
combatants, may cause "collateral civilian damage." International customary law
recognises that in the conduct of military operations during armed conflicts a dis-
tinction must be drawn at all times between persons actively taking part in the
hostilities and civilian population and provides that [a] the civilian populations as
such shall not be the object of military operations, and [b] every effort be made to
spare the civilian populations from the ravages of war, and [c] all necessary precau-
tions should be taken to avoid injury, loss or damage to the civilian population.
Kordi6 and Cerkez Appeals Judgment, supra note 91, 52.
661. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 780.
662. Id. at 783.
663. Id. (emphasis added).
664. Id. at 786-87.
665. Id. at 785-86.
666. Id. at 786 (citing Doc. No. 1182).
667. Id. at 788. The IHT also noted that "[i]t is not acceptable to base on or [invoke]
military necessit[y] as an excuse to target ... protected buildings, and it is not reasonable to
destroy all the protected buildings in thousands of Kurdish villages within the four northern
governorates, for warlike necessities." Id. This statement may confuse "military necessity,"
with the question of whether the buildings were used for military purposes.
668. Id.
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Individual Criminal Responsibility
The IHT appears to find that there was a joint criminal enterprise with
respect to both war crimes. While the IHT did not thoroughly analyze the
elements of joint criminal enterprise responsibility, based on the facts as
found by the Tribunal, they appear met.669 As to the first crime-directing
attacks against civilians-the IHT stated that Hussein Rashid "participated
in a criminal plan.., in order to boost the criminal activity or the criminal
purpose of the former regime and its military systems., 670 The IHT found
that there was "a joint criminal intention,"67' which appears to be a finding
of "shared intent" as required for a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise. 67 As
to the second war crime, directing attacks against protected buildings,
the IHT similarly found "that [Hussein Rashid] participated [in] his per-
sonal capacity in the joint criminal plan with all the other
[defendants] .,' 673 The IHT also found that the defendants "intended to
target, and to direct attacks against protected property,, 674 which would
roughly satisfy the "shared intent" requirement Accordingly, based on
the facts as found by the Trial Chamber, the elements of this war crime
676
also appear met.
E. Sabir Abd al-Aziz al-Douri
The Tribunal's convictions of al-Douri appear justified based on the
facts as found by the Trial Chamber.677 While he was not directly in-
volved as a key perpetrator, al-Douri was found to be instrumental in
both creating a study as to the possible use of chemical weapons, and
suggesting specific targets, including Peshmerga sites (legitimate mili-
tary targets) and Kurdish villages (illegitimate targets). The primary
concerns regarding his conviction-aside from the fair trial issues and
lack of adequate appellate review-are: (i) the genocide conviction does
not explain whether al-Douri was an aider and abettor of genocide or a
"co-perpetrator," which might have caused an error; and (ii) there appear
to be gaps in the analysis as to all three crimes of which he was con-
victed. On balance, however, the evidence, as found by the IHT, appears
669. For a more complete analysis of the elements of joint criminal enterprise responsi-
bility, see supra Part II.D.3 (discussing Hussein Rashid's convictions for crimes against
humanity).
670. A/ Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 782-83.
671. Id. at 783.
672. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, 84.
673. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 788.
674. Id.
675. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, 84.
676. But see caveats supra note 98.
677. See caveats supra note 98.
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to support a conviction as to all three crimes (although perhaps only as to
one of the two war crimes).
1. The Tribunal's Conclusions as to al-Douri's Role in the Anfal
Al-Douri was a Staff Major General and Director of the General
Military Intelligence Directorate during the Anfal. 678 He described his job
as "providing ... intelligence information [for] Military Operations!
6
19
Some of the key documentary evidence on which the IHT relied in con-
victing al-Douri include documents revealing the use of chemical
weapons against civilians. For example, al-Douri signed correspondence
indicating the intent of the General Military Intelligence Directorate to
comply with all of the instructions as to chemical attacks.60 He also
signed a letter concerning the possibility of using "special ammunitions"
and discussing the results of previous attacks. 68' In another document, al-
Douri recommends "examin[ing] the ability of the chemical weapons" and
suggests targeting locations that he considers to be a "refuge for Iran's
agents," including "Balisan basin, Tutma village, Khati village, Shaykh
Wasanan village, Qara Dagh basin, Takya village, Balak Jar village, [and]
Siwsinan village.' 682 Moreover, al-Douri signed correspondence detailing
the defensive measures taken by the Peshmerga and area residents to re-
duce the effects of the chemical weapons.683 Finally, al-Douri signed a
document tabulating the body count of not only "saboteurs," but also
"families" and "villagers."
In his defense, al-Douri argued that he had never suggested killing
681 686
civilians,685 that he never personally "committed" any of the crimes,
and that he acted with no "preconceived malice ' "67 Al-Douri also argued
that his actions took place in the context of the war between Iran and
Iraq; that all armies of the world have units that provide intelligence
678. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 790.
679. Id.
680. Id. at 794.
681. Id. at 791 (citing Doc. No. 5809, Mar. 10, 1987). When confronted with the letter,
al-Douri admitted that he signed the document, but stated that he did not recollect presenting
any suggestion regarding using special ammunitions in the Northern Area. Id.
682. Id. at 792 (citing Doc. No. U3\S2\6885, Mar. 25, 1987). Al-Douri again admitted
his signature but stated that he did not recollect suggesting that special ammunitions be used.
Id.
683. Id. at 857-58 (discussing Correspondence No. M5\U3\S2\8859, Apr. 30, 1987).
684. Id. at 879 (emphasis added) (citing Doc. No. M5\U3\S2\1 1325, June 10, 1988).
685. Id. at 795. This position seems contradicted by the documents signed by al-Douri
that discuss the targeting of villages, and the anti-chemical procedures taken by Peshmerga
and "the residents." See, e.g., id. at 884 (discussing Correspondence No. M5/U3/S2/8859).
686. Id. at 810. This argument ignores the fact that one may incur criminal responsibility
without personally committing crimes.
687. Id. at 811.
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about enemy troop positions; that Military Intelligence had no compe-
tence to make military decisions in carrying out operations; and that
plans were pursued to defend Iraq from Iranian forces and forces that
supported them, not to kill Kurdish civilians.688 Al-Douri admitted that he
selected targets for the armed forces, but testified that he was providing
information about enemy headquarters. 689 Additional arguments made by
al-Douri included: (i) one cannot be convicted of something that is not a
crime at the time;69° (ii) a soldier cannot be interrogated about legal du-
ties; 69' (iii) the Tribunal was wrong to refuse his requests to present
defense witnesses and a military expert; 692 and (iv) he "was a soldier who
abided by his professional duties."693 He also claimed that he refused to
obey orders to identify locations suitable to be bombed by special weap-
694
ons.
The IHT does not appear to address each of these arguments-as it
arguably should have-although some appear necessarily rejected by the
Trial Chamber's factual findings. The IHT expressly concluded that al-
Douri gathered information on activities that took place in the Northern
Area and submitted it to the military authorities, so that they could carry
out military operations. 69' Based on documents and testimony, the IHT
also concluded that it was al-Douri who "presented information and
plans''696 in a study on the use of internationally prohibited special am-
munitions in the Northern Area.697 "The study ... included many
recommendations such as the use of chemical weapons, [and] continua-
tion of strikes, specifying the place and date of strikes as well as the
targets ... to be bombarded by chemical weapons."'6 98
2. Al-Douri's Genocide Convictions
The Trial Chamber convicted al-Douri of two counts of genocide
based on (i) killing members of the group; and (ii) causing serious bodily
688. Id. at 812-13. A1-Douri was cut off from fully making arguments about the Iran-
Iraq war context, which may be an additional fair trial problem. Id. at 813.
689. Id. at 815.
690. Id. at 820.
691. Id. at 821.
692. Id. at 824. For a discussion of the fair trial problems related to the lack of defense
witnesses, see supra Part I.C.
693. Id. at 827.
694. Id. at 828.
695. Id. at 802.
696. Id. at 795.
697. Id. at 795, 803.
698. Id. at 803. A1-Douri admitted to conducting the study but argued that he was just
following orders from a superior. See id. at 814 (reporting al-Douri as saying, "Is there any
soldier... [who] can disobey a military order?").
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or mental harm to members of the group. 69 Based on the facts as found
by the Trial Chamber, it appears that al-Douri might have been convicted
either as an aider and abettor of genocide or as a co-perpetrator°0 How-
ever, it is unclear on which theory the IHT in fact relied.
First Underlying Crime. Killing Members of the Group
The IHT does not directly examine the elements of the first underly-
ing crime (or does not do so clearly). However, the Tribunal's findings
do seem to contain the required elements. The IHT found that (i) mur-
ders occurred during the Anfal campaign, (ii) al-Douri made suggestions
that villages should be targeted,'' and (iii) the murders were "premedi-
tated."'7  Accordingly, all of the required elements appear to be met.
Furthermore, al-Douri's claims that he only suggested military targets7 3
seems inconsistent with the documents suggesting that al-Douri knew
that villages,7 0 residents, and families were being targeted, although the
IHT should have made such findings expressly.
Second Underlying Crime: Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to
Members of the Group
As to the second underlying crime, the IHT primarily relied on al-
Douri's study regarding the use of chemical weapons, in which he "tack-
led the usage of different chemical weapons (Sarin, Valon, and Mustard
[Gas]) by all available methods; artillery, air force, and army aviation
through Anfal operations., 70 5 The Tribunal also relied on a document in
which al-Douri suggested targeting villages in the Balisan Basin and
Qara Dagh Basin areas.7 6 Finally, the IHT relied on the testimony of vil-
lagers who were maimed or whose family members were maimed or
707killed in the chemical weapons attacks. There can be little doubt that
the use of chemical weapons on residents of the Kurdish areas during the
Anfal caused "serious bodily or mental harm." Al-Douri's suggestions as
to the targeting of particular villages also undoubtedly caused some of
699. Id. at 859.
700. See infra Part Il.E.2; see also caveats supra note 98. Because this Article has al-
ready examined the Tribunal's findings as to the chapeau requirements for genocide, it will
not discuss them separately here. See supra Part II.B.2; see infra Part fl.E.2 (analyzing the
IHT's findings as to al-Douri's mental state).
701. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 835 ("[T]hese frequent
attacks led to [the deaths of] many people living in the Kurdish villages.").
702. Id. at 840.
703. Id. at 815.
704. See id. at 840 (citing Doc. No. U3/$2/6885, Mar. 25, 1987); id. 857-88 (citing Doc.
No. M I/U3/S2/19330).
705. Id. at 844.
706. Id. at 845.
707. Id. at 846-55.
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the suffering.7 8 Furthermore, documents signed by al-Douri certainly
suggest intentional targeting of villages. Thus, while the IHT's analysis
leaves a good deal to be desired, the findings tend to suggest that the re-
quired elements of these two underlying crimes were proved.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
Additionally, a form of individual criminal responsibility is required.
The IHT did not expressly convict al-Douri of any particular form of
individual responsibility, but did specify that the convictions were under
Article 11(e) of the IHT Statute, which covers "complicity in geno-
cide.,, 709 "Complicity in genocide" has been interpreted to cover both
"accomplice" responsibility (as in a co-perpetrator) as well as "aiding
and abetting" responsibility.
7 0
If by convicting al-Douri of "complicity in genocide" the IHT in-
tended to find al-Douri responsible as a "co-perpetrator," then it would
generally need to show that he possessed genocidal intent.7  If the
"complicity" conviction is intended to suggest that al-Douri was an
"aider and abettor," it would suffice that "'an accused knew that his own
708. See, e.g., id. at 820 (citing Doc. No. U3/$2/6885, Mar. 25, 1987). The IHT also
found that al-Douri "did not only specify the targets and the locations-which were mostly
safe villages inhabited by civilians .. . [a]nd order[] the Air Force or the Army Aviation ... to
attack the villages by Special ammunition .... He was also interested to know the results of
these attacks and their affected volume." Id. at 857 (emphasis added). The mention of "order-
ing" raises the possibility that it might have been an additional form of responsibility.
709. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 11 (e).
710. The ICTY stated in Brdanin:
According to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal and of the ICTR, complicity in
genocide under Article 4(3)(e) can consist of aiding and abetting genocide, al-
though ... there may be other acts which are not strictly aiding and abetting but
which could amount to complicity. The Appeals Chamber has held that "the terms
'complicity' and 'accomplice' may encompass conduct broader than aiding and
abetting."
Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 729; see also Blagojevie and Joki Trial Judgment,
supra note 144, 776 ("[C]omplicity has generally been broadly conceived as a form of sec-
ondary liability[,] and as such, it covers various heads of responsibility listed under Article
7(1).").
711. The ICTY has explained:
[Tihere is authority to suggest that complicity in genocide, where it prohibits con-
duct broader than aiding and abetting, requires proof that the accomplice had the
specific intent to destroy a protected group. Article 4 of the Statute is most naturally
read to suggest that Article 4(2)'s requirement that a perpetrator of genocide pos-
sess the requisite "intent to destroy" a protected group applies to all of the
prohibited acts enumerated in Article 4(3), including complicity in genocide. There
is also evidence that the drafters of the Genocide Convention intended the charge of
complicity in genocide to require a showing of genocidal intent.
Krsti6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 146, 142.
[Vol. 30:305
Winter 2009] Guide to Iraqi High Tribunal's Anfal Judgment
acts assisted in the commission of genocide by the principal offender and
was aware of the principal offender's state of mind .... The IHT
seems to vacillate between these positions.7 3
As to the theory that al-Douri himself possessed genocidal intent, the
IHT appears to rely on a variety of documentary evidence7 1 1 suggesting
that al-Douri was involved in the decision to use chemical and other
weapons against both Peshmerga forces and villagers. The IHT also
looked to the fact that al-Douri took no measures to avoid targeting civil-
ians,75 which the Tribunal suggested indicated "that the accused had
intention to commit genocide. ,7 6 The IHT further concluded that al-
Douri's study and suggestions encouraging the use of chemical weapons
against Kurdish nationalists, "with his awareness that it is a lethal and an
internationally prohibited weapon, is obvious evidence of his criminal
intention to destroy the Kurdish people totally or partially.,7t 7 Both of
these positions may involve a leap of logic. However, if one credits the
Tribunal's factual findings, they appear to conclude that al-Douri himself
possessed genocidal intent.
As to the theory that al-Douri aided and abetted genocide, the IHT
suggested that one can infer the genocidal intent of the primary
712. As the ICTY has explained:
Complicity in genocide, where it consists of aiding and abetting genocide, does not
require proof that the accomplice had the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a protected group. In[stead] ... the Prosecution must prove beyond reasonable
doubt "that an accused knew that his own acts assisted in the commission of geno-
cide by the principal offender and was aware of the principal offender's state of
mind; it need not show that an accused shared the specific intent of the principal of-
fender."
Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 730. For aiding and abetting genocide, it must also
be shown that "[t]he aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to assist, encourage
or lend moral support to the perpetration of a certain specific crime (murder, extermination,
rape, torture, wanton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a substantial
effect upon the perpetration of the crime .... " Prosecutor v. Bla~ki6, Case No. IT-95-14-A,
Appeals Judgment, 45 (July 29, 2004) [hereinafter BlakiM Appeals Judgment].
713. The IHT at various points also suggested that al-Douri was a co-perpetrator in a
joint criminal enterprise and concluded that he participated "with other [defendants]" in a
"joint criminal plan." Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 871. That finding
suggests that the factual elements of a joint criminal enterprise were likely present. For the
factual elements of a joint criminal enterprise, see supra note 533.
714. AlAnfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 833-34, 856.
715. Id. at 858.
716. Id.
717. Id. at 856 (emphasis added). The IHT also makes various other findings in its dis-
cussion of genocide that appear directed at the intent requirement but seem to fall short of
meeting it. For example, the Tribunal states that "the accused did not exert any effort to distin-
guish between fighters or civilians" "didn't show any effort.., to avoid killing the civilians,"
and "was fully aware of the international prohibition of [chemical] weapons." Id. at 839. It is
unclear which legal conclusions the IHT is reaching based on these statements.
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perpetrators based on factors such as "the number of harmed
individuals[,] ... the person[s] or property ... target[ed], [use of]
insulting language towards the targeted group members, weapons' usage,
systemic way [in which the crimes were planned], and the [extend of]
the actual eradication."78 These standards appear to be based on ICTY
law.7 9 The IHT also examined whether the attacks were pursuant to a
"plan or policy," also a factor in inferring genocidal intent,72° and found
such evidence."' Additionally, the IHT relied on documents signed by al-
Douri regarding the use of chemical weapons72 that suggested that al-
Douri played a part in that plan. The IHT concluded that al-Douri "was
fully aware" of the primary perpetrators' intent to "commit[] the crimes
[oA] the previous regime.''72 These findings suggest that the primary
perpetrators possessed genocidal intent, and that al-Douri, knowing of
such intent, assisted them.
Thus, the Tribunal's findings are quite unclear as to whether it found
al-Douri to be an aider and abettor or a co-perpetrator of genocide. The
IHT should have made these distinctions because the responsibility of an
aider and abettor is generally regarded as less than that of a co-
perpetrator.724 Accordingly, if al-Douri was an aider and abettor, there
may have been a sentencing error. Also, this apparent vacillation as to
theory in and of itself suggests potential error.
3. Al-Douri's Crimes Against Humanity Conviction
The Trial Chamber also convicted al-Douri of willful killing as a
crime against humanity. 725 The chapeau requirements for crimes against
718. Id. at 856. The IHT also considered factors such as "[t]he number of victims, corpo-
ral harm, the use of offensive language to targeted individuals, the methodical way [in which
plans were followed], the relative degree of the actual destruction, [and] the repetition, com-
patibility and methodology of the [attack]." Id.
719. See TRAHAN, ICTY DIGEST, supra note 228, at 155-56 (summarizing cases that
describe the factors for inferring "intent to destroy").
720. The ICTY Appeals Chamber explained in Krsti6:
[T]he existence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide.
While the existence of such a plan may help to establish that the accused possessed
the requisite genocidal intent, it remains only evidence supporting the inference of
intent, and does not become a legal ingredient of the offence.
Krsti6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 146, T 225 (internal quotations omitted).
721. AlAnfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 834 (citing Doc. No. 160).
722. Id. at 856.
723. Id. at 830 (emphasis added).
724. See TRAHAN, ICTY DIGEST, supra note 228, at 441 (discussing cases that support
the proposition that "responsibility of an aider and abettor is less than a participant in a joint
criminal enterprise").
725. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 871.
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humanity have been examined above 726 and will not be re-examined
here.727
War Crime: Willful Killing
As to willful killing, the IHT concluded that al-Douri caused the
deaths of one or more people because he instructed armed forces to at-
tack villages.7 2 The Tribunal also found that al-Douri's actions in this
respect were "premeditated. 7 29 These findings roughly satisfy the ele-
ments of willful killing, although it would have been helpful had the IHT
addressed al-Douri's arguments that appear related to this crime.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
As to individual criminal responsibility, the IHT referred to al-Douri
as "contributi[ng] in implementing a joint criminal plan with other [de-
fendants]., 730 As discussed above, there seem to be ample findings to
support the conclusion that there was a joint criminal enterprise,' and
the IHT here found that al-Douri contributed to implementing the crimi-
nal plan.732 In evaluating whether the underlying crime of willful killing
occurred, the IHT also found the killings to be "premeditated." 733 While a
"type 1,, 7 14 joint criminal enterprise requires a showing of shared intent to
726. See supra Part II.B.3.
727. The parts of the chapeau that are defendant-specific appear to be met. The IHT
concluded that al-Douri's acts were part of the attack, based on documents revealing perma-
nent contacts between al-Douri and the General Military Intelligence Directorate on the one
hand, and the "forces which carried out the attack[s]" on the other. Al Anfal Trial Chamber
Judgment, supra note 2, at 869. The Tribunal also concluded that al-Douri knew of the wider
context in which his acts occurred, based on documentary evidence that "contained sugges-
tions and instructions directed to military establishments ... which launched systematic large
scaled attacks against civil inhabitants ... [that were] headed at the time by [al-Douri]." Id. at
870.
728. Id. at 861.
729. Id.
730. Id. at 871.
731. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Majid's individual criminal responsibility for
genocide).
732. The IHT also found that al-Douri's actions were premeditated based on the fact that
"he did not exert any remarkable effort" to prevent or punish the crimes committed in the
Anfal operations. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 871. This conclusion
seems to confuse joint criminal enterprise (where preventing and punishing crimes is irrele-
vant) and command responsibility (where preventing and punishing crimes is relevant). Where
a superior knew or had reason to know that a crime was about to be or had been committed by
troops under the superior's effective command and control, command responsibility imposes a
duty to prevent and/or punish the crimes. See, e.g., Kordi and Cerkez Appeals Judgment,
supra note 91, 839. The IHT, however, made no attempt to show that al-Douri had command
and control over troops, nor did it mention command responsibility.
733. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 861.
734. For discussion of a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise, see supra note 234.
Michigan Journal of International Law
commit the joint criminal plan,735 the Prosecution need not establish that
"every participant agreed to every one of the crimes committed.""' 6 Ac-
cordingly, it is possible that the finding of premeditation regarding
killing would suffice for individual criminal responsibility if the parts of
the plan in which al-Douri was said to have been involved were articu-
lated narrowly enough. Thus, while the Tribunal's analysis again leaves
much to be desired, the elements of willful killing as a crime against
humanity appear roughly satisfied.73
4. Al-Douri's War Crimes Convictions
Al-Douri was also convicted of two war crimes: intentionally direct-
ing attacks against the civilian population..8 and destroying the property of
an adversary. 79 This Article will not re-examine the chapeau requirements
for war crimes, other than to note that the elements that are defendant-
specific appear met.74°
First Underlying Crime: Intentionally Directing Attacks Against the
Civilian Population
As to this crime, the IHT relied on victim and witness testimony of
civilians who were attacked and who saw family members and other ci-
vilians killed by conventional or chemical weapons during the Anfal
operations.74 ' The Tribunal also relied on documentary evidence, includ-
ing one document signed by al-Douri, that tabulated body counts and
indicated that families and villagers were attacked.742 While various
documents clearly also show an intent to target Peshmerga (a valid tar-
get), as a matter of law, the presence of non-civilians within the targeted
population does not change the nature of the attack for the purposes of
735. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, 84.
736. The ICTY Trial Chamber has explained:
[W]hile a JCE [joint criminal enterprise] may have a number of different criminal
objects, it is not necessary for the Prosecution to establish that every participant
agreed to every one of the crimes committed. However, it is necessary for the
Prosecution to prove that, between the member of the JCE physically committing
the material crime charged and the person held responsible under the JCE for that
crime, there was a common plan to commit at least that particular crime.
Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, $ 264 (emphasis added).
737. See caveats supra note 98.
738. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 872-82.
739. Id. at 883-96.
740. As to showing al-Douri's knowledge of the facts establishing the existence of armed
conflict, the IHT found that requirement met by relying on various documentary evidence. See
id. at 892, 882.
741. Id. at 873-79.
742. Id. at 879 (citing Doc. No. M5/U3/S2/11325).
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this war crime, provided that those attacked are "predominantly civil-
ian. 71 3 The IHT did not examine whether this test had been met-a gap
in its analysis-but the evidence clearly suggests that a very large num-
. 744
ber of civilians were killed during the operations.
As to causation (or substantial contribution) and intent, these re-
quirements would appear met based on the Tribunal's conclusion that
al-Douri "premeditatedly caused, through a joint criminal plan" the at-
tacks against civilian inhabitants during the Anfal.74 5 The Tribunal's
decision would have been stronger had it acknowledged that al-Douri
was clearly also specifying Peshmerga targets, and reached a conclusion
consistent with that fact. For example, the IHT could have pointed to
documents suggesting a willingness to eradicate large numbers of
Kurdish villages and villagers, even if there was also intent to target
Peshmerga.
Second Underlying Crime: Destroying the Property of an Adversary
Regarding its findings as to the second war crime, the IHT relied on
a document, copied to the General Military Intelligence Directorate, dis-
cussing (i) the "[e]limination of all villages and houses within one
village since ... one or more houses was left [from previous cleansing
operations]"; (ii) directions to "destroy and eliminate" various Kurdish
villages; and (iii) reports on the burning of villages and scattered
houses.746 As to al-Douri's intent, the IHT concluded that he "premedi-1 47
tated" the destruction, citing numerous documents sent to the General
Military Intelligence Directorate and Intelligence Services. At least one
of these documents, reporting on the demolition of villages, was signed
• •748
by al-Douri.
As already discussed above, there is an issue of whether the IHT
found that the destroyed property was that of an "adversary" as the crime
requires. 741 If that is read to mean a "military adversary"-and logic sug-
gests such a reading, because civilians are not "adversaies"-then that
743. Strugar Trial Judgment, supra note 240, 282.
744. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 501 (noting that estimates of
civilian deaths reach as high as 182,000).
745. Id. at 882.
746. Id. at 886 (citing Doc. No. 1122, Aug. 21, 1988).
747. Id. at 893.
748. Id. at 893-95. As to the lack of military necessity, the IHT concluded that "war
operations did not make destroying those properties or seizing them a necessity." Id. at 892. It
also characterized the destruction as a "scorched earth policy." Id.
749. For the elements of the war crime of destroying or seizing the enemy's property, see
supra note 402.
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element has not been shown.75° Accordingly, it is unclear if the elements
of this crime were satisfied.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
While, once again, the IHT did not specifically state al-Douri's form
of individual responsibility, it did state that he "participated with other
suspects in a joint criminal [enterprise]" to perpetrate law of war viola-
tions, and that he followed "a joint criminal plan" in targeting civilians
for attack.7 1' This language suggests that al-Douri was found to be a par-
ticipant in a joint criminal enterprise. As mentioned above, the factual
requirements of joint criminal enterprise responsibility appear to be
met,112 and the IHT here found that al-Douri contributed to implementing
the criminal plan. Because the IHT concluded that there was premedita-
tion as to both war crimes, those findings would arguably suffice to show
shared intent if the "type 1" joint criminal enterprise were narrowly de-
fined.753
Thus, although the Tribunal's analysis is far from clear and has some
gaps, al-Douri's convictions generally appear supported by the factual
findings of the Trial Chamber.7 " As to the genocide conviction, the IHT
should have been more specific as to whether it was based on aiding and
abetting genocide or co-perpetration. Because the responsibility of an
aider and abettor is generally regarded as less than that of a
co-perpetrator,75 this lack of clarity could have impacted on al-Douri's
sentencing, and the vacillation as to legal theory also suggests legal
error. It is also unclear whether one of the war crimes, destroying the
property of an adversary, was shown.
F. Farhan Mutlaq al-Jaburi
The Tribunal's conviction of al-Jaburi for genocide appears to be
supported by the facts found by the Trial Chamber.7 6 While al-Jaburi
was not directly involved as a key perpetrator, the IHT found that he
provided intelligence that assisted the Anfal campaigns. The primary
750. See, e.g., Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 594 (discussing de-
struction of villages and villagers' property).
751. Id. at 872, 883.
752. See, e.g., supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Majid's individual criminal responsibility for
genocide).
753. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, 84 (noting that a "type I" joint
criminal enterprise requires shared intent).
754. See caveats supra note 98.
755. See TRAHAN, ICTY DIGEST, supra note 228, at 441 (discussing cases that support
the proposition that "responsibility of an aider and abettor is less than a participant in a joint
criminal enterprise").
756. See caveats supra note 98.
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concern regarding his conviction is that although the IHT suggested that
al-Jaburi was a "contributor" or "collaborator," it does not further iden-
tify his particular form of responsibility-such as aiding and abetting or
co-perpetration of a joint criminal enterprise.757 Arguably, this failing
may have had an adverse impact on al-Jaburi's sentence. While there are
gaps in the Tribunal's legal analysis, the factual findings generally sup-
port a conviction of aiding and abetting genocide and participating in a
joint criminal enterprise as to crimes against humanity.
1. The Tribunal's Conclusions as to al-Jaburi's Role in the Anfal
The IHT found that al-Jaburi was Director of the Northern Intelli-
gence System and then Director of the Eastern Intelligence System
effective November 2, 1987.758
Some of the key evidence on which the IHT relied in convicting
al-Jaburi includes documents discussing destroyed villages,7 9 field exe-
cutions without trial,7' ° detention of families, TM and the use of chemical
weapons, including against village residents . The IHT also relied on
the testimony of defendants al-Douri, Hussein Rashid, and Sultan
Ahmad that al-Jaburi was "in charge of transferring families[,] including
children, women and elders[,] from their villages to the Northern Or-
ganization Office. '763 Al-Jaburi denied that role.M Defendant Majid also
testified that the Eastern and Northern Zones' Intelligence Systems were
under al-Jaburi's authority and received orders from Majid.765
Three witnesses testified on behalf of the defendant, one as a charac-
ter witness, and two others testified that they never saw al-Jaburi commit
crimes. 766 Al-Jaburi's primary defense was that his role solely pertained
757. This is in addition to the fair trial issues and lack of adequate appellate review. See
caveats supra note 98.
758. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 917.
759. See id. at 901-02 (citing Doc. No. 384, signed by al-Jaburi, which includes a list of
villages destroyed within the Eastern System sector between October 15, 1987, and November
1, 1987).
760. Id. at 902, 919 (citing Doc. No. 1289, also signed by al-Jaburi, which regards carry-
ing out field executions against "criminals" without trial). AI-Jaburi confessed that field
executions were carried out without trial, but stated that this was pursuant to Majid's orders.
Id. at 919.
761. Id. at 903 (citing Doc. No. 15055, signed by al-Jaburi, which discusses the deten-
tion of two families that took refuge in a prohibited zone and were transferred to a Security
Directorate).
762. Id. at 902, 921 (citing Doc. No. 13613, issued by the Eastern Zone's Intelligence
System, which regards chemical weapons attacks conducted on the Balisan Area that killed
both "saboteurs" and village residents).
763. Id. at 918.
764. Id. at 911.
765. Id. at 907.
766. See id. at 915-16.
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to gathering information."' As to his intentions, al-Jaburi argued that he
was only "following orders.""76
The IHT ultimately found that al-Jaburi's duties were "to survey
hostile and Kurdish villagers' activities" and "to provide sufficient in-
formation about targeted villages. 769 Specifically, the IHT found that "he
used to provide detailed information and reports on targeted villages,
enemy's positions, number of forces, type of weapons, and results of
chemical and conventional weapons' attacks over villages and Kurdish
fighters [Peshmerga,] identifying the points of strength and weakness."77
He also "monitored the movements of families, [and] submitted informa-
tion regarding victims and [those] injured by chemical weapons."77 ' The
IHT also found that al-Jaburi was aware of the Anfal plans,772 and was
"in charge of sending Kurdish villagers to [the] North[ern] Organization
Office, supervising interrogations, executing detainees and notifying [de-
fendant Majid] about all details. 773
2. A1-Jaburi's Genocide Conviction(s)
The IHT convicted al-Jaburi of killing as a form of genocide.7 He
may have also been convicted of causing serious bodily or mental harm
as a form of genocide, but this is unclear, as there is a discrepancy be-
tween the body of the Trial Chamber judgment-which states that al-
Jaburi was convicted on both counts775-and the final summation of the
convictions-which states that he was only convicted of the underlying
crime of killing.
7 76
The key flaw of al-Jaburi's conviction is that the IHT convicted him
under Articles 15(1) and 15(2) of the IHT Statute (which cover all forms
of individual responsibility), rather than selecting the appropriate form.777
Notwithstanding, it appears that al-Jaburi's conviction for genocide has
foundation if one accepts the Tribunal's factual findings.778 While the
IHT, in discussing al-Jaburi, does not separately address whether or not
767. See id. at 912.
768. AI-Jaburi testified that he was "doing his job" and that "no one dares to refuse
[Majid's] orders." Id. at 911.
769. Id. at 917.
770. Id.
771. Id.
772. Id. at 921.
773. Id. at 918.
774. Id. at 922.
775. Id.
776. Id. at 943.
777. IHT Statute, supra note 12, arts. 15(1), 15(2).
778. See caveats supra note 98.
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genocide occurred, the facts clearly suggest that it did.779 The part of the
Trial Chamber judgment discussing al-Jaburi also does not appear to
analyze the elements of genocide's underlying crimes at issue. This is
somewhat troubling, but there is little doubt that the crimes did occur
during the Anfal campaign. Those findings have also been previously
analyzed in this Article.
Individual Criminal Responsibility
As to individual criminal responsibility, the Trial Chamber con-
cluded that there was no "direct evidence[]" of criminal intent to commit
genocide, that is, al-Jaburi had no intent to partly or completely eradicate
Kurdish nationals.78 ' Rather, because his role was to gather information
and submit it to defendant al-Douri, and there was no evidence of al-
Jaburi's participation in decision-making, the IHT concluded that
• 782
al-Jaburi "contributed" to committing genocide. The judgment also
refers to him as "collaborating" in committing genocide.78 ' The IHT
found that "by helping in targeting and providing information after
launching attacks," al-Douri "facilitate[d] and helped the continuation of
the ... attacks and murder."
784
Al-Jaburi's form of responsibility, might, for example, appropriately
be characterized as that of an aider and abettor. For aiding and abetting
genocide, the law requires that
[t]he aider and abettor carries out acts specifically directed to as-
sist, encourage or lend moral support to the perpetration of a
certain specific crime (murder, extermination, rape, torture, wan-
ton destruction of civilian property, etc.), and this support has a
785
substantial effect upon the perpetration of the crime ....
This standard arguably would be met by the Tribunal's factual findings.
The Trial Chamber found that al-Jaburi provided "detailed information
and reports on targeted villages, enemy's positions, number of forces,
type of weapons, and results of chemical and conventional weapons' at-
tacks over villages and Kurdish fighters [Peshmerga] identifying the
points of strength and weakness,"786 and concluded that he "vastly helped
779. See supra Part II.B.2 (analyzing Majid's genocide conviction). For a discussion of
Al-Jaburi's own mental state, see infra Part H.F.2.
780. See supra Parts II.B.2, II.C.2, II.D.2, II.E.2 (analyzing genocide's underlying
crimes in relation to Majid, Sultan Ahmad, Hussein Rashid, and al-Douri).
781. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 919.
782. Id. at 920.
783. Id. at 922.
784. Id. at 920.
785. Blagki6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 712, 45.
786. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 917.
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committing genocide. 787 This would seem to roughly satisfy the re-
quirements of both assisting and that the assistance had a "substantial
effect" on the perpetration of the crimes.
As to the mental state for aiding and abetting genocide, "an individ-
ual who aids and abets a specific intent offense may be held responsible
if he assists the commission of the crime knowing the intent behind the
crime., 78  Here, the IHT found that al-Jaburi was aware of the Anfal
plans 89 and that he "knew that the attacks were not military-conventional
ones."790 The IHT also concluded that he was "fully aware and acknowl-
edged that his acts contributed to the crime., 79' This appears again to
roughly satisfy the legal requirements.
Accordingly, it appears that the Trial Chamber's factual findings
support al-Jaburi's conviction of genocide. However, by finding al-Jaburi
guilty of genocide and not aiding and abetting genocide, a sentencing
error may have resulted. As noted above, there is law that "aiding and
abetting is a form of responsibility which generally warrants a lower sen-
tence than is appropriate to responsibility as a co-perpetrator.' 792 Because
the IHT never articulated its reasoning for sentencing al-Jaburi to life in
prison rather than death, it is unclear whether it considered this lesser
responsibility. It is also possible that his lesser sentence reflects that he
was convicted on fewer counts than the other convicted defendants. Ar-
guably both factors, as well as the fact that he acted under orders,793
should have been reflected in his sentence.
3. Al-Jaburi's Crimes Against Humanity Convictions
The Trial Chamber also convicted al-Jaburi of willful killing and de-
portation or forcible transfer of population as crimes against humanity.
94
These convictions seem reasonable based on the facts found by the Tri-
bunal. 795 The primary problem again appears to be the limited legal
analysis of individual criminal responsibility. This Article will not re-
examine the chapeau requirements for crimes against humanity here,
787. Id. at 922.
788. Krsti6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 146, 140.
789. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 921 (citing Doc. Nos. 4008
and 3650).
790. Id. at 922.
791. Id.
792. Vasiljevi6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 234, 182; Krsti6 Appeals Judgment,
supra note 146, 268 (noting that the same standard applies under ICTR law and in many
national jurisdictions).
793. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 911 (summarizing al-Jaburi's
testimony).
794. Id. at 944.
795. See caveats supra note 98.
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other than to note that the requirements that are defendant-specific ap-
pear to have been roughly satisfied as to al-Jaburi.796
First Underlying Crime: Willful Killing
As to this first underlying crime, the IHT relied on reports submitted
by al-Jaburi regarding the targeting of villages and the results of conven-
tional and chemical weapons attacks.797 It also relied on its finding that
al-Jaburi knew of the Anfal operations, and was "fully aware of [Ma-
jid's] orders to launch systematic large scaled attacks against Kurdish
civilians, killing those residing in prohibited zones., 798 The IHT addition-
ally found that al-Jaburi "was aware" that the chemical weapons, by
nature, did not "differentiate between a civilian and [a] fighter."7 99 The
IHT concluded that al-Jaburi
played a direct role in making the attacks easier for the army
where he provided intelligence reports concerning the nature and
efficiency of attacks' locations, analyzing hostile forces' stance,
their points of weaknesses and strength. Even though he did not
recommend the use of chemical weapons, he gave reports on
their efficiency. Based on that, he is considered as contributor in
achieving the criminal result.. .. o
The IHT concluded that "based on [al-Jaburi's] participation," he "pro-
vided help and encouragement" for launching "systematic wide scaled
attacks against Kurdish civilians in Northern Iraq, using conventional
and chemical weapons."8°'
Based on these facts found by the Trial Chamber, it seems that the
elements of the underlying crime-specifically, (i) murder; (ii) causation
or substantial contribution;0 2 and (iii) intent°-were met. The IHT
found that many Kurdish men, boys, women, children, and elderly were
796. Specifically, the IHT found that al-Jaburi's acts "provided help and encouragement
for the attacks." Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 920. Furthermore, the facts
as found by the Tribunal seem to suggest that al-Jaburi knew of the wider context in which his
acts occurred. The IHT found that al-Jaburi was "fully aware" of Majid's "orders to launch
systematic large scaled attacks against Kurdish civilians, killing those residing in prohibited
zones." Id. at 926. It also concluded that al-Jaburi "played a very essential and important role
in making the operation successful." Id.
797. Id. at 924.
798. Id. at 926 (referring to the operations as articulated in Doc. Nos. 4008 and 3680).
799. Id.
800. Id.
801. Id. at 927.
802. For a discussion of the "substantial contribution" requirement, see supra note 195.
803. For a full articulation of the elements, see supra Part II.B.3.
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murdered as part of the Anfal campaign. 4 As to whether al-Jaburi's ac-
tions were a substantial cause of some of the deaths, that appears met
based on the Tribunal's conclusion that al-Jaburi "played a very essential
and important role in making the [Anfal] operation successful."' 5 As to
mental state, the IHT concluded that, based on his role, al-Jaburi had
"intentions to launch a systematic large scaled wide-range attack," and
that murder was "premeditated."' 6
Second Underlying Crime: Deportation or Forcible Transfer
Based on the IHT's finding that al-Jaburi's role included transporting
Kurdish civilians to Northern Organization Office,0 7 the IHT concluded
that he was also responsible for deportation or forcible transfer as a
crime against humanity.0 8 The IHT appears also to offer an alternative
theory that even if al-Jaburi were not involved in displacements, because
of his role in facilitating the attacks using chemical and conventional
weapons, displacement was "expected as a possible logical conse-
quence."'s°
To show forcible displacement, it is necessary "that the displacement
takes place under coercion"-that is, "where the persons concerned had
no real choice."' sl Here, entire villages of individuals in so-called "prohib-
ited zones" were displaced under conditions that clearly indicated that the
alternative of staying would likely lead to death. Moreover, defendants al-
Douri, Hussein Rashid, and Sultan Ahmad all testified that al-Jaburi was
involved in transporting Kurdish villagers to the Northern Organization
Office."1' A document signed by al-Jaburi, which discusses transfer of
two families from a prohibited zone, would seem to provide further sup-
port."' Accordingly, it is clear that displacements occurred and that they
were not permissible under international law.
804. Elsewhere in the Trial Chamber judgment, the IHT noted that "some sources esti-
mated Al Anfal victims to reach 182 thousand[]."Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra
note 2, at 501. It found that more than 3,000 villages were destroyed and that there were "tens
of thousands of victims" Id. at 501.
805. Id. at 926.
806. Id.
807. Here, the IHT accepted the testimony of defendants al-Douri, Hussein Rashid, and
Sultan Ahmad that al-Jaburi was involved in transporting Kurdish villagers to the Northern
Organization Office, id. at 918, and rejected al-Jaburi's denial of responsibility, id. at 912.
808. Id. at 928-29 (page 929 is erroneously labeled as a second page 517).
809. Id. at 929 (page 929 is erroneously labeled as a second page 517). Convictions,
however, should not be made in the alternative. A court is supposed to definitively determine
what has occurred.
810. Brdanin Trial Judgment, supra note 147, 543.
811. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 918.
812. Id. at 903.
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Individual Criminal Responsibility
With regard to both crimes against humanity convictions, the IHT
convicted al-Jaburi under Articles 15(1) and 15(2) of the IHT Statute
(i.e., all forms of responsibility)," ' thereby again failing to identify any
particular form of responsibility. The IHT also does virtually no analysis
of individual criminal responsibility. At one point, the IHT characterized
al-Jaburi as a "contributor";81 4 this suggests that the IHT may have found
him to be a co-perpetrator of a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise." 5 At
another point, the IHT stated that he provided "help," "encourage-
ment, '' 116 and "support[], 81 7 which suggests aiding and abetting
responsibility. Again, because co-perpetration is generally seen as more
serious than aiding and abetting,88 the failure to be more definitive could
have caused a sentencing error (at least under international standards)." 9
When analyzing the situation as a joint criminal enterprise (which,
on balance, appears to be what the IHT suggests), the necessary ele-
ments appear present. Here, (i) the plurality of persons would be the five
convicted defendants plus added individuals; (ii) the IHT found that
there was a "joint criminal plan";82° and (iii) the IHT found that al-Jaburi
"participated in [the joint criminal plan by] killing civil[ian] residents
[who were] Kurds."82'
As to the mental state, for a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise, thatrequres har  " 122
requires shared intent, which might be as limited as shared intent to
commit one crime.12' Accordingly, it is possible that the findings of
"premeditated murder" as to willful killing24 and a finding of "joint
criminal initiation"825 which presumably means "joint criminal intent,"
as to deportation or forcible transfer, would suffice for individual crimi-
nal responsibility if the part of the plan that al-Jaburi was said to have
been involved in were articulated narrowly enough.
Alternatively, the IHT also suggested that displacement was a "nor-
mal and predictable consequence[] of using chemical and conventional
813. Id. at 927, 929 (page 929 is erroneously labeled as a second page 517); see IHT
Statute, supra note 12, arts. 15(1), 15(b).
814. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 926.
815. For discussion of a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise, see supra note 234.
816. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 927.
817. Id. at 929 (page 929 is erroneously labeled as a second page 517).
818. Vasiljevi6 Appeals Judgment, supra note 234, 73.
819. See supra note 420.
820. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 926.
821. Id. (finding that al-Jaburi acted under orders issued in Doc. Nos. 4008 and 3650).
822. Krnojelac Appeals Judgment, supra note 338, 84.
823. See supra note 736.
824. Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 926.
825. Id. at 929 (page 929 is erroneously labeled as a second page 517).
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weapons. 826 This suggests a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise . 21 One
would also need a finding that al-Jaburi took the risk that displacement
might occur by participating in the Anfal campaign, which again seems
to be a reasonable conclusion based on the facts found by the Trial
Chamber (although one not explicitly made). Accordingly, it also seems
possible that there was a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise.
Thus, the Tribunal's most significant failing is not characterizing al-
Jaburi's role as warranting any particular form of responsibility. Al-
Jaburi's genocide conviction(s) appear(s) to be supported by the factual
evidence as found by the Trial Chamber, but the conviction(s) arguably
should have been for aiding and abetting genocide. As to the two crimes
against humanity convictions, they appear to have foundation if willful
killing is evaluated as a "type 1" joint criminal enterprise, and deporta-
tion or forcible transfer is evaluated as a "type 1" or "type 3" joint
criminal enterprise, although that vacillation suggests legal error. Given
that an aider and abettor generally is seen to bear less responsibility
than a perpetrator, the Tribunal's failure to differentiate between co-
perpetration and aiding and abetting genocide may have had an
erroneous impact on sentencing. An argument could be made that if al-
Jaburi were an aider and abettor of genocide, then because he acted un-
828der orders, and because he was convicted on fewer counts than any of
the other convicted defendants, his sentence of life in prison is too strin-
gent.
In conclusion, many of the Trial Chamber's convictions appear to be
sound. Given the standard of proof of "beyond a reasonable doubt,"
some of the flaws noted in this Article suggest that certain of the convic-
tions, however, should not stand. In the future, the IHT should be more
precise as to which form of individual criminal responsibility it is find-
ing and whether the requisite mental state was established by the
evidence. The IHT should also not present alternative theories as to part
of its convictions, but reach definitive conclusions. Again, given the fair
trial issues that exist, as well as the flaws in appellate review,829 this Arti-
cle does not necessarily suggest that even as to convictions where all of
the elements of the crimes were established, the convictions should nec-
essarily stand. Ideally, a mechanism would be found so that there could
be genuine appellate review of the trial.
826. Id. Again, the IHT should not make findings in the alternative.
827. For discussion of a "type 3" joint criminal enterprise, see supra note 342 and ac-
companying text.
828. See Al Anfal Trial Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, at 911 (summarizing al-
Jaburi's testimony).
829. See supra Part IC; see infra Part III.
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III. THE CASSATION CHAMBER JUDGMENT
After the Trial Chamber rendered its decision in the Anfal case, both
sides had thirty days to file appellate briefs.83° Not long thereafter, on
September 4, 2007, the Cassation Chamber rendered its decision, affirm-
ing all convictions on all counts. This Article has two primary concerns
with the appeals process. First, after this extremely complex trial and
extremely lengthy Trial Chamber judgment, a mere thirty days to file
appellate briefs was palpably inadequate. Second, the quality of the
Cassation Chamber judgment does not suggest that there was any serious
legal review.
A. Inadequate Time for Filing for Appeal
The thirty-day time period given to appeal appears to be wholly in-
adequate, and potentially a violation of the right to an appeal and the
right to adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a defense.
"The right to adequate time and facilities to prepare the [defense] applies
both to the accused and their lawyer at all stages of the proceedings, in-
cluding before the trial and during any appeals."83' What constitutes
"adequate" time depends on the nature of the proceedings and the factual
circumstances of a case.832 "Factors to be taken into account include the
complexity of a case, the defendant's access to evidence, the time limits
provided for in domestic law for certain actions in the proceedings,
etc. 833
The Anfal case was extremely complex. It put at issue multiple
charges of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, regarding
defendants who played different roles in the Anfal campaign. The
complexity of filing appellate briefing was only increased by the fact that
the Trial Chamber judgment was repeatedly opaque as to which form of
individual criminal responsibility it found. Moreover, the Trial Chamber
judgment on which the appeal was based was 963 pages in length,
covering a trial that lasted fifty-nine days, with a voluminous trial
830. See IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 16 ("The Tribunal shall follow the rules of
procedure provided for in the Criminal Procedure Law 23 of 1971 and the Rules of Procedures
and Evidence appended to this Law"); Iraq Code of Criminal Procedure, supra note 72, art.
252(A) (stating that a petition for appeal must be presented "within a period of thirty days,
starting from the day after the judgement was issued").
831. AMNESTY INT'L, FAIR TRIALS MANUAL 8.1 (1998) [hereinafter FAIR TRIALS MAN-
UAL], available at http://www.amnesty.org/enIlibrary/asset/POL30/002/1998/en/dom-POL
300021998en.pdf.
832. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUM. RTS., WHAT Is A FAIR TRIAL? A BASIC GUIDE To LE-
GAL STANDARDS AND PRACTICE 16 (2000), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pubs/
descriptions/fairjtrial.pdf.
833. Id. (emphasis added).
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transcript8 3 To compound matters, there appears to have been a delay in
getting the Trial Chamber judgment to defense counsel, so that they did
not in fact have access to the judgment for the entire thirty-day period.
B. The Lack of Serious Review Suggested by
the Cassation Chamber Judgment
The Cassation Chamber judgment also appears to have been the
product of a rushed review process that failed to seriously grapple with
substantive and procedural issues. While the Cassation Chamber judges
did issue a written decision (twenty-eight pages in length), 35 the decision
primarily recites the convictions against each defendant; lists some, but
not all, of the arguments raised on appeal by the defendants; and recites
what appear to be the Trial Chamber's conclusions as to the role that
each defendant played with respect to the Anfal campaign. The judg-
ment, however, does not seriously grapple with the procedural and fair
trial challenges presented, examine the elements of any of the crimes or
individual criminal responsibility, or respond to a plethora of the defen-
dants' arguments raised on appeal. This lack of serious appellate review
may have risen to the level of a violation of the right to review by a
higher tribunal.836
The IHT Statute suggests that the appellate review will cover: (i) er-
rors of law; (ii) errors of procedure; and/or (iii) material errors of fact
837that led to a violation of justice. Here, there appears to have been no
"genuine review." The Cassation Chamber Judgment commences with an
eight-page recitation of the convictions reached by the Trial Chamber.83
It then recites some-but by no means a11839--of the arguments raised on
834. At the ICTY and ICTR-both of which adjudicate similarly complex cases-the
time provided to defendants to file for appeal is considerably longer. The ICTY and ICTR
require that a notice of appeal be filed within thirty days after the judgment is pronounced.
This notice need only identify the "grounds of the appeal," Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda, Rules
of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 108, U.N. Doc. ITR/3/Rev.1 (June 29, 1995) [hereinafter
ICTR Rules of Evidence and Procedure] (emphasis added), or the "order, decision or ruling
challenged, and the substance of the alleged errors and the relief sought." Id. (emphasis
added). An appellant's brief setting out all arguments must be filed within seventy-five days
after the notice of appeal at the ICTY, meaning 105 days in total, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the For-
mer Yugoslavia, Rules of Evidence and Procedure, Rule 1 1 (a) U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.38 (June
13, 2006), or within ninety days of the "certification of the trial record by the Registrar" at the
ICTR, ICTR Rules of Evidence and Procedure, supra, Rule I11.
835. Al Anfal Cassation Chamber Judgment, supra note 19, at 2-10 (Iraqi High Trib.
2007) [hereinafter Al Anfal Cassation Chamber Judgment].
836. The right to review by a higher tribunal has been construed to require a "genuine
review of the issues in the case." FAIR TRIALS MANUAL, supra note 831, at 26.3.
837. IHT Statute, supra note 12, art. 25.
838. Al Anfal Cassation Chamber Judgment, supra note 19, at 2-10.
839. For example, Sultan Ahmad raises approximately thirty-six arguments in his appel-
late brief. See Brief for Sultan Hashim Ahmad, Al Anfal, Case No. l/CSecond/2006, Cassation
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appeal by the defendants.m Furthermore, the substance of the Cassation
Chamber decision occupies fourteen pages.8"' While this Article does not
suggest that the merits of a decision should be judged based on length
alone, potential errors in a 963-page judgment cannot possibly be ad-
dressed in fourteen pages. The Cassation Chamber never examines the
chapeau requirements of the three crimes-genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity-although it occasionally recites some of the
language pertinent to the chapeau in passing, but without giving any
sense that the Cassation Chamber judges realized the importance of
these chapeau elements. It mentions some of the underlying crimes, but
again, without any reference to their elements. It does very little exami-
nation as to individual criminal responsibility, and the limited analysis it
does provide leaves one guessing as to what form of individual criminal
responsibility the Cassation Chamber thought the Trial Chamber had
found and whether or not the elements had been shown. The Cassation
Chamber devotes a single paragraph to fair trial issues-cursorily dis-
missing issues (i) as to the legitimacy of the tribunal, (ii) that defense
witnesses and experts did not testify, and (iii) as to the adequacy of the
charges-in a few sentences each. It is thus palpably inadequate in many




It is exceedingly difficult to conduct document- and witness-
intensive trials regarding extremely complex crimes, involving multiple
defendants, and complicated standards of individual criminal responsi-
bility, especially when the judges have not had prior experience in
adjudicating such cases. That said, it appears that there were both nu-
merous fair trial problems associated with the Anfal trial, and that the
Trial Chamber judges crafted a fairly well done Trial Chamber judgment
supported by the evidence. There are two primary faults with the Trial
Chamber Judgment, 2-10 (Iraqi High Trib. 2007) (on file with author). However, the Cass-
ation Chamber lists only three of them. Al Anfal Cassation Chamber Judgment, supra note 19,
at 11. Similarly, Hussein Rashid raises a large number of arguments in his appeal papers. See
Brief for Husayn Rashid Mohammed, Al Anfal, Case No. l/CSecond/2006, Cassation Cham-
ber Judgment, 2-10 (Iraqi High Trib. 2007) (on file with author). However, the Cassation
Chamber notes approximately four of them. Al Anfal Cassation Chamber Judgment, supra
note 19, at 11.
840. Al Anfal Cassation Chamber Judgment, supra note 19, at 10-12.
841. Id. at 13-27.
842. The type of review of the Trial Chamber judgment that this Article has attempted-
while undoubtedly imperfect-suggests the type of review that the Cassation Chamber should
have attempted.
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Chamber judgment. The Trial Chamber judges: (i) did not seriously ad-
dress fair trial issues; and (ii) should have analyzed individual criminal
responsibility more carefully, making clear which form of responsibility
they found. Despite these criticisms, as to most counts, the required ele-
ments appear present in the Tribunal's factual findings-although this
Article suggests that as to the defendants other than Majid, the genocide
convictions arguably should have been for aiding and abetting genocide
because the IHT never found (or consistently found) that the other de-
fendants possessed the intent necessary for genocide. By contrast, the
Cassation Chamber judgment appears so flawed that it raises the issue of
whether serious review was intended or attempted, or whether the Cass-
ation Chamber may have, in effect, been acting politically and not as a
judicial review chamber.
The Anfal campaign was an extraordinarily brutal one conducted by
the Iraqi regime against its Kurdish citizens. The significance of the An-
fal trial is difficult to overstate. Senior leaders of the regime were forced
to face justice for horrific crimes. These trials presented an historic op-
portunity to create a solid record of the crimes, and bring at least some
measure of justice to the victims. Unfortunately, the danger of trials not
fully conducted pursuant to international fair trial standards is that they
subject the verdict to lingering questions: Was the trial fair? Was justice
achieved? The fact that the Trial Chamber judgment and Cassation
Chamber judgment both fail to deal seriously with fair trial issues was a
lost opportunity to put some of these fairness questions to rest. The lack
of serious appellate review also undermined the largely solid work that
was put into the Trial Chamber opinion. Victims who testified were
clearly given a voice, and official listeners-the IHT judges-gave them
their due. Unfortunately, however, because the IHT has no outreach pro-
gram, and it is unlikely that many members of the public will read the
963-page Trial Chamber judgment, the achievements (and failings) of
the trial will also be obscured. The victims deserve that the public know
about these crimes by the former Iraqi regime, and deserve the creation
of a solid historical record, free from doubt. It is hoped that the victims
will feel at least a degree of solace in knowing that at least some justice
was done through the Anfal trial, despite its flaws.
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APPENDIX: OVERVIEW OF THE CONVICTIONS
As explained in detail in this Article, and subject to caveats previ-
ously discussed regarding unresolved fair trial problems and lack of
adequate appellate review that leave lingering problems as to all convic-
tions, this Article concludes:
As to Ali Hassan al-Majid: The Tribunal's factual findings sug-
gest that he was basically the "architect" of the entire Anfal
campaign. He was responsible for two seriously incriminating
documents-Document Nos. 4008 and 3650-which set forth
the plan to commit most of the Anfal crimes. Furthermore, the
Tribunal's findings as to his intentions appear to be amply sup-
ported by audiotape played at trial in which he discusses using
chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds.43 The facts found by
the Tribunal support the Tribunal's legal conclusion that geno-
cide occurred, and that the three underlying crimes of genocide
as to which Majid was convicted occurred. In terms of individual
criminal responsibility, the facts also appear to support Majid's
convictions for committing genocide as a participant in a joint
criminal enterprise and ordering genocide. The three underlying
crimes (and thus three counts of genocide) as to which he was
convicted were: killing members of the group, causing serious
bodily harm to members of the group, and intentionally inflict-
ing upon the group conditions calculated to destroy the group in
whole or in part. His crimes against humanity convictions (will-
ful killing, extermination, deportation or forcible transfer,
imprisonment, torture, enforced disappearances, and other in-
humane acts) appear well-founded, as do four of the five war
crimes convictions (intentionally directing attacks against the ci-
vilian population, ordering the displacement of the civilian
population, intentionally directing attacks against protected
buildings, and pillage).'
As to Sultan Hashim Ahmad: The Tribunal found that he
commanded the 1st Corps troops who perpetrated part of the
Anfal campaign. 5 This Article suggests that as to his genocide
843. The Tribunal's findings as to Majid's role in the Anfal are detailed more thoroughly
in Part II.B.I.
844. This Article has some questions as to whether the elements of "destroying or seiz-
ing the property of an adversary" were proven. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, this
Article does not advocate that the death penalty be implemented as to any defendant.
845. The Tribunal's findings as to Sultan Ahmad's role in the Anfal are detailed more
thoroughly in Part H.C.I.
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conviction, based on the facts found by the Tribunal, and, in
particular, the Tribunal's findings as to mental state, his genocide
convictions should have been for aiding and abetting genocide
because, on balance, the Tribunal appears to have found that it
was Majid who possessed genocidal intent, and, knowing of that
intent, Sultan Ahmad nonetheless knowingly participated in the
Anfal. Three of the five crimes against humanity convictions
also appear to have foundation (willful killing, imprisonment,
and other inhumane acts). This Article, however, does find flaws
with the crimes against humanity convictions based on
deportation and extermination. Two of the four war crimes
convictions appear to have foundation (intentionally directing
attacks against the civilian population and intentionally directing
attacks against protected buildings). This Article, however, has
concerns regarding the war crime of ordering the displacement
of the civilian population, as the Tribunal's reasoning appears to
vacillate as to which form of individual criminal responsibility
was found. As to the final war crime (destroying or seizing the
property of an adversary), an element of the crime may not have
been proven. Because (i) certain of Sultan Ahmad's convictions
appear flawed, (ii) under international legal standards (made
relevant under the IHT Statute), the responsibility of an "aider
and abettor" is less than that of a co-perpetrator, and (iii) Sultan
Ahmad invoked the defense of "following orders," which
permits mitigation of punishment, imposition of the death
penalty is not warranted.
As to Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti: The Tribunal found that Hussein
Rashid, as former Chief of Army Staff's Deputy for Military
Operations, participated in planning and providing supplies for
the Anfal operations.46 This Article suggests that the death pen-
alty seems too severe compared to the sentence of the other
defendants because (i) the evidence suggests that his role was
more comparable to that of defendants al-Douri and al-Jaburi,
who were given life sentences, and (ii) Hussein Rashid invoked
the defense of "following orders." As to genocide, the facts as
found by the IHT, and, in particular, the Tribunal's findings as to
mental state, suggest that his convictions should, at most, have
been for aiding and abetting genocide. There does, however, ap-
pear to be foundation for his two crimes against humanity
convictions (murder and extermination), and his two war crimes
846. The Tribunal's findings as to Hussein Rashid's role in the Anfal are detailed more
thoroughly in Part i.D.I.
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convictions (intentionally directing attacks against the civilian
population and intentionally directing attacks against protected
buildings).
As to Sabir Abd al-Aziz al-Douri: The Tribunal found that al-
Douri, as former Staff Major General and Director of the Gen-
eral Military Intelligence Directorate, provided intelligence
regarding the Anfal campaign.' 7 There is a lack of clarity as to
whether the Tribunal found that he aided and abetted genocide
or was a co-perpetrator. If he was an aider and abettor, there
could have been a sentencing error. (The ambiguity alone also
potentially suggests error.) The fact that he invoked the defense
of "following orders" also suggests mitigation could be war-
ranted. While the Tribunal's analysis has some gaps, the one
crimes against humanity conviction (willful killing) appears to
have foundation, and at least one of the war crimes convictions
appears to have foundation (intentionally directing attacks
against the civilian population). As to the war crime of destroy-
ing or seizing the property of an adversary, an element of the
crime may not have been proven. Any error as to the convictions
should be considered regarding his sentence.
As to Farhan Mutlaq al-Jaburi: The Tribunal found that al-
Jaburi, as former Director of the Northern and then Eastern In-
telligence Systems, provided intelligence regarding the Anfal
campaign.!" This Article suggests that, based on the facts as
found by the Tribunal, and, in particular, the Tribunal's findings
as to mental state, the genocide conviction(s) again should have
been characterized as aiding and abetting genocide. The crimes
against humanity convictions (willful killing, and deportation or
forcible transfer) appear to have foundation (although the IHT's
vacillation as to legal theory suggests possible error as to the lat-
ter conviction). Because (i) al-Jaburi was at most an aider and
abettor of genocide; (ii) he invoked the defense of "following
orders"; (iii) he was convicted of fewer counts than any of the
other convicted defendants; and (iv) there may have been an er-
ror as to one of those convictions, his sentence of life in prison
appears too stringent.
847. The Tribunal's findings as to al-Douri's role in the Anfal are detailed more thor-
oughly in Part I.E.1.
848. The Tribunal's findings as to al-Jaburi's role in the Anfal are detailed more thor-
oughly in Part I.EI.
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Because the Cassation Chamber judgment did not seriously review any
of these issues, this Article has attempted to perform something akin to
appellate-level analysis.
